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Prefaee
Rescarchingand IITil inghislory isa complex and lengthy process and one of
the dangers is thm rescarch fiJx:lingsare not publisbedor are not published in
approprime publishing outlets. Publicmion of historical IWrk is crucial to
maintaining a vibrant academic discipline. Thepublishing landscape has lu:n
tmnsformed in the last few years v.ith Irish, English. American and
continental European presses receptive to Irish material. Hov.ever, in the
current c1imatev.here tirst. resmrdl ma:ricshave been accepted by miversity
leaders and second, the consensus in the historiml profession in lrelatd. that
there is no hienrchyofpublishing houses and academic journals in Ireland
andelsel\here and that commercial projects such as Thomson Reuters IS!
Web of Knov.ledge database is. according to Canny, 'methodologically
msoWld v.here humanities disciplines arc concerned'. researchers at all
levels should give m uch thought to the placement ofbooks, anicles. chapt ers
and reviev.s. This is partia..tlarly appositetoresearchtts in Irish history I\ho
are prolific and play a significant role in elocid.'1ting the distinctive Irish
dimension tothe natimal past and present. Their material may not ahluys
find a home in an ISI journal. Consequently, it behOl'esestOOlished historians
to resist the ske\lingof Irish historical scholarship by the adoption of this
commercially drivCll prodoct in Irish mivasities. Historians accept that all
research must be assessed for its quality. [t is how books are received by
peers in the profession, rather than as Canny notes 'the imprint of the
publisher that dctennines Iwrth. 'This volume includes contributions from
scholars in the UnivlTsityofLOI1doo, University ofYock. London School of
Economic, Trinity College Dublin. University of Limerick. University
College Cork, NUl Maynooth. University College Dublin. It provides
invaluable insights into Irish. English, Belgian and international history from
the medieval to late tv.entielh century.
I commend the collection and congratulate the University of Limerick
History Society foc its support of the journal. TheofteIKlegleeted role of the
editor and editorial panel should be recognised also. They condoct a vital
activity in the resea-eh process and ensure continuity ofoutput, The journal
editors. Mr Paul M. Hayes and Mr Freyne Corbett have maintained high
production and scholarship values in volwne t\-elve of the journal.
Ikrnadette Whelan M.A. Ph.D.
Head, Department of History
University of Limerick
Ackuowletlgmel1 IS
The editors \\()u1d like 10 thank Dr. Bem:d::tte Whelan. Head, Dcpllnmdlt of
History, for her generous sponsorship and encouragement, and her
predecessor Mr Raymond Friel. Without v.hich this volume \\Uuld not be
published. Professor Tom Lodge, Dean of Ihe College of Humanit ies al1d
Professor Brian Fitzgerald, Vice President Research. Univer.;ity of Limerick
v.ho also providcdvaluable financial assistam:e. Wc arc indelxcd to Dr Davu
Flemingfor his advice and help in preparil1gthis volume. My thanks also go
10 the contributing authors for thdr patience.
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Foreword
The UnivCl"sityofLimcrid: Histt:l"y Society is delighted tosee the continuing
vitality of History Studies. The Society isjustly proud of the fact that its
journal remains theonlyjourrol in Ireland edited and managed by SlOOents
and has published 12 volumes. A central aim of the Sodet)· is to provide a
vehicle through "flich younger scholars can see their \\Qrk in print.
While funding the journal isa maller fur concern in a period of shortage and
cutbacks. the Society is hopeful that the support it receives from its
bcnefactt:l"s can be sustained intothc futme. In this regard, \1(' arc delighted
to acknowledge the continuing financial aid provided by the Department of
History, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences,
and the Office of the Vice President. Research, \\;thout "hich History
Studies could not be produced.
Scamus Kearney
Editorial
ram pleased to present a diverse set of essays in volwne t\\,\'lve of His/ory
Sl1ufies. Th.: high num1Jf'r of submissions shows the abundance of
postgraduate history researchers \lUrking at this time. Many exceptional
essays \lere rejeet.:d \\hol1y on thebasis of a lack of&-pace. The essays in this
journal are from contriblnors across Britain and Ireland, encompassing a
\\;de range of topics. From 13 ~ ccnlury\\mfare to political violmce in Cork
in the first decade of the 20'" centlD'Y, various political themes are also
evident spanning a nllm1Jf'r ofcOl.UlIrics. The diversity of submissions sho\\s
the strcngthofpostgraduate resc:rch \\;thinthe Wliversitieson these islands.
Paul Hayes
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The report of friar John of Piano Carpini:
Analysis of an intelligence gathering mission conducted on
behalf of the Papacy in the mid thirteenth century
Stephen Bennctl
Qui seclllldos opw/ 'memus, dimicel or/e, 'lOll casll. /
Intelligence can be detined as the product of analysis of refined and collated
data.1 Ideally drawn from a variety of sources, Intelligence should aim to
answer the decision maker's specific infonnation requirements and unlock
the deeper processes at work in the target system. The requirement for
intelligence is clear in Vegetius' lk re milirari. With some 260 surviving
Latin manuscripts it has been presented as the principle wori< on military
doctrine of the age. J What evidence is there, however, ofth.: ideas outlined in
De re militari being applied in practice?
This paper will consider the reliability and value of a report on the
Mongol Empire in the mid thirteenth ccntury written by I'ranciscan Friar
JolUl of PIano Carpini for Pope Innocent IV. In doing so this paper will
attempt to highlight that Carpini's report was packed with meticulous and
precise military data, even if at times it lacked insight into causality: This
goes some way 10 demonstnlling the advaJlCed nature of intelligence
gathering in the Middle Ages was in line \\ith Vegctiusian doctrine.
Bctwe.:n 12]7 and 1Nl the Mongols had surged westwards,
subjugating th.: Rus' and defeating the forces of Poland, Moravia and
Hungary before withdrawing.l Analysing the nature of the MOIlgolthreat was
'V<i'~"'" D< '< mJli,,,,;. pc<fac. '0 Book III ... C. SaLlll<kn, F, uSa",.f><! N. Th<>...... leds). Wrlu"ll
11',..-, M«IWl'IJl U"rory',<'pon>t< Id """fan (C.mboid~.~0lJ.I).
1 C.........OM",i"')' of DefeJl<O. .1<>;,,, 1,,"II~nc< 1),><"1",, lOt..'.... 200». pp 1-11
'C. AIIm<>f><!. 'no: /)f,~ mmuvl ofVegeliu... ,lie Mlddle JI.iI<o.TJd R.,...j'.......' in Sa"1'Jers.. t-"
Sa"" ond Thom.. (<do). WrlUng War, pp t5_28.
• John of Plo.., C"",ini. 'Hislory of'b<: Moog.o!s' in Th.! ,\w.@~ ..I>tl<>n: oorrothv,",", 1",,<,. qfth<
Fr"<>el''''''' ..wl""",;", /" Mongolia at'" Chi"" In ,h< I~;"..rnh """ fi_t~.rnh "rn.,;.,. ,""'- • OWl
ofS'anbrook Abbey. cd, c. 0."',"",( Ne" York,19lS). pp 18. 22-4. 29.
, D. Mori'" 71N' ,I/oogo/>. 2nd cd"ioo (O,furd. :>001). p, 12~.
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• priority for Pope Innocent TV at the First COI.JllCil of L)'OllS in 1245.· For
this be required timely, accurate and cogent information. Although some
(wenty year1li had passed since: the first Mongol nids into Gcofgia and Russia.
little ",-as kl1O"'n of the Mongols. their culture. rdigious beliefs or miliuuy
intentions.' Owing the course of the Council, Innocent IV san three sep3nltc
embassies to the Mongols; t",o Dominican missioos under Andrew of
Longjurneau and Frill/' Ascelin respe<:tivdy. and a Franciscan mission under
Carpini. Peter Jackson argues persuasively that the infonnation required of
them drew from the questioning of a Rus' cleric at the Council in June, In
addition. the routes assigned to each embassy matched routes threatcned by
Mongol annies. and that this can hardly have been a eoiocidence. Two
information requiraroenu ",-ere e\'idently paramount; the religious beliefs of
!be Mongols and the military thrt'at they presmted to Christm<lom,' This
paper will f0CU5 on the laner.
In modem military inlelligence. the quality of data is judged by
the reliability of the souree and the \'llriety of other sources lbat can confinn
its validity. Carpini was a senior and IruSled figure: in the Franciscan Order
and had pla)'ed a leading role in its establishment in Western Europe." His
report of Novemhcr 1247 was the first detailed account of the Mongols to
reach Pope lnnoceru IV and he was the only Papal envoy to travel to
Mongolia and meet the Great Khan.'D Amidst the "'ealth of material provided
on Mongol society. history. politics. as well as the local topography. then:
was detailed infonnation on the Mongol army and the demands of
campaigning on !be steppe. Given lnnocmt's likely concerns ",ith the
Mongol milital) Ihreal. this paper "'ill f0CU5 on Carpini's rqJort on Mongol
"lbol.. P. HI,
'r"' th< ........_ ••lIilob1o ... _ IV_~__n.r~_......
(H......,. ;!OO'). p- 17,
'1b;d.. ppI7.91
·Corpini. '11;".",. "fib< M<Jr¥l .... P. 2: G, l.on<. (;0"1;"10 KJw" _ M~ nJ.(ltld........ lil.
2(04). p, 1:Hi: ............ M""l!iol•. pp 17·1,
"1b: earli<:51 inlO....-lionDh.1u< "'"tl'..,,,fhior.k>hn DfH~, So< M"rpn. M~J. p.l$l:
n.. ,"wlt>n,ojFrl<Jr 1I',lIh"" ofR~lKwt; huJ--)'I<> ,,,. C"""~,,,.Gr<'" /(h,m M"'W'., I:JJ·
I]'j. N. P Jo<._ "iI;h D. Motpn (L<>ndon. I 'l9O). p. 21: J.oct...... M""fI"h, p. 94.
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fighting power and compare it "'ith information drawn from other primary
In addition to dr.iwing from penonal obse.....ation. Carpini credited
Uungarians Md Rus' captives taken in the first Mongol mid of 1221·2 or,
more commonly. the campaign of 1237-42. Those who had learnt the Mongol
language. as "'ell as French or Lalin, were useful in providing 'bits of private
infornlalion about the Emperor', but also 'a thorough knowledge of
everything'.1I From the account ofCarpini's companion. 13enedict the Pole, it
is likely that details were also dra",n from Georgians ",ithin the Mongol
Empire.'l
In lerms of ChristiM sources. we can compare Carpini \\ith the
accounts of Innocent IV's other t...o ClIVO)'S and that of FrillT William of
Rubruck "'00 tnI,"clkd to Mongolia in 1253·5.1J Man:o Polo's (•. 125-4-1324)
accOllllI has had a mixed reception from historians. some of ",born doubt that
he t\CI1 "'enllO China." YeI, according to John Lamer. evidence that Polo
had intimllle contact ",ith !be Mongols is strong and ekmenls of his work are
useful to this shidy.
Perhaps the most conlplele Persian account of lite Mongols is that
of' Ala·ad-Din .AIa·Mulik Ju~'aini (1226-83). A s.:nior Muslim bureaucrat of
the Seljuqs and Kltorazm·Shahs, Juvaini was also a governor under the
I1khanid d)T1as1Y and "'role under their patronage." Rashid al·Din Hamadani
(1247.1318) "'role a key work on the llknanate, the Jam; a1-Ta...arikh
(Compendium of Ouonic1es). in the earl)' fourteenth cen.tury, also under
"C.,.,o. ·Hiooow) .rth<~', ",,,-
"_iddlol'Vl<..·Il.do<..·.n..~ nfl/.. F_
_ •• p.1U.
,'...- DflAn&io-"tcpotI io M....... hrW.c-..~.i. PI' I 1}.6, ':-__01
S_ do< §oft..()uonlio. ......... Df"," IIIIiooioo or Fr" A<a1io ID th< MDrc<>I.....,m Iloiju "" b<MIf
Dfhp<t"""""", 'V', V_ de: _'; ~ Hu--ioh, N. J Mo>noolin (IHJ). <>.1t><tSed. S,
Ri<honl ·S"".'" sa...Qu<nIin·, Hu <Jt. T"""', (P'-;'" I'l6n pp 'iof. I17. So< Morpo.
M~, pp 1'''7 and Jao~..,... .If""fl"h. ppI7.92•
.. F. Wood. [)jJ .11",...., P<>lo." '" Chi",,? (Oookl<r. 19%): J. Lamer••I~....'O P<>lo ,OJd l/or Ji.uo'''". of
,I>< "",1,1 (New H••~ 1_). pp '1·63, I7J·12: P. J""k...... 'Maroo Polo> onil hit ' ...-cb·. 8,,1I.,1~ '?!
,,,. !kloJo/ ~O<j""," and-V'f""" -"Jut/if•• 61.1 (1991), PI' 82· 101; oaJ. o.n. Zh<l>l. 'Smol! .....: , ,....
""'inri DfMoltD Polo>·,II ..lliDM', M",I"",~ ,..,,'" (h,lion I...... ). 124. I (2OO'>).pp l·ll.
"',,~l);n ''''''.ht.olil Ju,..inl &"pIs I:Jo... IIw ltU1or:>·~,1ot ....,..JJ~"""', ....... JA Il<>}'"
from1llo1d' DfMizro M~Qlln'ini (MMt_... 199n lIP ... i.....iv. '1~.I;L
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Mongol patronage.'· Bar Hebraeus (1226-86). a Syrian Jacobite clergyman
and author of Chronicon SyriacwlI provided a more objective view." Chinese
sources are gradually becoming available in translation. such as Zhao Hong's
Ret:ord of/he Mongnl,5 and Tar/ors. penned by the Chinese envoy in the mid
thirteenth century. the hum Shi and K.A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng's
work on the history of Liao. I1 Lastly there is a Mongol source, The Seerel
His/ory of the Mongols, which was probably wrilten in the mid thirteenth
century.'·
To consider Carpini's analysis 1Ne shall approach his report through
the three components of fighting power: conceptual. physical and moral. The
conceptual component is the thought process behind the ability to fight, such
as education, tactics, military training and decision-making. The physical
component is thc means to fight, including, equipment. Sllstainability,
manpov.er and collective pertbnnance. The moral component has three
fundamental elements: motivation, effective leadership, and sound
managemCllt.l(I
Starting "ith the conceptual component. Carpini's linkage of
Mongol military education to hunting techniques fitted a perception of the
Mongols as a nation that fought as it lived. Training began at an early age and
he "rote that:
T1>ey hunl and practice archery. for they are all, big and link excellent
arche",. and lheir children begin a, SOOn as they are hm nr th..:<: ~'eal"S old
"Morpn. ,1/OIW>i', p. 183: RaJhid I~Din H.mod:oni, ·Co~iumof<luoni<ko:. hislor)--oftho
Mongot.·. ,'""'- W.M. Tho<;h,,,,,..0;.",,,,,, ,>/or~nraJ lonpap-,-.Jliurong", ,,,l4~ in ,..... 1'"'"
(1998·9),
"PI 6",", OT<I O.G. Khch. Th<?chnmlronS)'rioc"", oflJm H<br",,,, J ,,,ll. t~ipzig.. 1189)
11 Zhoo H""8- ~""",.D6IkI-L":Po/"", Opi","~ ,1/OIW>i<rTalar.lram. N. Munkon'{Mo"""".
t97,), r",," Ski. 'nom- CIl·;-Qi"i U,..... no. '"ItiM"}' ..,ab/Ish",,", of IN !'loan 0,''''"". (C.mbtidgr
M..... 1978~ PI' n·9\; K.A. Wit,fug<t .'Id r""ll CIlia·Shorog. Ifls""" ofChl""u ,tOC~1)·. Lu." ~r­
Jl15tl'hil3d<lph".I'l.tg~
" JJ. s.LJnd<.... TIo. h;'t",,· ofllo. M<Jnso! ronIj",,'" (Phibdolphia. t9? l), PI' t93,l: no. ,,<:tVt hi."""
1'/,10. ,I/o"lloi.. 110. 11/, ,md11"".. <>j'Ch;nggo·, Kha... ed .'Id ,........ U. 000. (Abingdon. .'00'): TM
",cm Mu",,· af IN .IIo>"gah. 0> Ma~l_ rp'c chnmklr oflM thlrtunth "'''''Iry'. "1nL t. de
Ro<~'illz{2 ,,,Is.. Elrill. 2(04).
'" Un.NI Kin;dom Minimy ofDef"""". Br""h Mm,,,,,, Doc,ri... Or<! EdiliolL S"'ir<!olL 2008~ PI' 4.
,. t ,
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IQ ride and manage horse. and '0 gallop on ,hem, and lhey = given bows
10 suit ,heir sta,urt and tau&!lt to shOOllhem."
Rashid aI-Din provided further evidence for this when he described Genghis
Khan's maxims instructing military commanders to teach their sons,
'archery, horsemanship, and wreslling welr. ll In Zhao Hung we find
Mongols being bom and raised in the saddle. lJ In addition, the Seae/ HistoT)'
of/he Mongols rcl31ed the skills expected of an adolescent archer.!'
Onc area not mentioned by Carpini \\-'as the inclusion of sons of
subjecl rulers in the Greal Khan's guard. Here they received preparation for
subordinate command as well as serve as a deterrent to rebellion. However.
Carpini described the system of command even if he did not specify Ihat
young Mongol nobles learnt their craft under the guidance of experienced
generals prior to being given independent command, 'Two or three chiefs arc
in command of the whole anny, yet in such a way that one holds supreme
command·. ll 'lbis was reflected by Juvaini's, 'The right wing, left wing and
cenlre are dra\\-ll up and entrusted to the great emirs. ".
Although providing comprehensive examples of Mongol tactics
and siegecrafl, unlike William of Rubruck, Carpini did not see beyond the
influence of hunting techniques to link Mongol tactics \\-ilh the nl'rge (row or
column)." This fonned part of the bO/llle (ruUlual hunt) described by Juvaini
and Rubruck in which Mongols fmmed out over several kilometres 10 fonn a
large circle. The hunters would then gradually ride inwards over a month or
two, driving Ihe prey before them until they were \Tapped within a ring of
horsemen. It "''as a highly disciplined activity requiring careful control and
1I Cupini.. 'HiSlOX)" of,..., Mo"O\ok<'. p, 18,
" Ro>hid a~Din. 'CO"1'OOO;um ofdlron... Ie., I'- 297, ""'. a''''' P",i<, Chroni<:a M'!i<"" pp 1')·6.
"Zhao fl-. Mrng.D6 &;·Lu. pp 6l-{j.
"Ro<l>ov.-i~z,~,~" h;SI"')'. p. 20.
" T. M.). no. M""If.o/ urI clwar. Chingg;, Khi", nnd Itw ~f<:o,lX'~ mm,OI)' .),.um tElamsk)·. 2(07). pp
]2·36, 8?·8; carp .., ·11'''0'1 of,ho M01\&Ok·, p. 33.
'" JU"lini. G",gM. Kh",," p. 27.
" T, M.~..Th< '",inini of.n j1lll<f As;"n Nool'lOd """y in ,be prc-rnoJom petiod' in Ttw.!<JumaI <>j'
,I/itll""· I/i"",,', 70 t~OOO). p. 6,9
excellenl communicalions.~ This is in accord \\;lh Carpini's description of
columns being senl around an memy's flank and 'in lhis way swround Ibem
and close in $0 that !he Iigllling begins from all sides' in a doubl~
~m~lopment.~ An example of which could be .5«ll in Rashid al-[)in's
1ICCOWIl of !he campaign againsl !he Rus· ... Carpini described !be Mongol
approach 10 I siege in a similar TIliUIDCl'", '~ SUfTOUnd it. sometimes n'en
fencing it round so that no OO~ can enter Cl" lea' c', Jl In the same~ be
wml 00 10 mention !heir usc of dh'ened ri"ers 10 flood 1000ns and mints to
gain mlry.J: All~ laClics are born out by othcT accoum!. such as lhat of
the siege ofXi_Xia.Jl
In banlc. Carpini added thal lhe Mongols often lcft an escape
roule open so Ihal Ihey could deslrQy thc nceing enemy forces in detail and
accounlS of the "erge mentioned animals being allowed 10 escape in a
s)1llbolic ael of compassion by the Khan.J< It would have been a 13ctic
famili3f 10 survivors of the Hungarian anllY defeated al Mohi in 1241 and
may well have been drn"'lI by C3rpini from eytwilnesses. He also madc
many referetlces to lhe usc of ambuscadcs and deceplion such as mounting
dummies on spare horses and placing ....omen and children among the resen.'e
to inCTeUc Ihe apparent size of lhe f~, which were supported by OIller
~"
Mongol use ofthc traditional nomadic laCtic of feigned flighl ....-as
recognised by Carpini. Indeed. 00 facing I pankularly SJrong enemy, ~
menlioned!he "'ithdrawlI.llasting da)'S until !he enemy has dispenal and "'"lIS
susccplible to a rm~.....cd offensi\~. Polo highlighted the effecti\'enes,s of this
tactie and examplts cxiSl in accounts of Mongol campaigns.lI; HO\\"C\·~.
'" M ••• Gt-ot1t/rk KJ-. ... 27·3: __ F... ""iII_,,,...... p.3~; 1.10)', ''''''-cI """l...
~... '11.."') o(,he Mooop.... p. J6.
.. RashOl.~Oin.'Co......,d..... ofcllmni<:... ·• p. 3rt.
" c.rpini. '11"011 of .... Mootw>.... p. J7.
., Ibd., pp 11. ~L
llMoy.of"'II.",.p.19,
-" "'_pm. ·ltioooryof'ho MonJo.. ·. 1'37, Mor.·Nomod "'Ill)"". p. 610,
" CoIJI"i. 'Uiolory of'he ",,->10'. pp 36-7, Onoft. no. "",,' ~I>I"')' '!f 'Iw .lI~" p.1 1:1: Jo,.ini.
V."",~I, "IuI, I' 406: on <l<cqcion ... Moy, of" af "...-. 1'1' 19,&1.
,. C"'l';ni. 'Ili"ory of'he Moni0lo·. P. J6: Polo. ",I. 1. P. 262: ... 0100 SObodei". """",""er ,..ilh the
Kipot.. r ...k•• May. A"qf,,,,,,. p. R
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Carpini's description of bow the Mongols foughl is al !he cmtre of some
debat~,»Two imponam passages OlIlhis highlight !heir losing lhree Cl" four
arrows before ~iring and !heir a"cmOlllo close C(IIIlba. JI There is "ery link
data IHUlablt else....here 011 bow !he Mongols operated :It subunit In'd ....ith
som~ ....-orks seeking 10 draw para.llels wilb man,Juk lfaining manuals 10 fill
the gap,~ It is likely thal Carpini also drew his information from. "eterans he
encoonlcred on his joumey easlwards or ChriSlian capti\'cs of the Mongols
held in Asia,
As ....ell as influencing 1Ictics. lhe nerge $en'ed as tmining fCl" war
and Carpini's menlioo of Ihe impor1llllce of hunling and archery has a1rt'3dy
been ciled. Contrary 10 some modem claims lhal Ihey ....ere average archers,
Carpi"; was clear aboul their sldlL'" The Armenians. a sociely familiar Wilh
nomadic horse archers. labelled mem 'Ihe Nalion of Archers'." Moreover.
JlIvaini "rote:
lh")" 3I'C ~\'er tager fur tM ctJas<, and ~ncour3i" their armies Ihll'110 occupy
the_l,es: not for the s:>k~ ..fthe pme alo<.:. but al... in order lha! the)
may bec<J.nx, lOCClIS10mcd and inured 10 hWl1in&:>IId familiarisN "'ith the
handlina ..fthe ""'" and m. <:ndlnnC1: oflwdships.·~
Th~ ~rge also underpinned Moogol milillf) decision-making. I1 required
careful delegat;OII of tasks to lruSted subordil13lcs lov.'3.rds a common goal ~
....-hal today ....~.dd be refcnal 10 as °Missioo Command,.<J To~ the
rapid flo..... of informal ion. Carpini highlighted the Moogol yam ("pony
express'). .....hich provided fresh mounts and SUSlmllnCe 10 official
messengers, bure-aucnllls lIlld fCKcign ef\\"O)'S at a series of way SI3IiOllS 01\
specified routes acros.s lhe Empire. It \\"lIS 3 S)'SIem menlioned by many other
" F... 1ktoiI "" _ -. R. Aooiloi-PR....~ "'-'ItJb,. TIw ,1bIII,,*·II~ IO·....
/.'60-1.'11 (C_ Im~ ppll ....19: Ma). A" pp ~!·1. 1I..1;J.M. SmO:h. 'All> .la"":
Mamlut .....,.,... Moni<>I fiil_T io H..-NnfJ-rtJJl'llA'I<Mk-$I ~. -1-11 (19J.I~pp Jl)l..1,:
J.M. Smith.'~I _i<l~ .... mililar}' MiddJ< ,,-, __. io w... _
.l«1o-(l'/It,'" _Ifflf M<dI~_". "'Io--frfi""'~"","'wIn.ee1. V. Leo. (DrilL 19\16). pp H-.
.. C..,.;ni. 'History of'llt ~\otliIo,,·_pp 36-7.
JO Mo~. 'NonlOCl "'Ill)"". p. 62~,
.. Srn~h. . ..f)'~.AJ"' •• pp 31l-6,
" R.P B..... and R.N. hI". '11>< history oflll< ...,ion ofon: ....... 1»-' G'ii'" ofAuno' in 1/'",'",,1
.Jawn.J "-'A,hm S,,,,/!u, 12 (11~9). PI' 26'J-3'l'J.
"Jo,."~ c;."",ltIs ,.;"",. p, 27,
.. Brh,,~Mm"",,, Doc"I.... pp~;I_II.
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eyewilnesses, btU as a bureaucral. Juvaini was able to provide further delail
on its adminislration ..... This syslem allowed Ihe rapid flow of dala fed from
lhe Mongol imelJigence network. Carpini's identificaliOl1 oflhe importance
of intelligence and the use of spies by Ihe Mongols was also supported
elsewhere.'J The review of other sources demons\nlles Ihal Ihe nerge and
baltl/a were Ihe foundmion of Ihe conceptual component of Mongol fighting
power. Whilsl not identifying its causaJily, Carpini accuMely described
Mongol milital)' education, tactics, training and decision·making. Carpini's
description of IIle level of preparation of Mongol forces also required the
reader to draw their 01111 deductioos based on the friar's description of
Mongol fonnmions and their val)'ing states of readiness as he travelled
eastwards. Detail on the deploymCTlt of flank guards to cover approach routes
to the CTllpire and supporting forces would have been of utmost use if a
crusade were to be lalUlched against them:'"
Carpini dev01ed part of his report to the minmia thm made up lhe
physical component of fighting power. He gave specific detail on Mongol
arms ;md annour, its cOl1struction and potential \,,.eak areas. Whilst he is the
lHlly source to speak of warriors carrying multiple bows, his description of
the bow (a CQmpound rccurve), and lhe quantity and types of arrows (three
large quivCTS with two types of arrow) was in accord with Polo. Meng Hung
listed three types of arrow, but one oflh05e whistled and may well have been
designed for communicmions.'7 Carpini's account of the single-edged curved
sword fittcd that in use across the Steppe. but he was unique in mentioning a
hook near the lip of the spear, designed to allow the warrior 10 pull
adversaries from lhe saddle.'1 Unlike Meng Hung. Carpini only described thc
wicker shield used by guards whilst in camp and, given the detail displayed
elsewhcre, was clearly not priry to lhc large tortoise shield used in sieges or
" c.rpin;' ·IHs,"')' ~ftJ>eMOflgOl!!·. PI' 5S, 61. 611: J",.. in' (!~ngh.. Khan. p. 33: Polo. W 1l{)-5
" IU>hid .~Din. ·u,,,",,,,n<lium of chronicl<.'. p. 3.lI'l.
.. J",""n. Friar ""illia.. ofRuh"",k.w 97-100,
" Carp;"i. ·Hi..,,')· ~ftJ>eMo'\ilo"·. PI' 27. 35: Polo. p.300: J",k"'n. fri", N"illia.. ofRuhr..d. p. 91;
M""lIIl""ll. oiI«I in H.D. M.nin."The ~'Ioo;;o>I.n-ny· in -la'''''''' of';'" R,,!"" A.lali<:Soc;m'<>fGrYm
Br;'a'"a"" 1,,10"". 1(1943). p.52.
.. Carpi"i. ·Iliolory oft!>< Mon;:ol>·. PI' H-4.
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the smaller shields carried by dismounted IToopS.+9 Carpini's report on
3nll0Uf for warriors :md ponies is highly dctaiJcd. Use of lacquered !emher
laminar annour for both. somctimes replaced with metal b;vtds., an iron
helmet for lhe rider and a metal chamfron for the mounl fits conlemporary
illustrations as well the accounlS of Andrew ofLongjumeau and Rubruek. JO
In c01lsidering an anny whose special assel was horsepower, dma
on the size and number of mounts was vitaL A large borse was stronger and
could carry a beavily 3ffil0ured warrior, but required greater suSlenance tban
a pony. Carpini dcscribed tbe small, nimble and highly trained mounls oftbe
Mongols in some detail. of wbicb each warrior would bave five. This
compensated for a dCl::reased lood bearing capacity by providing multiple
mounts on lhe march and also. arguably, maintaining fresh re-mounts during
battlc. Much research has been conducted on tbe size and capacity of Mongol
ponies and il suppons the infonnation in Carpini's report. ll
In lenns of logistics., the seasonal migration of many bundreds of
miles belween summer and winter pastures was of greal benefil in providing
experience in !he movcmcnt of large fonnalions on campaign. Moreover, as
Timothy May argucs. the nerge contributed to producing a disciplined force
capable of complex manoeuvres over a broad fronl. 51 The advanlages
migration brought was not identified diTCi:tly by Carpini. but bc did describe
tbe process, the level of Mongol self-sufficiency and impol1alll logistic
functions fulfilled by women in line with Juvaini. lJ Some extrapolalion was
required, however, to delcnnine the size oflhe Mongol logistic !ail and likely
consequences. John Masson Smilb estimatcs Ihal tbe 170,000 warriors in
HiiJegu's anny of 1256 grew 10 850,000 ";th lhe inclusion of families and
artisans. Assessing Ihat eacb family of five had some 100 sheep and len
ponies (five mounts and fivc milk-producing mares), Smiths suggests a herd
.. Corpini ·Hi"oryoftl>o M0nv.0ls·. p. 35. M<n& H""lI. 0;'«1 in Martin. ·M""lIolonny·, Po 53.
., Corp;"i. 'Hi"ory OflJ>e MonKoIs·, Ill' JJ-4; P.n... Chrooiro Map", Po 115: M.S. ll"iroglu. l''''hJlog
a"" lhe CWlun <>fIM hI<Jnso!' (No,.. Vork. 1966). p. 50. p. 19: J.ookSM. Fri<" Will;".. of Ruh"",k, PI'
216-1 .
"For M""i"1 poo;., ... Smith, ·Mo''Il01 society..-.l ",;I...y in tJ>e MioJdk East·. Pl'1W-1.
" Ma}'. An if~"r. p, -l6
SJ Carpini. 'H",ory oft!>< M0"ll0ls • p, 18: Ju,..inL G'UShi> Khim. p. )0.
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of 17 million sheep and 1.7 million ponies. SoI These figures have been
con1t"sted by Ruebcn Amatei-I'riess, but even a ninety percent reduction
would lea\'e a substantial logistic burden." Even a modest force of 30,000
warriors. therefore, had a considerable requirement for fresh pasture on
which to gra7..e and time in which to do so. Carpini did not ignore Mongol
vulnerability in this area when he covered the methodology of confronting
them in battle:'· Carpini was not definite on the extent of Mongol manpower.
but his detailed description of a nation in anns is reflected by Juvaini when
he referred to thcm as. 'peasant/)' in the guise of an anny, all of them ..in
time of banle become swordsmen, archers, lancers and advancing in
whatever manner the occasion requires' .'7
Writing a few decadcs later. the Annenian cleric Grigor of Akanc
stated that the Mongois rcgistered all males aged bet'-'"een fifteen and sixty
who were fit for military service." This was confirmed by Meng Hung.
whilst the ruan Shi extended the age limit to seventy and gavc the age for
induction as between fifteen and twenty years old.l'I In relating this to
manpower committed to the military, several sources indicated a typical
recruitmcnt figure of onc in ten "ith the potential to levy more.'" This was
useful dctail on military manning excluded from Carpini"s repon. but
probably unavailable to him. However. Carpini did cover Mongol use of
captive c..... ftsman to fulfil those tasks they were unablc to perform. He
described the process of selt:etion that followed a successful siege and
Juvaini gave similar detail in his account of the siege of Otrar. in modem
Kazakstan."' Moreover. Mongol use of captives and allies appeared in many
eyewitness accOlUlts. and Carpini's suggestion that thcy were under Mongol
"Smill\. -M""I;ol sod<t(, "" 249,
<' Antit.~Prci».. M",WJJ' """ If"..luL. 1'1' 125·9.
,. C.rpmi. 'Hi"ory ofttoe Mooll0!>·. 1'1' 46-S0
"J",~ini. G",ghi, /;,1><",. p. 30.
<' GrigOf or Ak.nc, 'n.. hi<lOI'j' oftl>< nalioo ofor<hcts'. cd. ond tron>. R.P. Blake .nO R.N, FI'j<.
11",.",,,,1,,,-,,,,,,,,1,1 A.u"kS,,,,Ii... t2. 3/~ (1949). p. 325: G. 1.20><. C"'ghi, Kl><m ,,"" .lIOOf1.of ",I,.
(InOianopotis. 20001). p.t M.
: ~::':1~~..~~<;.r~.'''''''''· <..... in M.rtin. 'MOOiot army'. "" S3: /,,,,," ,W. p. 74,
"C.rpini. 'HiIlOT)' "f'h< l>Iongo,,·. p. 37:J"".ini. G<"$~i.! Khm. p. 85. 0 ...... !lJl«'ioli... _ J.M.
Smilh. 'M""Il"t "'""""".... ond P....ian popo*'."'" ,!<mr,.a ofl'" £"""".." ,,"" S<x-i<lllIi,""y <of''''
Ori<m. 1&.3 (t9m. p. 215.
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leadership is supported by Juvaini in his description of the campaign against
thc Khwarazmians.'" Mongol use of captives to augment military capability
indicates their progressive adaption in exploiting new technologi<:s and
techniques.
Strong collt:etive performance is based on cohesion - the 'quality
that binds together constituent pans thereby providing resilience against
dislocation and disruption'.!U Whilst moral cohesion will be considered later,
Carpini's description of how the Mongols used captives and subject allies is
relevant to collective perfonnance. Carpini placed thcm in the cell1rt: of the
battle formation and this did not corTCspond with the recorded role of
lIu;.;iliary contingents against the Mamluks or aceOWlts of previous Mongol
campaigns by Juvaini.... Sources place al-Ashraf Musa's Muslim force v.ith
the Mongol left wing at 'Ay" Jilt"t in 1260 and the small Annenian and
Georgian contingents \'cry probably fomled pan of the Mongol victorious
right wing at the second battle of Homs in 1281."' In both examples, allies
were integrated into the strongest wing of the anny. At an individual level,
other sources show how selected captures could be inducted into Mongol
units in a manner n01 related by Carpini."" However, Simon of SI. Qucutin
and Muslim sources recorded the lcvying of indigenous manpower during
sicges, These were seemly favoured for the most perilous tasks, which
supports Carpini's aecolUlt.·'
lbis topic of subject peoples fonns a bridge between the physical
and moral components of Mongol fighting power. The induction of subject
peoples would have required cacefnl comrol to avoid damaging the cohesion
of the Mongol anny - especially those who were n01 from a steppe nomad
background and did not acknowledge the ccmuries old concept of steppe-
'" Corpin;, 'Hisl"')' of'h< M""",,,,,', p. 3~: Ju,~ini. G"'Xhi, KiN",. pp 91-2. t07. 122.
., Unilod l(in¥OOm Mini",y ofDefence. Army Do:H.1.iro< l'ublicotion. \UL 1. lJp<mri<"" (1J>n<lon.
''194).1'1'2.6
.. C&rp"'i. 'Hisl"ry of the Mongols'. p, 36: 00 "".=' _ Armil.i·Preuos. .,w~,.",'.II...I"h. 1'1'
~I).S. '9t_S.
., tbn Wo..,'- .... 1703. Iill, 161. cilod in Am...i-P,oi». ,lImrgoJ, w><1 M"",'uL. p.!6: A...'oi·Pr.,...
•Ayn J.luI· pp 139---10: lUdlid .t·Din. p.J,t62.
.. i.""in;' &"ghu KJom. "" t21.
01 Sim<>n ofSI. Quon<in. ·N.,,,,i,,.·, p, I.
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overlordship.f>I John Saunders argues thm Genghis Khan was devoid of
racism. recruiting ministers and commanders from twenty different nmioos.6'l
It is an argument supported by the positions held by Juvaini Ilnd Polo. but
some groups were assimilated belle.- Ihan others. Carpini's was the aeeount of
an outsider alld many of his sources were Ihose on the margins of Mongol
society or subject to it ralher Ihan favoured bureaucrats or commanders.
Carpini's account did re<:ord a clear image of a Mongol destiny
that brought moral cohesion 10 the anny and the strict roles that maintained
its integrity.7ll A common theme in early Mongol history is that of an imperial
destillY in which they would bring Ihe world under their hegemony. Rather
than cOllquerors, the Mongols portrayed themselves as fulfilling their divine
role. Those who accepted subjugation were el (at peace or in hannony), those
who resisted were bulglw (confilsed or disordered) or yag"l (enemy) and in
both cases were regarded as being in rebellion to the divine order." In
addition to being held by the family of Genghis Khan. a Chinese source
prescnted this belief as penneating throughout the Mongol al1l1y in the mid-
thirtttnth centUTy.n
There is great emphasis placed 00 discipline as the key to Mongol
success and Carpini dcscribes several examples of individual and collective
punishment. such as:
When they.re in l>allk. if""" or two or three or eyen mo", oUl of a group
ohen run away. all a", pUl 10 dealh: aod if. "oole group oflen Oees. lhe
resl of the group ofa hundred arc all pUl to dealh., iflhey do nol flee loo. In
• word_ unless lhe) ",Ireal in. 1><><1) ••11 who Iak~ fliglu are pUl 10 de.th."
Discipline was focused on achieving collecti"e action. as 'Umar lbn lbrahirn
al-Ansi al-An'ari. noted 'R~'tiring [from the bailIe) and returning [to it] was
.. hooh"". M,"'1<'~'.p. ~6.
.. So""""".'\/~"'''''I,...,u.ppf>6.1,
'" corpin~ ·H;""')' of,.. MOlI&ob·. p, 17,
"H. Fletct>er. -11.. M""lI0li: <ro~icolooo _iol p<np<cti,'... ;a lIah'ahIJ",,,,,,,lafA>iatk
S""'I-.. 46 \ 10M). I'JI 10. 30-S.
" Plrlg Do.).. and X" TifIK. 11,/.,(0 .~/·I,,,,. in WO"ll Gw-w";.ed. .\1'''11-1('' .~i·lioo ,j.=!roItg noip<i.
107S). p. 488. <~ed in Am~.i-P",w.. .lIonxoJ "old M"ml"h p, 10.
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denied to each of them'." Juvaini cOlllluented that one could leave a riding
crop OIl the ground for many days and only its Olol-ner would pick it up, no
mllner how long it had lain there." The Seerel History also demonstrated
how discipline ",.as at the heart of Genghis Khan's risc to power. Whilst still
a subordinate commander of the Kereit. it recorded him insisting that his llIen
defeat the enemy before IUming to plunder and be prepared to regroup at a
rally point if defeated rather than disperse.'· As Carpini recorded. 'Moreover,
whatever command he [the Great Khan] gives them, whatever the time,
whatever the place, be it in ballle, to life or to death, they obey without
question'." Taking into account the wealth of supporting data, Carpini's
report accurately described a system of discipline closely linked with
personalleadersh.ip through persuasion, compulsion and shared hardship. and
where conmtand was earned.
However, just as detail was lacking on recruitment, Carpini was
unlikely to be party to the dispositions of the Mongol anny.71 Carpini instead
focused 011 lower levels, such as Genghis Khan's use of a decimal system to
organise the al1l1Y_ Troops were fonned into units of ten. a hundred, a
thousand and ten thousand. which he stated they called a 'darkness'
(dI7man).'" TIlis is broadly supported by several other accounts although the
word I{;mm) (ten thousand) was used by other writers. Yet there are subtle
differences. where Juvaini described a strictly decimal system. Andrew of
Longjumeau stated that. 'everyone in command. right up to the king, has
under him ten men' - a ten per cent differenee..a Moreover, Carpini's account
was also supported by rolo and Zhao Hong_ as well as filling the traditional
" 'Umor Itw> .~An,; .~An·:ui. Tafrij ",-/;an~ jI TaJbir al· '","b (Coir<>. 1'1611. P 103.
"I",..ini. T"l>aq<u-i-S"'irl. ,ol2. p, 181.
.. ~hew;lIz.S«r<1 Hu,,,'),. p_ 16
n Corpini. 'l1i"'"O)' "f,he M,,"i"Io·. P. 27.
" Based on a ~ft ",'iJlll!..."em orn\y (1"""'1"'"). RiIIh< "'-ina!",'...ern ..my (Mm ''''HI'') .od N""'" or
""") "flhe lmp.rill Oril" (q"'J. Mo.i". 'Mo<>;I,,1 orm)·. p, SS.
" Carpini ,,-,..1. ,,,...bro.J (<la........). probot>l) """["..... b<I"...... It,,,,,,,, (10.000) and J;)1tUlt!
(<to"'.'''). Carpini. 'l1isl<>TY oftl>e Mo,,~"Io·. pp 26. 33.
• J.....ini. G<"!!h;., /;/tun. p. 3I: pon., Chr<",i"" ,Ifuj,>ro. p, 113.
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s)'stern employed by Steppe Nomads. underlining his reliability on military
matters."
From this comparison of the analysis of Mongol fighting power
in Carpini's report with other eyewitness accounts it can be seen that. some
twO and a half )'ears after he had been dispatched eastwards. Carpini
presented an accurate and comprehensive study to Innocent IV. Although
lacking some detail on Mongol military strength. minor tactics and strategic
dispositions. this intelligence would have provided the Pope v,ith the sort of
timely and concrete data required for infonned decision-making. Following
his time with the Mongols and. perhaps. influenced by discussed refonns of
the Rus·. Carpini made a series of recommendations on the composition of a
military force capable of confronting the Mongols that is also seemingly
influenced by Vegetius. Whilst it is arguable that he had a Military Order in
mind as the basis of his proposed force. it would instead be interesting to
consider its value by comparing his commentary "ith an army that defeated
the Mongols on a number of occasions- the Mamluks of Eg"vpt.
" M.y_ An of""', 1'.32: ""'~ini. G'''I<hi, KIo<",. p. 21: Zhoo I-k>ni. ~knK·Da !J</·L". p. 67.
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'Consent not to the \Vyckeduesse':
The contribution of Nicodemites to the Elizabethan
Church
Angela Ranson
In a letter he "rote to his parishioners in Lucca in 1542. Peter Martyr
Vennigli advised 'the weaker brethren' that they flee the country instead of
causing damage through their abjnration at home.' In 1543. John Calvin said
that Protestants who tried to justiry conforming to Catholicism were 'looking
for cushions to put their consciences to sleep. and for someone to make them
believe that they are alive when really they are dead:! In 1554, John
Bradford rejected the idea that Protestants could be physically present at the
mass and yet absent in mind and spirit. advising his followers to 'COllSC1l1 not
to the wyekednesse.·J These writings. along with countless others. spoke
against the people later labelled as followers of Nicodcmism (Nicodemites).
Nicodemism ean be defined as outward cooIonnity to the dominant religion
despite differing internal beliefs, while justifying that confornlity through a
particular set of argumcms. These argum~'1lts often used the Biblical
examples of Nicodemus and Naaman. separated the beliefs of mind and spirit
from the actions of the body, and advocated that it was beller to confonn than
to risk offending other Christians. While never an official sect or cOllfession.
Nicodemism could be found throughout the sixteenth century in England.
Under H....nry VIlL it be>:ame well-kno"ll during the Act of Six Articlcs
persecutions. It was what Andrew Pettegree calls the 'burning issnc of the
day' during the time of th.... Mary l. when it was practiced by some of the
Protestants living w,der her Catholicism.' Later in the cemury. Catholics
, JoIln V."iok UoM<II).'>.l. HI., I.,,,,, ,,"""'"••'"""I p,,,, J1",~" r"""NIi (Krl"illc.1 'l9\I~ p. 9J.
, S«h Skoblitsky. 'ran<, C""" olUfrom 0"""W,"'m. ·Ami·.V,,,,,,,,..i,,· ",Iti,'f;; "I.John (;d,·/"
(T..... 2(01). 1'1' 47·8.
, Jom Imdfurd. r", h",,, of""ing ""1.1Y. s.,'IOI"th by ''''1,,/111'''/ "''''''"I''l' ofIP>J {u""l rom"""
.",.,,, ojCIoFisl. /1>0" Bro4fo1"it, "h,,{"l Iw ,,'"I',j,.-, {" ,'" ru"" "I tu",,,,," I LoooJoo. l56n pp
'-'3,-1\,4,.
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li\'ing under Elizabeth·s Church of England used Nicodemi!e argumrn!S in
their deliberations about recusancy. This paper "ill focus on some of the
Nicodemites of Mary's reign. who rewaled their Prol:estantism during the
reign of Elizabeth.
Nicodemitcs inspired much polemic from sixtccnth-ecntUI)'
reformers. who often portr3)'a:! them as fallen belie\'ers who avoided
mlll't)n1om by den)ing thcir beliefs or 8nJiding confrontation "ith
authorities. Alternatiwly. NioodanilCS "'a"C: portrayed as well-meaning but
wea)(-",illed people who loved the work! too much and so risked their
sah'3.tion br their lack of zral This negative portrayal of Nicodemism is
largely accepIed b)' modem historians as well. The dominanl impression in
the hiSloriograpby is tbat N"J<:OOemitcs were the co"Ids of the Reformation.
Andrew Pettegree, in his book Morioll ProteMant;s"" notes thal many
English Protestants under Henry and Ed....'31'd conformed w1der Mal) and
then promptly re-adopled Protestantism when it became safe 10 do so under
Elizabeth. Pdltgree calls this a 'genuine if flexible commitment' to
Prol:estantism.} bul maD)' hiSlorians diS3gJtt that a commitment of that son is
truly a conunitrnent. NilOO Shcphm:lson considers it damaging. suggesting
thal Nicodemism in France undennined the rhetoric of mart)n1om that ....<IS
then shaping the identity of the Reformed communi!)'.' Alexandra Walsham
suggests that such conformity migtll he simply a pan of the 'religious
\'acillations' that occurred during this lime of political and religious
uphea\'al. sl'Kming neither faith nor the lack of it.1 Anne (Nerell calls the
English and Italian Protestants who gave in to the pressure to conform
Nieodl'1l1ltcs, using as e.'lamples the recanlalions of JoItn Cheke and Thomas
Craruner.'
This is a one-sided portrayal of Nicodemism. It ,,;u possible to
be boIh a Nicodemile and a commilled belie\'cr, and some of the men and
'11>01•• p, 6•
• NiHi Sh.pnmbon. B,,,.,,i"/! =."r ,'" .Jw,orlr of ...........10.. "",I'M """',,"'" .,,,,,..,,,,i(l' I" Fm...·•
IN....' kf",>. 2007). pp !.lQ. ns.
I ,\I.<.and.. w•."....",. cloari",hI. ;"',,..,d. ,aJ.rall"" a",1 i"'aJmm<"< i" £'IIJ(I"nt/, 1j(J(J.I"OO
IM """ 200l\~ p. 20.
, """ Qo, II. IIull"" 1Yfa'.. aM £"1111.<10 tyfor,,,,,,.....(... Id....""•. 2008). p, In.
16
women who fell inlo this calegory later made great contribulions to the
development of the English Church. The Nicodemism of some leading
Elizabethan figures nOl only sa\'oo their li\C$ during the Marian years. but
also provided them the skills they needed to lead the government under
Elizabeth. Nieodemism ga\'e them an ability to compromise and adapt.
which helped them establish and maintain the new Church of England when
it came into existence through the ISS9 Elizabethan Settlement. Some of the
leaders of this ehurcb. such as the 5l3Iesman Nicholas Bacon, the privy
counsellor Robert Dudlcy and lbe royal secretlll)" William eecil. de\eloped
tall,'!llS in equlHlCatioo and diplomacy ....'bile they .....ere Nicodemiles that they
IatC!" used 10 defend the DeI'o' church's doctrine and rituals..
Of COl1I"SC, 001 all Nicodemites adopted Nieodemism fOl" noble
pwposc5. Self-inlerest moth'ated many, including John Cbeke......ho
conformed panly because he .....anled to keep his lands and his life.' Ed"'31'd
Counenay's Nicodernism ....;u in a large pan moth'3.ted br self-interest. since
he avowed "hatC\CI' religious beliefs thal he thoughl would free him from the
TOYo"el"." HOYo·e\CI'. lhe best example of Nicodemism for the sake of self-
intCf'eSl can be found in the e.umple ofRiehard Sm)"Ih. Sm)"IIt was a leelUrer
and a fello.... at Q,tford in the later yealS of Henry VlII. and his conser....ti\·e
vie.....s became cOll1l'O\'erslal at the aceessioo of Ed"'31'd. He immedialel)'
recanted in order 10 salvage his CareeT. which lost him allies both on the:
COOSe,..,..ative side and on lhe evangelical side. Smyth himself said publicly
that be had erred and ....<IS repentant. and yet mainlained his innocence in
private. 1l
Peter Martyr Vermigli replaced Smyth as Regius Professor of
Divinity in 1S47. and Sm),h intml'diately proco:t'ded to do all he could to
unsettle Vennigli. including challenge him 10 a disputation about the
Eucharist. Vennigli accepted. and Smyth ran away inlO exile the C\'ening
• k>M SI'>,.,.. TIot Ilk alllot 1.,,,,,,,,1 S" .1,,10" (,"'lo, ~",flw i","'u,"'r, ,ift.",,,,,I, SUM,,')· ufSII~'
I<J KI"II E,h",rtI 1'1. Ow oflM "..'U .........." qf1r'",1 (t..on<k>n, nos). p. 16'1.
.. Qo,.....lll"'lkut ,..fun.... pp 61·2.
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heron: the dispul3tioo was to take place.'! In 1552 he wrote 10 Archbishop
Cranmcr. SH)ing that he v,as under pressure 10 refute Cranmer's latest book
and that it "''as 'against his conscience' 10 do $0. Ill.' promised that if
Cranmer arranged for 11 royal pardon so that Sm)1h could return 10 England.
he would conform 10 !he Edwardian church and publish a book accepting
some orllle InlC'tS of the Prote5Ulnl faith he had pl"C'\iously ~ecled. He C'\'en
promised thaJ. he ...."QUld support Cranl1l('f" and that Cranmcr 'would nc\'er
~. arranging 10 bring him home. Sm}th gained his royal pardon. came
home and conformcd.. In 1553. on Ihc accession of M3f)'. he promplly re·
adopted Catholicism. and later presided O'...~r the trial thaJ: sent Cranmer to the
stake for heresy. 1J
Sm)th was an otn:me case of self-inla-esled Nicodemism.
Somelimes self-inteRS! blended with caution or what could be called simp~
common sense. Anlfre"o,. Pettegree notes that some of the Stranger
communities in London did DQ( dis,wh'c under Mary 115 ooc might ha\'c
n:pected they would. He Ihinks that this migtll rc:flect prnctical masons as
well 115 religious conviction, such as their employment. Some of the peop....
in these corrununities were in\'(X\"ed in trades that required lMge and
.....'(~nsi>·c equiprnml - equipmenl ....illi:h Ihq' We!'e ~ll,I(1ant to ~'('. So if
they could 'Iil:' 10.....· and SUI",i\·I:'. Ihq' had rnson 10 do so. PcltcgJtt also
nOlCS the financial and social asp«1S of Nioodmlism for many English
pcopll:'. They tended 10 bC' 'ofmiddling wealth and status. reluetanllherefore
10 throw up a comfonabk staIIdard of living for an uncertain future abroad.
and IlOI inclined 10 court a death sentence by open defiance. ,"
John Calvin despised the cowardice and duplicity imolved in
such Nicodnnism. calling il '""ickcl subtlety'. Il He understood. to a cmain
extent. the desire to liw in peacl:'. but Ill:' feh that even if Protestants chose to
conform to Catholicism, their altitude should bC' one of humble
acknowledgement of their sin. They should nOlt1')' to justify their eOllfonnity
"0>'0«11. 11<,/"", ~f"r"'. "" '0+8.
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\\ith any Nieodl:'mite arguments. It was worse to 'bC' doubl)' confounding
and condemning ourselves by squirming about and 5eC'king vain excuses:'·
Calvin identified four l)'JICS of Nicodemiu~s: (lnit. the preacher.; who wanted
to lTeat Jesus like their chef'SO he can Pr'q)aR' them fine meals' - in other
words. preachers \\no claimed the promises ofChristianity while ignoring the
responsibilities of the faith, Second. men who were pleasal 10 have the
gospel and chat about il \\ith the ladies. 'as long as it did not prevent them
from living as they like'. Third. the pwple Cah'in called philosophical
Christians. who would wait arouod in times of uphea\-al to seC' what
bappened. and finally, the 'me«:hants and commoners wbo are comfortable
in their bouseboIds and are irritated that~ should come and trouble
tbem..IJ
Calvin did not ac],;no,.ledge a fifth kind of Nioodemile: someone
who chose to conform so that tbq would be ali\e and I'C'ady to challenge and
change the dominant religion wben lhe opportunity arose. Bacon. Dudley,
Cecil, and many 0Iher$ could fit into this ClI1t:gory of Nicodemite. lkir
decisions 10 conform Wft'e often IlOI made lightly. and it is a mistake to
a.sstIIIle !hal those ....1Jo made thaI de<:isiOll always acted out of cowardiCC' or
ambiguity. For people like thenl. Nicodnnite arguments carried IlIOre
legitimacy. Sot= firmly believed that their faith allowed conformity. These
Nicodemiles followed the example of the Biblical Nicodanus. willi:h is how
they got their name. Nicodemus came 10 Jesll5 in the niglltto learn about the
kingdom of God and remained a JC\\;sh Pharisee during the day. Thus. he
lived a dOllble life. He followed the rules and procooure:s of me Pttarisees.
and yet belie\'ed in the mess:tg<: of JesU$. Nicodemus was saved because his
heart was faithful even if his lips W~'l'C not. To some reformers. such as John
Hooper. the faith thal Nicodemus showed by clHning to Christ was what
saved him, and Nicodc1l1us' consistent return to his life as:l Pharisee was not
" lbid.. p. 49.
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really important. Nicodcmus learned from Christ. and accepted Christ in his
heart. and that was enough."
The idea that individuals. like Nicodemus. did 1I0t have to
proclaim their faith to hold it was also supported by Grcgory the Great's
Moralia. In it. he asked 'what 113nn is there if in the judgement of man our
words differ superficially from the rectitude of truth when in the heart they
are in accord with it?"" Some Nicodemites claimed that their confonnity to
the dominant religion was merely a political act. a mark of temporal loyalty.
111cy defended this stance using the case of Naaman the Syrian. a man of
faith who bowed in the temple of Rimmon in order to assist his king. Both
the Protcst:tlllS under Mary and the Catholics under Elizabeth used this story
to justify their attendance at church. Philip Melanchthon noted in his 1521
Lod Commllnes that laws should be endured 'as we endure any injustice or
tyranny, in accordance with Malt 5:41: "If anyone fon;es you to go one mile.
go with him two miles:""" Martin Buccr stresscd the importance of the
internal beliefs of individuals and their personal piety, suggesting that
individuals could decide for themselves whethcr or not to confonn to carthly
authority. 11 John Bradford also advocated this. saying that: 'it is thc duty of
every Christian after Illeir \'(x:aliol1 to disallow all that he cannot obey and do
\\ith good conscience. ,>1
Other Nicodemites hid their resistance under a veil of eonfonnity.
William Guest. later considered for a bishopric under Elizabeth.. was an
evangelical under Edward and became a Nicodcmite under Mary. As Brelt
Usher puts it. he kept 'recent theological developments at ann's length
during Mary's reign and lived a fugitive life in England.lJ Matthew Parker.
" JoIv1 1t00j><'f. A d,~fr"",ia" afCIIri", and of his affiu c<""~"yd, /,). j'>Ma 11""" (t.<>ndon. 1SoIl).
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who became Archbishop of Canterbury under Elizabeth, confomled just
enough undcr Mary to live essentially 'untroubled' in England throughout her
reign.l< John Day. a London printer, hid in Lincolnshire and printed
subversive tracts undcr various aliases. One of these Vias Gardiner's Dc Vera
Obediemia, sometimes slyly used by Protestant martyrs when und~'T
interrogation by Gardiner himself."' It is difficult to determine Day's actions
during the Marian years, but it is kno....n that he was arrested for the products
of his press and then releascd. He spent the last two years ofMary's reign in
London, and it can be assumed that he conformed becausc he was allowed to
continue his printing business.~ However. once Elizabeth ascended the
throne. Day became the printer of Jolm Fo:»e's Act,· and Monllmenls,
arguably one of the most influential books in the Protestant Church of
England. l7
Nicodemites of this sort often provided help and succour for the
martyrs in prison, in the fonu of ....rinen encouragement, financial support. or
both. 111ey also helped other Protestants escape the country. John Strype, in
his Ecclesialfical Memorials. lists eighteen people whom he calls 'sustainers
of the gospel.' and says that there .....ere many more .....hose names were
'studiously concealed, for their safety in those times.' Some of thesc people
were gentry, others merchants. Ol.hers described merely as 'godly ladies: l'
One of these 'godly ladies' was Anne Warcup, who had a significant if
indirect influence on the establishment of the Church of England. It was she
who sheltered John Jewel in umdon when he was fleeing from Marian
authorities, and helped him escape into e:»ile.'" John Jewel. later Bishop of
Salisbury, ....Tote the first Apology oflhe Church of Eng/(IIul, which defined
,. Got}' Jookin<. John .ko.',1 ",.1 ,'" N"'iomal Cho",h (Aldershol. ::O(l()). p, 39,
" Jobo Fox•• A,,, "",I """"'''I''''' (1 >76 od~ioo) ( hnp:/I"-w,,"'.hrionlinc.>h<f,,,."lJfoxel. p, 1523) (
J""- WII).
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the church's beliefs and defendcd it against continental retractors, He also
defcnded the church against Catholic v.'fitcrs, preached several impot1ant
court sennolls, helped to write the 39 Articles, and became Richard Hooker's
mentor, Jewel is generally portrayed as the Church of England's first
champion, and his survival can be allributed in part to a Nicodemite.
A third justification for Nicodemism is well summarized in PeTe7.
Zagorin's book Ways ofLying: Dissimu!orion, Persecmion ond Conformir)' in
Early Modern Europe, zagorin notes that some Nicodcmites acted for
pragmatic reasons, These could include the fear of martyTdom, the fear of
losing property. or a belief that it would belter SCT\'e others to survh'e than to
make a stand that would end in defea!.'" It is easy to dismiss such reawns as
mere excuses for cowardice. but they are actually more legitimate than one
might think. Take. for example. the case of one famous Nicodemite of the
Marian years' Elizabeth Tudor herself. Although there is no record stming
that Elizabeth dedded to confonn to Catholicism under Mar)"s reign for an)'
of the reasons above stated, it is easy to see how they could have legitimately
applied in her situation. Her martynlom would have removed the hope of a
IUlllre Protestant ruler, and losing her property and thus her staIDs as a major
landowner would mean losing part of the power base that allowed her to
ascend the throne. Finally. it could be argued that it was better for an heir to
the throne to confoml and survive than to make a stand that would prove
hopeless, for the sake ofher subjects.
Elizabeth also developed her skills in equivocation and diplomacy
during her years as a Nicodemite. She told her sister Mary that her lack of
participation in the Mass was due to her ignorance nOl her disink'rest. and
asked for instructors. She also attended Mass with an expressiOll of long-
suffering on her face, which allowed peopk to interpret her participation in
different ....'ayS.)1 Conyers Read says that. during thosc )'ears.
[Elizabeth] Md de\eloped .xtraordinary agilit), bnth of mind and
conscience, exlraor<Jinary quickness in .izing up " sit""tion. extraordinary
JO r....zZOgorin. 11"<1)" oflyl"ll:' ,/[";"",II1Iio,,, p<'ru<-"'i<m and ro«"""I1)'I" <arl)' m<><!<," f"'""lH
(Comh<;dg., 1990). p, 10,
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readi""•• IQ go backwards or fOI"\\'ards or side"..i"" "he""er a ,,"w
foothold ",cmed to "ffer, extraordinaT)' indiffcreoce to an)1hinjl, like.
logical or or<Jcrly progn.-s<. aloog ",ith cx'm-ordinary ",If-eonfid~ncc in her
ahility 10 get 00 sonlC"'hcre 'iOmehow."
These arc early signs of the skilful equivocatioll she used in her later reign,
which is often described as 'answers answ.:r1ess', and helped her mainlain
stability in both the cOlUllry and lhe Church of England.
Nicodemism also helped the Tudor Slalesman Nicholas flacon and
his wife Anne Cooke Bacon 10 sm....ive. Bolh were stTOng Protestants under
Edward. and Anne's Si511:f Mildred was married to a man who had helped set
Lady Jane Grey on the throne, so the Bacons had cause 10 fear the ascension
of Mary. Annc Cooke Bacon's quick thinking greally assistcd in saving
them; as soon as Mary C311le to umdon, Alme became a Gemlewoman of the
Queen's Privy Ch311lber. ThaI gave her lhe queen's ear, so to speak, and
A1Ule used it to promole her husband and her brother-in~law, As Robcn
Tilller puts it in his biography of Nicholas Bacon. Arme 'swallowed h<:r
Protestant pride' and remained in Mary's service throughoul her reign. Later.
during the reign of Elizabeth, Anne contributed gremly to lhe establishment
of the Church of England througlt her gift of languages. It v.'aS she who
tr~nsla\ed Jewel's Apology of/he Church ofEng!ol1d from Latin imo English.
Nicholas Bacon managed to employ equivocation and skilful
diplomacy during Mary's reign, which allowed him to stay in a position of
authority. His chosen method was through the law. He ser....ed in the COW1
of Wards. as treasurer of Grey's Inn. and as commissioner of the peace in
Suffolk. None of lhese posilions were specifically religious in nature, so
Bacon was able 10 avoid gelling involved ill controversy and maintain his
outward cOllfonnity. Once Elizabeth ascended the throne, Bacon became
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and a member of Elizabeth's Privy CounciL
He assisted in the developmelU of lhe Church of England through his legal
expertise, helped Elizabeth and Cecil creat.: lhe episcopacy for the lIew
" C""l~ R<ad, M. S"'.,."'') C"iJ ",.1 Qu..",' flhllH,h (London. 1~$1), p, 118.
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church. presided aT Eliz;abeth's fm>t Parliamem. and ser,ed as ModeroTor for
the WO:Slminsll.T DisputaTion. The purpose of This dispuTation. which look
place just as the 1559 Act of Supremacy and Uniformity looked likely 10 fail.
has often been debated. Some historians claim that it was meant to pl"O\'ide
an excuse 10 am:st somc Marian bishops.JJ Othen think thal it was meant to
legilimize the Protestant side through open debate, or 10 weaken the Catholic
side through a rigged S)'Stern of debate.].I Whale\'er its purpose. its actual
accomplishment was that il gathered together the ideas of many fine
Proll:Slant minds. including those of John Jcwel. and hclped alter the balance
of pOWCT fOl" Elinlbcth in her first Parliament Bacon's modmilion helped
make this possible, His moderalKJn also helped sellle the \eslmetlt
contTO\'ersy in 1571. wbich threatened to \'iolently upset the stl\lC1Urt and
beliefs of the Onum of England.~
Analhn" Nioodcmite of the Marian )'c:aB "'3$ Roben Dudle)',
fnourite of Queen Elizabeth and lall'!" Earl of Leicester. Dudicy's father. the
Duke of Northumberland led !he uprising against Mary and atlempted 10
placc Janc Grcy on the throne. Robm Dudley and his brothen led some of
the troops in thal attempt:. Hc and his brothen "ne accordingl)' senl 10 the
TO\\~. and his father "'as cxecuted as a traitOl". Robcn Dudlt')' remained in
the Tower until 155". when he W'as released on the goodwill of the new King
Philip. He W'as pardoned in 1555 and even panidpated in some court
activities. 5Uggcsting that he 100 conformed 10 thc Catholic m3.$$. He "'as not
completely trusted. however. being one of the people ordered to leave
London during lbe Queen's confinemrnl.)o;
Room Dudley was still just a rising fl1\ourite during the time of
the Eli1.abethan Settlement in 1559. so the most significant of his
contribulions 10 the Church of England occum:d laler. He developed a
., ll.......y Norb<n IJ... 171< Elt.liN'Ioan n!ligiou!H"I,_",' "'''''~ <Jf.-...".,..,., ,*",_...
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reputation as a champion of the Proiesmm cause. John AI)'Il1er dedicated his
response 10 Knox's treatise against women rulers 10 Dudley because he
thouglll that Dudley was a person who had a 'singular favour and desire 10
advance and promotc the I1UI: doctrine of Christ's Cross.' Many othet" works
wen: either dedicated 10 Roben Dudley 01" published under his promotion:
fOl" e:<ample, in 1561. a treatise againsl thc doctline of free will; in 1562, a
trnnslalioo of The l.ol"$ and S/tJ/IIfes 01 (Nne>v; in 156.t. a translation of
Peter Martyr's CommelJlarles 011 Judgn: and in 1572. a ~futalion of the
papal bull against Eli:tabcth. ""Tltten by Heinrich Bullinger himsel[ Because
this refutation W'as so importanl. Sarah Gristwood thinks that this dedicalion
'amoUlII[edllo an official recognition of Leicester's stalUS as guanIian of
ProcCSUllllism.,n Dudley also pa1roni~ particular clerics. belping them
secure posts in the church, Laurence IIwnphrcy. fOl" cxarnplc. attributed his
placanem to Dudley.'"
The historian Camden noto:s that Dudley was ','ery skilful in
lemporizing. and filling himself to the times. to S("'n'e his own lurn. ,Jo I1 is
true that Dudley wu a master equh'ocalOl", sometIting he learned early and
dcveloped during his )"C3I"S as a Nicodernite. He used his skills 10 promote
the ~ign of Elizabeth and her religious selllemcnl; for example. "hen hc
managed 10 let some of the COrtlinenllll Catholic pow-ers bcliC'o'c in his
possible conversion during Elizabeth·s marriage negotialions,· and when he
let himself be considered the champion of the puritans e\ en though he did not
specifically adhere to puritan beliefs. His actual beliefs reflected his position
in the Elizabethan gO"ernment, as shown during the conlro\'~ of the
prophesyings when he followed ord\'l'S and helped suppress them. Thomas
Wood anacked him in print for betraying thc purilans over this issue atld
Dudley wTOte b.ad: to Wood to dcny it, He said Ihal:
I am noo, I thank God. fantaSIi<:all) po:rsu:oded in ",Iigion bUl. being
"'solved to 0')' eomfon of all the sobstance theteof, do find il soWldly and
" Sorah GNt"'ood. [1I:"J,."h ,."J L,h'w,r (101.... Yor~. ~oon p.I'I9.
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godly Sd forth in this UI'Ii\"crso.l Church of England"."hich doetri"" aoo
rclilliOflI "ish 10 be "b.y~ dui)" as il "usht "f.1I ,ubjects "fthi, land."
Dudlcy·s suppon of the Chureh of England helped it de\'e[op. but
the N'kodemite "ith Ihe greatest innu~ ",'er the nedgling church "'lIli
William Cecil. the queen's secn1:ar)'. Cecil Yo'llli Northumberland's principal
sccrdal)' and took pan in the alteration of succession that attempted to put
Lady Jane Grey on the throoe. but he managed to~ the consequences of
that through dipJomao:y and eqUi\"OClltioo. He was ooe of the first people
pardoned WKIer Mary. and managed to establish himself at a distanCe from
the ooun. a1loY.ing him to both de..-elop a network of connections and keep
away from religious quarTds. Like NiclJOlas Bacon. Cecil managed to take
positions thill "-a'l: DOl b}' nature religious; for example. he served at
Reginald Pole's lord high S1~'3I'd, accompanied delegates for diplomatic
missions. and acted as bosl for some of King Philip's retinue.c The most
rig,-y lTKJ\'e Cecil made was during the Parliament of ISSS. when he acth'ely
resisted the bill to take away the \.:lnd of all exila His effOlt$ saved the
proper!)' of many of the Marian exiles. and helped them survi\'e on the
continent..u Also. although Cecil outwardly confanned and carefully
maintained that !!bow of cOllformity. he did quietly K'Sist in ocher ways. For
example. he O"ned the land in Lincolnshire on which John Day ran his
printing business for the fU'Sl two )'eaf'S of Mar)'s mgn," Conyen Read
thinks that this form ofresiSl3JlCe renects Ceci!'s sensible. logical nature. As
Read puts it, 'Cecil "'lIli lemp<ramenl:llly no mart}T. He knew that he could
lIoCcomplish more in office than out of office. more Ih'ing than dead. more by
moking friends ofthc mammon of unrightCOllsness than by openly opposing
it:"
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Once Elizabeth ascended the lhrone, Cecil became her secretary
and remained in her service until his death in 1598. Cecil was invoI\'ed in the
creation of the Acts of Suprem3oC)' and Unif<nnil)' that established the
Churdi or England. enginecrc:d. its first bench of bishops. on:bestrated the
Wesuninsler Disputation. and defended the church against threats of all
kinds. He also commissioned JoIm Jewel 10 wrile the Apology. and to write
another anonymous letter called the Epistle• ....hich WllS meant to ans.....er
some continental deuactors of the Church of England." Cecirs skills in
equ.i\<OCIlioo and diplomacy are well knovon, and !hose skills helped bring lite
Church ofEng.land into existence in the: form it took in 1559,'7
As prm'en tIuooglt lbesc' case studies. a net",oO; of Nicodanites
anc:t"'8ed from !heir grim confannity during Mary's mgn to tale the mns of
a new government and a new church. During the rears of their Nicodemism.
Ihcy displared • range or behaviours,. from quin retirement 10 active
resistance, and de\'doped the skills they needed 10 help run a Proteswu
government. 1lIey assisted in the formation of Ihe Chun:b of England in
many 'A"3.)~ from the indim:t sort of help provided by Anne Warcup. 10 the
dangerous under'ground woO;: of John Day. 10 the carrlul diplOIDaC}' of
William CeciL These people pl'O\'c how Nicodemism "'lIli rtOI necessarily an
IICl of cowardice or ambiguily, It was often 11 fann of faith, a deliberate
CO\JJW of action based on religious and moral beliefs. One could be both a
Nicodemite and a commined Protestant. as long as one did not 'COIl5CtItlO the
wyckednesse. '
"lbid, p. :6:1,
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How were the 164J depositions manipulated in Engl:lOd 10
persuade the English masses ofCatholie persecution?
Sophie Cooper
Ar.l.n thr. cruel~ IhaI to exen:~ upon us, '.., """" _ for ",,- calM, offmc:c, or
.-mi"l! p.......,.ion in innicled on .... (5in~ed)""ins 1Nl wc "'Cf'e ProtC$UllllS.'
This arlicle "ill look al how lhe: dqJOSilions taken in the aftermalh of Ihe
I!HI Irish rdJdlion"~ manipulated by authors in England 10 achie'l'e!heir
OVon ends. lbe principle q~ions !hat Ihis anick aims 10 answer are: how
were the depositions altered to prOOUCC' an utterly negative image of Irish
Catholics in the minds of the English? Who read the mal't}TOlogies and
pamphleu which ,,-a-e produced? Fill3l1y, how,,~ the deposilions used 10
equate the hom:Jf of "itat was happening in Ireland >lith Protestants being
God's cho$en people? To answer some of these questions. this arlicle >lill
examine the auaeu and SUlries which >l1:re published in mar1)ToIogies. like
Samuel Clarkc's A genervl man)"rolog~, and oom~ them to the original
dqlOSilions 10 s« ,,-her-e disparilies e:<ist. Firstly a definilion is necessary.
the Oxfim/ English Dictionm:r derUlCS a mart}T1llogy as 'the histories of
mill'tyn coll«tivcly·. ~ Kathken M. Noman has described the role of
mart}TOlogiSlS as religious people seeking 'to edify. inspire, and cajolc Ihe
failhful who could occasional!)' grow faint-hC'aned.·)
llJe Marian per.l«ulions ofthc mid-sixll.'mlh century became the
focus of man)' m:ntyrologislS. most famous of which was John FOlCe's Ae",
,mt! Monuments. Samuel Clarke's reliance on FOlCe's work is referenced in
, SO..... IClwb. A I<",MI~~H.<_lOll.., a «JII«,~ af(J/I 'M_" JW'""""'_ ,,'~k~
~.. b.-foIk<> ,,,, <lhn~<!CItr#t,/n_ ,,,, <T",.~ '" "orf""''''''' ';_' ""'ryl" u ,1>.." "" <.'11<"
............. 1>/,,,, f'rot<"",,,uuff<ri~ I" QI_" M"lu ry~ ~latry""",It ",/Md ,,,, In","'1 'hlrQ ""~
t:<tgIIJ~ ,N,'i".. ... '''t'',,,,r .,.;,~,,,, I"". <JIG",,,,,'''' lr/.N"", kl"ll 'If .1'>,..<It~. .Ja>_ ('o/~m.
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lhe inlrOdUClion to A general mart)"roJogie when Chute "Tiles 'some may
think this lallor of mine superfluous, because mese things ha,·e been so
largely, and fully handled by thlll faithful. and laborious servant o/Christ.
Masler FolC in his Act and Monumenu.' He does concede Ihlll 'I ha,'e IU11led
over many 0Iher Authors' and this can be seen by the: way that he li Its whole
pages from John Temple's The Irish rdwflion: This "ill be illUSl1'3led in
later pages. Foxe's namui\'e of weak ProIestaII15 suffering unpromked
CadJoIic~ion 'had bocome entrenched in the English psyche' by 1641
and bccamc a frame",ork ontO ",hich new tales of Catholic cruell)' could be
hllllg.' Manyrologies "'~ often used 10 explain "fly God allowed such
atrocities 10 occur 10 'His' people, Henry Jooes has been considered onc: of
the firsl "TilO$ that presented the kIea of the Irish Rebellion as being a
general massacre of Irish Pro!eswns.0 His A Remonstrance was published in
the inune<!iale aftermath of the Rebellion and recorded a num~ of
depositions ",hich ",ere !hen used in the marl)TOlogies of Temple and
Clarlr.e.' lhe ideas contained in all of IhcK books were spread around the
masses of England through a nwnhcr of mediums. including sermons and
also through the rise of cheap prim.
The depositioos consist of Ihirt)··thrtt \'olumes of manuscripls
held in Trinity Collegt' Dublin >lflich were compiled al three differenl limes
in the aftermath of the l!HI Irish Rebellion. Joseph Cope has described the
depositions as 'an archi\'e of sun'i\'al S1orics' and 10 a huge extent mey are
witness teslimonies.' The objective of their compilation differed depending
on when they ",ere rtCorded, Thc firSl depositions were laken by a
• SorIlI><l ctone. A ~""MI ~....w,;':.1so Johl T~ ... .".. 1rWt /1./><11"",. <1<. ""/Wk":'- af'iw
<1<,,_, af'''' /rlI. pap/I'S '" .~'11"p11U ,,,, """"'hNIO I~ ,iw AI~~ ~Iryland; "'p1h<r ~;,~ ,I><
__<rwl,;'j _1ti<t<4'~" "lW<"~ .",wd ,,,,..._ - .."n.nfr- /W """
~__ , I><"'k "'p"'II_ 'If",lw, .,~."H"'IH'(London, 1112~ ,
'o..'i<! A. 0·11 £"11/1,• ...,,~b«oo4tandlrl<.1I.b.-1liun. 16II.Ml9~~OL 2006}.p..IQ El.....
Ho..-.nl Shopn. ·C_....~inidiIConl: Oloo~. ..... ''''' UlIIi>h,_to ,"" Iri>II
~bellion of 1641' in .".. ;"""",I! ofB,lIh. SI",II<•• ,-",·i. 1(19\11). pp 4-J~, ,
• Wolttf t.o." in To"'O"('''''....''' .0«:"""...... fro", 1", ...-.1: oont.~ po"'!Jhlel ,..c<""" '" U..
Confed<nto w 1641·I&W (M.U" thtsll. Unj"."ilyCollqo o"hlin. (9911), p, 6.
, lI.....y .kuI«. A """"",,"" ofdl,,,....."""',,lbl. J""S"S" <'0l><Il",1"11'''' c.".... ,wd Itl,."t.><w
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conunissiOfl dating from 23 December 1641 and were quickly followed by a
second commission in JanullJ)' 1642. The sceond commissiOfl required the
commissioneB to ask about British settlrn; who had been mUTdffed or died
due to e:<posure and famine,· Although there "''lIS a thin! group of depositions
taken by Qlh'er Cromwe1l's men the following decade. they focused on
cOfl\"ieting~ invoh'ed in the rebellion. not the general stories of th~
people who Wal: attaCked. The length of time in betwem the event and the
record also brings into question the legitimat)· of the testimony. as people
forget things and ina(h'erlently change their story. The focus of this anicle is
on ClaR.e"s martyrology wbich is based on the depositions recorded in the
immediate aftennath of the rebellioo. and therefore, they shall be the focal
point. The depositions an: nJuable as the). pn:r.ide insight into the economic
and social makeup of Ireland at the time; howc\"Cl'". the). do supply plen\)' of
problems to the histcrian. They an: ptOCtie:tlly all made by I'role$wus.
mainJy English setller5. to Prol:estants and ~fore the inherent snobberies
of the tillH: an: nidal!. The lISU31 problems of ",itness statements also oist
",itbin the depositioos. People an: subconsciously influenced ~. $lanes that
the). ha\'e heard. the way that they "'-ere brought up, an added issue with these
depositions WlIS that many deponents were illiterate and !hm:'fore at the
m~' of wboe·..er WlIS uanscribing their testimony. Ne\'erthdcss.. the
depositions an: a priceless resource for the hi$lcrian of early $e'\'enteenth
century In:Iand.
l1te flow of information about n'enl5 in Ireland throughout the
1(H()s led to 'a paper war' between the parliammtarillflS and the 1"O)1IIists.'·
The dqxIsitions were utilized b)' both sides during the English Ch'il War. and
thrif use did nOl stop there. They were used as anti-Catholic propaganda for
at least a ccntuty aftcrwan!s; the numerous re-editions of John Temple's The
Irish Rebellion which continued wuil 1812 il1ustrote this." 'The Irish
• Mic'-I P.,.<",~I·,"",,,,••lI. 'n.. u...... Ri<ing of '<'>I ,.•"" I'" Ilfp>l........ "' /rIj~ l/j"a..k,II
.'it",lif$. ",i. 12 (1911~ pp H4-67.
"0·11.... f:"IIIi3h ".....IxJo>b. p.lJ.
"Kothlcen M. Noonan. "'n.. <"",11 JIR'«'lli'of ........0<1....,,,,,,,,.. roa.....-, IriM.r>! t:lljlilh
....... ~). in ..,mc"""'lKo:nlUfY ""Iicy.r>! p"'I"'ll"rolo' in T"" Ili"",!raI .It,,,,",,,,,, ",.,i. \ (19"11). ""
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rebellion was, therefore. written by Englishmen for a domestic audience. with
domestic political objectives in mind. and the domestic reading audience: was
given limely reminders of the popish lhreat at key moments"~ John Foxe
regarded print as a 'providential gift from God which allowed lite shackles of
Rome to be shaken ofT and the true lighl of lite Gospel to da",n: LJ D3vid
Cressy has estimated tJuu thirty-three petUnt of adult males. and ten pattnl
or adult women in England could read and write by 1640." lbe constant
stream of information between the worid of print and 0Illl cultun" helped
spread the stories found in pamphlets and other print sourttS. Ultimately.
being illiterate did not stop people from utilizing the skills of others.. lJ It has
been found that. bcro.I"eell I~I and165J. of the 20.767 ",'QI'b that ",-ere
printed in London. 921 relaled to Ireland specifically: a total. of4.4 per cent
of all primed ",ms.16 John Ball has sho",n tJuu the initial Sl:orles of the
Uprising found in the London cheap prim u.k were based on e:<:iSl:ing
English notions of Catholic atrocities and. cruelty, and these stories were
merged ",ith exaggerated accounts of the n·etIts found in the depositions.. l1
Often the other authors who recycled the depositions and ideas lhal: !bey
found in Temple and Joocs' works did noc make clear if they had looIo::ed at
printed. manuscript, or criginal copies of depositions.. This made it easier foI"
a .specific $et of messages to percolate through the mass of literature available
10 the English masses."During the 1640s and 1650s. there was a tcmpor.uy
illC1"C3Se in the number of published amhors who were dra"TI from socially
and educaliOlUllly disadvantaged S«tions of socil"l.y.'· This led to a large
number of cheaply produced pamphlets and chapbooks which recycled much
" ....... I"ca<ey. 1'a1#irw..-J l',uttphI"Hf>_ propo_Iu Jwi.,"" f:"Siu~ CMI ......,..-1
bwnrr- (AIdfnhat. WlJ.I). pp :'1·:.
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.of the same information with a slightly different headline. Due to this. there
were two and a half times more editions printed between 1641 and 1700 than
in the prc<::eding century and a half.'"
The central topic of this anicle will be the manipulation of the
depositions in A general mal1)"rofagie. The omissions of the work will be as
important as that included, as they were, presumably. intentional omissions
meant to portray the rebels in a certain light. These will be illustrated by
comparing the actual depositions with their portrayals in Clarke's work, as
well as through using other depositioos not specifically mentioned. The use
of 'headlines' in the margins of Clarke's work are also important as they
allow for certain elements of the prose to be emphasized. Whilc this
technique was used by both Protestant and Catholic authors, phrases such as
'popish malice' and 'popish cruelty' were highlighted by martyrologists to
allow quick and directed reading for the English Protestant pUblic." There
are many repetitions of images throughout the General marlyrolugie
suggesting that they are not all specific to Ireland. but emphasizing the idea
that 1641 was a chapter in a long history of Catholic persecution in a
religious war between Protestants and Catholics. lbese images are also used
in Temple and Foxe and focus 00 violence against mothers and children,
murder, disembowelment and also violence against the Bible and religious
ground. These descriptions were used frequently, and still are, to emphasize
the barbarism of invading forces. no matter what religioo or race. One only
need look at reports from World War One to sce this.
A preoccupation of the martyrologists was to '''am English
Protestants about the threat of a huge and barbaric l'I1emy: International
Catholicism. As the Rising spread outside Ulster, the leaders solicited the
support of the Catholic Old English gemry claiming to be fighting for King
Charles I. but also to protect the liberties. religion. estates and persons of
'" G~". P,;",,,,../ r"".."""<.,,,. p, 9,
" fo' • C.,IIo]'" ",.mp", """ John T. Gilbert. «I, A ,:o"""'J-irJ' hJr,OIJ' ofq/fidrs i" /"/u"J,frr>m
/MI 10 I6H: """'P 'Mjir>lli.... puhlill>N.l "J'h u" uPI"O<I~'furiFJ""II""n "00 dO<"""","',
(Dublin. 181l(}).
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Catholics in l.reland." This declaration of fighting for Catbolic rights w'Us a
trigger for widespread panic in England at the threat of a Catholic invasion. It
combined with existing fears that the king was secretly Catholic, and was
going to ovenhrow the Refonnmion. Samucl Clarke explicitly gives his
reason for writing his martyrology as 'we have cause to fear the worst, and to
prepare for it; Forwarnd, forearmed.") Sweeping statements about the threat
of international Catholicism were supported by stories of the Irish rebels
wanting to kill all English people. Depositions such as Elizabeth Gough's
were relied on to provide the 'proof for people. She deposed that:
sh<: demaunded of Cahil 0 Reily the reason of these Mirages against the
English aho,·~ 0Ih.: ...: th.: said Cahil answcrinK thal it was piuy thal allth.:
English in England & Ireland wen: nol hangd dr~w"" and qual1c",d bet"",
OOW, this deponent dcmaunding the reason he replied, ther th.:y had hanged
& qual1ered the Quccnes priest in her preser>ce' & had pili gunpowder in
her sadle to blowe her up' ,he said El/glish calling her whore & hcrchildren
baslards "
Depositions such as these were used both to illustrate Catholic violence, bUl
also in some cases to demonstrate the support of the Catholics for Charles I
and his Catholic wife. These were used by the parliamentarians eager to
undercut English support for the king. Accounts of rebel suppon for the king
were relevant in the immediate aftennlllh orthe Rising, but a1>o later on after
the succession crisis when England was yet again faced with the prospect of a
Catholic monarch. Adam Glouer's testimony included reference to the rebels
having Charles l's support,
Phillip Rely spale & '1tered these traiterous words that he had the kings
broode ..,ale for doing the san", & ,hewed a writing by which he £(Jid Iw
had aulhorily from lhe king"
" AiJo" ClAr' •. ''The g~i. "f'Oo UIsk< ~iiinll of ](j.I1 . in PO!'" Roobuok. od. PI"""";",, '"
r.'::'UioIr: e'>OJ~ 10 UI".. M"O<)' in 1>0""", 0/J. L .<JcC",,"un (Belfa... 1981 ~ pp 2945.
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"Depooilioo ofElizabcth Go~ 8 fcb. 1(j.I2, 16-11 Dcvo>itioR> Projecl (bl'pJI J(j.IJ."-di<l<kpooition
.~? dep ID < "PhP ""M 833002.0(3) (accnsed Mo....y 13 Doe. 2010).11 "'fe"'....... '0 ,I>< 001....
Jeposilioo. "-er< oe<nsed <H:I 13 Doe. 1010 ""..... "'I><'" is<: ...,ed,
" Dopositioo of A<b.m GIo"", 4 l .... 1(j.I2 ( ht'pJII64J.'cd.i<ltkpo>ition.php).
33
-For those supporting the king. Ibis Stalement ofrdld support for the king was
auributed to the sly and devious n.arures of the Irish. who would lie to fool
and hann the Protestllnts in Ireland, but also to hann and slander the king. In
some instances, the use of the king's seal was simpl)' ignored. In the
deposition of Margam Fermeny, John Temple "'TlMe about now she was
robbed, her husband was killed, and !ben she was stripped se-'en times in me
day 00 the way to Dublin,3l This humiliation of an old woman. combined
"'ith the material and emGlional losses served to illustrate Irish barbarity.
However. Mrs Fermeny also testified that the rebels elaimed to be the king's
soldiers and had a warrant from the king. but Temple deleted this part and
chose: to focus on the uncouth and malicious behal'iour of the Irish
Catholics. IT After the Reformation. lrishness became 'inemuingl)' defined in
terms of Roman Catholicism.. and Roman Catholicism in Ireland beconles
incmtsingly an assertion of non-Englishness.. ,:0 These acts of betr.I)-a1 w~
further C"'idenct: of their un·English ways in Ihe eyes of many
contemporaries,
Other instances of Catholic betnLyal seized upon by Samuel
Clarte and his peers were used as a moral lesson to Protestants not 10 truSI
'Glhers'. An examph,' of this bet11lyal in Samuel Clarke's work was "ncn
chief Irish gentkmen prmtised tIleir PmIestant Dcighbours Ibat if Ibey ga,"e
them their challel and goods. the PmIestal1ts would be safe. Clarke argues
that the Catholic neighbours. whom 'the English PmIestants. ..nC"·er pRJ\"oked
them thereto, yea that had alwa)'S !i"cd peaceably "ith them, administring
help and comfort 10 them in diStress. pUlling no difference belwixlthem and
those: their 0\\11 Nalion, and cherished them as Friends and loving
Neighbon;', promised to 'secure them from the rage ofllle common people'.
This. according 10 Samuel Clarite, did not happened as the Catholics double·
crossed the Protestants.. stealing their goods and then murdering them. lO [I is
It T.....1e. no, '"'~ ,.,,,,,1/;,,,,. Po 1'1
"N_ 'Tho <nltll J'IftO'II'<',
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possible that this S10ry came from the deposition of John Glasse who accused
Florem:e Fit7.palriek of taking people into his protection in exchange for their
belongings and then 'in mOSt bloodie & barbarous manor. nlurthered those
betooke themselues to him for safctie.·..
1nStances of Catholics helping their Proieswu neighbours are
\\tlolly e:..eluded from Clarte's ll1lIlt)To!ogy althougb they are relath'ely
common "'ithin me deposilions lbcrn.se1\'C'S, AI! example of this is in !he
deposition of Roben Ma:..wdl. who Samuel Clme quotes while discussing
the rej~lion of Catholicism on pain of death that was chosen by some
English Protestants. The instance of deven rear old Robcrt Ecklin who
refused to go to Mass on pain of death is emphasized by bolh C!arte and
Temple, as is the story of Henry Cowel "ho was offered his life if 'be would
II1lIlT)" onc of the base Trolls' or go to Mass. CO'I'o"\'1 refused this olft!" and
chose: death.J1 HowC""er, in the same depositioo il ~es clear that these
stories are hearsay: Robat Ma:(well did not witness either e,'ent, He did,
however, receive aid from the 'best trends amOllgst the Rebells', Katherine
Hovenden, the mother of Sir I'hclim O'Neill.ll Katherine apparenlly provided
food and prottctioo for twenl}' four English and Scots for thiMy-seven weeks.
"fhe fact thal these three stories are tttoumed in me deposition iUustnlles the
ease in \\'hich John Temple or Henry Jones could ha, e related inSIanee of
kindness if they had so "'ished, Samuel Clarte, hO'l'o"(',"t!". would probably 1101
have had access 10 the actual depositions and therefore would probably ha\'e
recycled the testimonies detailed in other toniCS and thus would have been
oblivious to lhese conflicling stories. The compassion shown by Katherine
Ne Mahon (Ka.therine Hovendcn) was I"('lated in other depositions. ineluding
Thomas Cranl's in which be credits Katherine with sa\"ing his life and the
lives of his family.JJ This image of Irish 5tlC(:0IlT, blm."C\·er, did DOl fil "'ith
the poI'tnyal of Irish CllIhoIics that was being presented by English
It Dq>o>i;ioo of JoIIn CH.... I Apr. 1642 ( h"p:/II64I.t<d.~d<po.ilion.php),
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martyrologists. and indeed most English pamphleteers. at a time when an
emphasis OIl Catholic malice and uncouthness was important.
More in supporting the ideas and sentiments of the English
masses. and the idca of a long history of Catholic persecution of innocent
Protestants, were illustr"tions of Catholic violence. 'nlcse were oflen literally
illustratcd with the use ofwoOOcuttings of the genre that are seen in Tcarcs of
Ireland and throughout Clarke's work.'" These enabled the illiterate to
understand the atrocities that were occurring, and also to drivc home to those
who could read what they were reading about. These woodcuttings were
often recycled and took images from anecdotes from all aroulld Europe at the
time. In fact. A gcncrol nJnrfyrologie dedicated only sixteen oul of 574 pages
to the 1641 Rcbellion. while the images lIsed during these sixteen pagcs are
reused througllOul. Clarke presents 1641 as a confessional conflict. l10t one
that had its roots ill economic. political. or social reasons and this fits with his
namttive of Catholic persecution. Most of the images of violence used
througholll are typical of the time and genre: children being roasted on spits.
young children who are murdered in their mothers' anns before the mother is
killed. dro"ning. bumings. and rape.Jl Within the actual depositions.
however. it is possible to note that most of these stories are hearsay and were
not actually witnessed by the person relating them as fact. To emphasize the
un-Christian nature of those involved in the rebellion. Templc set in motion
the idea that the Irish Rebellion was the responsibility of Irish Catholics friars
and priests set on overthrowing the Protestant community in both Britain and
Ireland. The depositions contain imagcs of Irish Catholics desecrating the
Bible, the focal point for Protestants who were allowed to read the Bible
themselves, and murdering members of the Protestant clergy. Samuel Clarke
relates stories of priests giving the sacrament to all thc Irish as long as thcy
would promise to kill all the English Protestants, saying 'That it did them a
)< J'm<:! c"",f,,,,J. T/o< ,,,IT<, of1...11",,1 ~h<n'i" "/n...~· pr<un,,,1 ," in " -f!" u" ''1 I/o< 'ml!<",,1
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great deal of good to wash their Hands in their BloOO.,J6 Henry Jones was the
hcad of the deposition collection ClHnmission. and would have therefore been
deeply influenced by the depositions such as that of Adam Glouer. Glouer's
deposition testified to the sacrilegious role of the Irish Catholics:
James 0 Rely of or ne", "ntn the parish of Ilollyhe)'<:s yeoman and Hugh
Brad)' of or "'"'' IM. potisl, ofVrnagh and di,-e", OIhe'" ",flhe Rebell., did
,hen often take into their hands the prole.tant bybles & wc"t,ing lhem on thi:
dllrty ....·aler did 5 or 6 seueraJl Iymes dash the same on the face of the
deponent & other protestants saying come I kllOW y,HI 10\" a good lesson.
HeT<: is a most e""den! one for )"OU & come \0 morro....· & you shall ha.'c as
good a scnnon os Ihis: & used other scornfull and disgrncefull words "nlo
them J1
Again. instances of the Catholic clergy helping Protestam refugees were not
recorded although they do exist.
Manyrologies were popular as they were a way of equating what
v,as happCllmg in Ireland. and elsewhere, with the existCllce of God. They
were also a way of fonning a British identity which madc the English people
God's chosen ones. By the time of the third edition of Samuel Clarke's A
gener," mn17yrologie. Britain was engulfed by another presumed threat of a
popish plot. This had been brought about by the succession crisis which
occurred due to Charles lI's lack of legitimate children. The heir
presumptive, therefore. became his brother Jame5 who was a Catholic. The
Earl ofShaftesbury's campaign to exclude James from the succession led to a
period of huge anti-Catholicism with fears that the Irish Catholics. alwa~ a
presumed backdoor for continental Catholicism in to Britain, were ready to
rise up with the help of the French. The 1641 Rebellion had been included in
Clarke's work since 1651 and "",,s ponrayed as just one chapter in a long
histOl)' of Catholic persecution of Protestants. The ideas which v.ere
encompassed by Clarke. and previously John Temple's work The Irish
Rebellion which was republished in 1672, were therefore at the fore in the
"tbOJ_. p_ 269,
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minds of many English Pro!estanls as the international lh~al of Calholicism
"'liS again at large. A get/era/ mllrf)T'Ologie emphasited the th~al posed by
Irish Catholics and their allies in Spain and France, and helped remind
"'lining Protestants of their long perseculed anCesll:n, When Roger
L"Estrange allowed Clarke's wor\: 10 be n:-printed inl679 'TIle Popish Plot"
(brought aboul by lirus Oales' declanltions mat Catholics,,~going to push
Pro!estants OUI of &tgland in September 1678) "'liS spearheading another
"''lI\'e ofanti-Catholic hysteria!"
The reasons \'lII'ied bul~ are two main e:~planations for "hat
the Pro!estants in England wenl through al the hands of the Catholics. Doe of
these e:~planaJ.ions seems to be God ,,'lIS punishing the English Protestants in
Ireland fir the loknmce sho".-ed to Catholics b)' C'harles I and many of the
Protestants in Imand. JO Another reason gi\'en "'lIS that God "'lIS lesting the
Protestants in 1~1and. as be had tested Pml:estants thtoogboot Europe, as to
cleanse them aDd allow them 10 go to Hea\-en, Sam~l C\ari;:e outline this in
the introduction to his mart)'roIog> "riting thal 'He knov.'S that heavy
afflictions: and lhat grace is hid in nature here, as swe~ Water in Rose
Lean5, ",itich mUSl have the frre ofaffiietion put under 10 diSlil it OIIt,'- God
did TlOl: jUSl: lest the Pro!estants howe..-er, in eenain sirua.tions He showed His
!o\'e fir His Chosen People, Elizabeth Price's deposition about the events in
Portado"TI ha\'e been widely reused, the images of corpses et'nCfging the
River Bann screaming 'Revenge' made a huge impact. There are, oo...-e\·er,
other stories which ,,-en: utilized by Samuel Claric.e in his martymlog)'. In
Tipperary, a number of rebels murdered around lwenl}',fi\'e English
Pro!estants OIl a fair and clear Sabbath day,
B.. just B1 thalti~. God senl a fearful storm ofThun<kr, UiJ'lnini- Wind.
Itail and Rain' "hich lM rebels ronfC$.cd 'that i$ was a siil' ofGods aflia
ago.;ns/ IMm for thei' ~hl: Two of IM Prottslanu miraculoust),
.""-j,,.,,;I and ';1$ God SMw.,,;l his great ~rc) in Jl"'S"r"inll lMm. so he
"John Gibn<}-. 'E<lmun<! Murph}'. Oli,,,, P'"nk<1l .... lh< Pap;oh PI",- in 111,""1 /"/,,,,<1. 'ii. 4
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shc"'Cd his jllSl judil"n..m upon It"&h Kcnnod). the chief of tbosc
munhcrers. ..lill aOO.. E,\lht <la), aft." M dru\<,ncd hi_Jr."
In the depositions. the only ~feret\Ce fOllnd by Ihis researcher. was 1hal of
Ralph Lambert who claimed thal 'he hath likwise beene credihly toold both
by Irish and English' of the drowning. 'lAnother instance of these wonder.;
found in the depositions 1ll'llS lhe testimony of Elizabeth Crookcr.
the Rcbclb often pIbliqlltt)" said 10 Ihi. deponcrI and !he other Enalil.h
1lllll the) "ere noc ChrislilIns &. lhcrc .... noc ..,,~iort fOr them: And
saith aI_ Ifw as SQrI)C of lhc Rcbctb "ere robbir,a &. poophancing of 1hc
CI>uto>h onc oflhcm those robbcn fcU .....nc in 1hc Cbun:h c{Nrvry' &: !ell
n.., sudl Q tmnbling [ ling and CJ<1aS) that <Ilhcr Rebel.. ,,">= gIadd 10
earT)' him .... of1hc Church as a trvI.id .......
Although this 'miracle' was Illitnessed by the dqlOOCtll.. many other
depositions "''ft'e based on hearsay. This ~liance on hearsay "'lIS TlOl: made
dear in the original depositions as they "''ft'e TlOl: reo::orded in a ee:-Jtt of law
,,-ben • COI\\'iC1ion cannot be made on any unconfinned reports, Hov.'C\·er,
mast)TUIogiSlS such as Temple and C\ari;:e make no allempl. to make the
audicoce aware of this and portray it all as fact to support their claims. These
deposilions. or ponrayals of depositions, do help 10 support the view of
Protestants as God's people.. "no are either sa"ed in life or whose elcmaJ life
shall be spent at God's righl sidc. For this reason. stories from the depositions
"'~ utilized by preachers and ~Iigious people to in"ake renewed belief in
God from those whose belief was waning when confronled with so much
alrocity, in Ireland and in England. They were also used as moral guidelines,
slories ofgirls who shouled OUt God's name and tlten could not be stabbed b)'
a rebel, they were people lltal lite commoll people of England could look up
to and emulale,
The ideas cotllained in the martyrologil'S were spread more easily
than in previous years, due to the de>:rease in real price of books lhere was a
"Ibid.• p, 277.
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'do\\Tlwall!s diSSl."lTlinatioo' of prinl to the masses:" Another way of
spreading the ideas included in many of the lll(lI"C expensive books was
through the theatre and play pamphlets.. whieh did IlOl require lileracy as they
\\'t'!'t' heard not read.'l Manymlogies had been popular in England and
throughout Europe since the sixteenth eentu!)', due 10 cheap print and tire
increase of lileracy Je-.'els. Ihey had become more accessible 10 the masses.
When whole mllrtyrologies were not a\"ailable, aCet'Jlled \'ersions published
as pamphldS Wa"\' popular and eheapc!":" John Foxe's ANS tmd loton"mCFlfS
was also available for perusal in parish chlll'Ches ..'hill' il was said thal
Temple's The Irish Rebeffion WlIS 'a book worth chaining 10 1'\'1'1)' ehurch's
desk and reading O\~ ontt a ycu b)' 1""1'1)' family:" Martymlogies ..'t'!'t'
important becall5l' !hey pul current I'\'alts inlO a \\ider hislOrical and
European context. for tho5e in England Ihe) ..idened !he 0UI100k of 1TIlIn)".
The} \\'t'!'t' U1ili1.:td by politicians and the e1ites bowl'\er, to drum up popular
support for anti-Catholie crusades. for aamplc Temple's won: was produced
in some "~'5 to prm'ide support for his patron's son. Lord Lisle." Many of
!he original dqIosilions W't'!'t' fir.;( published to find mililaf)' and mondafy
support for the PnMeslaJlts in Ireland. and they W'tTC manipulated for man)'
)'CIB to come for similar reasons. The portnI)"lIl of the Irish Catholics as a
supcr.aitious 'Olher' ....as already being fashioned by 1641 due 10 Mary I and
also Ihe Gunpowder Plot of lOOS, These ideas were simply buih on by Clarke
and his peers to emphasize the thmll in a time of Purilllnical fer\"OUT, whieh
exi5ted al !he lime of A generoJ nJo,.,yrofogie's original two editions.
.. R.A.~LiI"'~';ntorl)'_m £~' ...,_tmJ~"'"Hoo.MOO(London. :!001~f; ~J: Nwtl Srn_I>. L ",-.NII"_ jn £>w/,,..,J. MJQ./6lJ()(l<>ndon. 1'1'1-0). p, N,
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The origins and inspirations of the Celtic re\'ival
Deirdre Kelly
This anicle will examine the background 10 the Celtic revival and
focus on !he specific indhiduals ...ho influenced its leading figures. In
doing so il \\i11 tUe inlo accounl !he universali!)' of folkloric lnIdilion
and its influentt O\cr a \\oider dimension. 1I ..ill anempl 10 formulale
an understanding as 10 w'hy this particular period in lrisb cultwal
nali<:nalism has mainlained such a fascination well O"'er a cemury after
it flCSl dI'\·eloped.
The binh of !he Irish Renaissance or Irish mival can be
said to ha"e begun with Thomas Da\'is (1814-45) ..-bo founded The
NOIion ne,.'spapc!" in 1&42 10 promulgate the regmention of pride in
Ireland amon.g Irishmen, Davis was exlTemely importam because be
was !he flf'Sl 10 argue efTecli"e!y that !he fiaun: of Irish ..Tiling lay in
bridging Ihe gap bo:I:ween Cellic Catholic Ireland and Pfo(estant Anglo-
Ireland,' [)a\'is did noI belong to a ~'olulionary organisation in !he
defIDed sense bUI l"lIthcr 10 a group thal inspired anliquarian belief and
interesl in !he Gaelic pasI, Ue and his friends aimed to establish. Irish
culture on ils own foundations. 10 go back as it ..'tTC. and to take up
lit the point where this culture had left off, wben the: Gaelic
aristocracy fled lhe count!)' ...ith lhe Flighl of the Earls in 1607,
Davis was aeti\'e in e\'cry group which was working for Ihe
improvement of the counU'y, and as edilor of The /I'll/ion encouraged
literary effort. As such he exercised a certain influence and garnered a
following.:
SanlUel Ferguson (1810-86), poet and antiquarian, was an
admirer of Davis. Writing in Ihe Dublin Uniw!rsil)' Maga:im.', he spoke
I R"honl roll... rlo< l'l1~ ,.""1,,,,,," ~n 1"'""ir",'1<m '0 A""/"./,i,h 1#",,,,,,, (DubI",- 197.). P
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out about how he, along "llh every OIher Irishman. was OUlrag~'d at
the lone of contempt directed al Ireland in the English press.
Follo\\ing thc traumatic years of Ihe Famine, theR' were persistent
",mours that the sySlan of Go\'l'1lUTIent in Ireland was to be changed.
The office of viceroy. and even the law rourts were supposedly under
threat. Ferguson as a barrister. felt that he could 001 hold back all)'
1000gtt. A new approach was needed to inculcate a sense of self-
idenlity and he declared Ihat the Anglo-lrish must 53ve themselves by
idenlif)ing Ihoroughly ..ith !he Irish past,J He IUmed 10 men of his
own kind for inspiralioo such as Slandish O'Orad)' (1846-1928) and
George petrie (1790-1866). Bodt \\"tf'e inll:gral to the g:ro..th and SWKt
of intensl in Irish cultural hiSlory.
In many wa)'5 !he Famine had lI'IaBed a watCTShed in Irish
life, demograpbka1l)', economicaU)', sociall) and culturally, Through
dealh and emigration. it dealt a near fatal blow to !he still powerful
Gaelic cultun: and panicularty 10 IhaI of the largesl and most
tnditional social grouping. the rural proletariat ..iJO disappe~ almo!it
a;,rnpletely from the face of the land \\ithin a couple of genenttions.
During iLS immediate aftermath Ireland remained in a somewhat
sluggish Slate until !he late 18705 and early 18805 ..-hen the post,
Famine: genrnttion emerged.' This gertaalion SOIIght 10 reshape Ireland
through a series of radical creatims which included Ihe Gaelic League
(1893). the Gaelic Athletic Association (1894) and lhe lilenry I'I:\'h'llJ.
Slandish O'Grady's Hi.s/QI')' of lref(md with ils stories of
heroic Irish tales in panicular, influenced many leading figures of the
Celtic revh·al. most notably. l.ady Augusta Gn:gor)'(1852.1932).' For
O'Grady, romance. epic. drama and anistic representation were cn'cial in
writing history. Archaeology culminated in history. he asserted, lIistory
, Oli,'<I' MxtJooollb- SI",..<if..iod (London, 1'It)). p.1 09,
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culminated in an. Anistic documentation whether lilerary or visual. were
juSl as important hiSloric contextual aids as straight historical fact.·
Part of the appeal of folklore for Lady Gregory, Douglas
H)'de (1860-1949). and W.O YealS (1865-1939). was that through its
srudy one could demoostrate and claim 'lrishness' at the very time
when this was being dermed more and more n::Slricl"·ely. 1lIe
disestablistunetn of the Church of Ireland in 1869, the Land War.
Gladstooe's legislation of 1881 enabling the lenant to become a pannet'
\\ith the landlord,lhe gT'OIloth of land purchase under subsequent Tory
~'emments and the imminent adoption of Home Rule. all contributed
10 the feeling lhat the whole social order and way of lif~ of the
AngIo-lrish minority \\'IIS coming to an elMe It has been suggested thal
these Anglo-lrish artists and writers wen: the first gmnation to ha\-e
gro\\n up in the n:alisation that the ascendancy of the class 10 \\1tich
they beloogcd \\'IIS no longer secure and irJe\·itable. F.S.L L)'ons
maintains Iltal lhis "'lIS the tngedy of the Anglo-lrish class. subsisting
as they did between (WO ,,·orlds. and 1IC\'er accepted by either. To the
English lhey came increasingly 10 seem an anacbrooism and to the
Catholic nationalisl Irish they remained an abnormality.· In simple terms
therefore, the only allemati\'c in the position of the minority was to
rebel againsl their class and religious ltaitage by adopting an alternative
identity.
When it came to a 'rein\'ention' of a Gaelic tradition, il
must be mm:mherOO that these major figures of the re\'iyal, such as
Lady Gregory ,w.e. Yeats and Goorge Russell (1867-1935). were anists
before they were nationalists and as such their strength Jay in cultural
interests.' They realised. 1I0w<,\,('r. Ihat if Ireland wen: ever to gain
political freedom, lhey would h.a\'e 10 provide the climate for il by
·1.1"....1MoA,..,.S",odiJ~o'G",,~', At: '''''I r..".(DubI""1OO1j, p. 11.
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helping cll'ate a nafional imagination which was diSlinetively Irish."
Folklore and anthropological intm'Sts opened a way into nationalism
via 'national tradition',1I Traditional Gaelic lilenlture h.ad a wealth of
stories.. siruations. cltarac1ers. imagery and folklorl.'. mostly dta"ll from
oral culrurc. which Slandish O'Grady had revealed to an avid
readet'Ship. Irish myth contained a diSlinai\"mes5 which WlIS~ as purely
Irish. 11 had to inspill' and resonate "ith the Irish ps)'che so Wt
although the meroes of sacrifice. death :md resurreaion "'ne universal.
it was only through the diSlincthoe sacrifICe, death and reslIl'I'tttion of
Irish heroes like CUchulainn thal a familiarit). immediacy and a
particular sense of ~lll.'f'Ship ~·oIved. A \'ilal pan of mis conscious
garnering of the past for the present and future was the recording of
oral tradition."
!be oral tale is the~ unh'ersal of all narrath'e fonns and
oral tradition is a body of information thal belongs to a panicubr
group of people. Its conlinued exisl:ence is b>' ....ord of mouth passed
from llm generation to the ncx1. What is transmined and 00..' it is
done is decided b>' ....hat social mcrnO!)' deems imponanl . It enhances
the sense of togelbancss that is SaJ1aified b>' the mystery of a distant
past. 0nLl tradition further ensures and entrcoches a sense of identity
in a people in the face of disasters. like loss of land. conquest. exile
and l:OIonialism. 11 can al....a}'s be me properly of the people wnatc\'eT
else is IosL lJ !be study of the folk tale and oral talc took pride of
place in international folldore scholarship from its nineleenth century
beginnings lUnit me middle of me twentieth century. b.1Sed on the
comparath'e scholarly frame....ork established by lhe Grimm Brothers.
Jakob (1785·1863) and Wilhelm (1786·1859). The pioneering talc
N F.II'" TN lri,~ ...""i'!IimI:<. p.~,
'; ItF. Fo.... PaJ./)' am .1fT r"....~ (l.o!>Jon, 1'I93~ pp ~o,. ~H.
, Ni<ola e-don Ilo",~ Io1d EI=belhCummin&. TIt. _. "",I<n!fl. """,~...... /~ 1>U1>/I~"",1
f.'Ii"'~(Dublin.19\11). p. I~.
",N. T""n. 'C~'if~ """"',"'1 in"..I,f1Idilion ond iI,,,,,,I,..lo.-.l 'ranomi..ion' in ~n1
S .......... MOB (""1""'-1..",.. 000 Ni;.11Je1l «,h). ON" tnoli""" ,Ih(/ ,,. ",,,,,,,,j,,/ow (0.".1>:"..
19\14). p. 16'1.
44
collection of the Irishman Thomas Crofton Croker (1798-1854) ....-as
translated by them and introduced "ilh a scholarly =r of thcir own
in 1807."
The early Irish Sloties based on lhe oral tales were prOOab1r
first documented around the eighth century, and they represenl the
foremost .....ritlen repository of the oral tradilioo of the Iron-Age Celu
.....ho nourished in Europe during the seven centuries before Christ. 11
Christian Ireland presm'oo. as a legllC)' fn:m paganism. the belief in a
time .....hen the supcmarur.ll was natural and the une:(plained normal.
'The)' have a value far beyond the tale of aclua1 ~'ents and daily
recorded facts..'" Standish O'Gndy's lIistOf)' of ireland provided the
fim tnm:dations of these Sloties into English. They bad been presl~fved
to some extent in the oral Irish \anguage culture. Due 10 uocenainty
.....hen il came 10 1r.U1SllIion. O'Grady used 'artistic licence' ....-hich
enabled him 10 omit any material or point of infornwion he feh did
DOl subscribe to his ideal." As Michael McAleer points out. the history
of one generation is m)1hologised ontO the nen. and so the cumulat;'e
histoties of successi"e genentlions mU$! therefore resuh in a qualilati"e
t1llllSformllion belween m)1h and hiSlOf)'. The l:OOCCJM of histOf)' that
iml.'f'CSlS O'Grady is nOl one of chronicle but of historil:al panems
informing mystic narratives, patterns ....-hose historical COl1Staocy. in his
view. gh'e rise to the m)"lh in the first place."
The two earliest and mOSt important surviving manuscripts.
date to the lwelfth cenlury. The period up to me end of the sixteenth
cennuy, was in Ireland. Wales and Scoiland. a time of literary revival
after the tunnoil of the previous epoch. The firsl of the manuscripts.
Lebor no hUMr., or The book of DIIII COli' was copied from an earlier
" Di>nn.lid O·G.,IIo.., L_I"t 1rl!J1t fo/4J_ (Cork.:!OOO~ pp H. 44. Crok.. "' oolleetor of
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manuscript ..rinen 00 the skin of a favourile animal. belonging 10
Saint Ciaran. who Ii\·oo in the 5e\"emh cenlury and gave the bool; its
name. An CDt!)' 00 one page reveals lhe name of the scribe lIS
MaeLmuiri \\flO was killed by raidCf'!i at Cloomacnois in 1106. 10 Only a
fragment of this book remains. amounting to 138 pagcs. sixty- sevCTI
Iea,'cs of ,·ellwn. but it contains some of the mClSl in,'aluable stories
iocluding the complell: account of Ihe epic saga the Toin 80 C,/Qilglle.
or the roit/ing of rhe Conle of CooIl!)'. in which the hero CUchulainn
performs some of his greatest feats. This is an epic acoounl of the
struggle between Medb of Connaught and Conchubar Mac Nessa of
Ulster. lIS 10 who should~ the BI"O\\T1 Bull of CooIey...flich can
be compared 10 Homer's Iliad with its tale of ..'llniors. weapons and
deities. LeIJo, mJ lIifldre was discO\'em:! b)' George Pc1rie (1790-1866)
in 1837 wben it turned up in the Hodges Smith CoIl«tioo of 227
manuscripcs that "ne pwclJas.ed by the RO)'a1 Irish Academ)' for 1.200
guineas in 18#.=-
Petrie was a ...lifer. musicologist. ardtaeologist and hiSlor1an
..110 dominated the 1lC\\1y cmcrgml field of Irish studics in the: filSl
half of the nineteenth Certtul)'. He ....as al50 curator of the RO)'a1 Irish
Acadcrny's Musewn of Anliquilies. [n 1831 the libr.uy of Austin
Cooper which had originally belonged 10 Colonel Bunm Con)1lgham
was offered fOl'" sale. Among this ooIleclion Wlls the Annals of rhe
"'our Masrers which Petrie subsequently donated to the Royal Irish
Academy. As a resull. he was made a life member of the Academy
and subsequent manuscripts which hc required 00 their behalf including
the Hodges Smith Collection where The Boofc of Dun Cow was
discovered. 11 These Annals or collections of manuscripts were edited by
" lA"",. "" ~Uid>Y. Rol,.1 I,ioh Acad<m)" (RIA MS Z3 ~ IS: c •. No. 1229)
" lbi<L
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Pelrie's fellow scholar, JoIUI O'Donovan and tr.msformed the nineleeth
cenlUry historiography of Gaelic lrellllld. l1
The secood mClSl important survi\'ing manuscript is the hooJ:
of /..einsler. Of somc..flat lesser importance are 11Ie yel/ow boot of
l.econ and The book of Baltl'mOle, bolh daling from the: founeenth
cenrury. The Boo4s of Lecan and Lismon are attributed to the fifteenth
cenrury.~ The language of these tales \'anes considerably. and it is
therefore nOl possible 10 gi\'e the exact dales of origin. Yet it appears
that Ihe oldest SUl'\'i\'ing manuscrip: dates to the eighth centW)'.
These ~ories. trnnslated by O'Grady in his own style. form
the: cmtcxt ..ithin \lonich the rtVi\'alisu based their 'mnnouOII' of
Gaelic uaditioo. F(W instance, according to Lebor Gaba/a (The book of
io,'asions), the earliest copy of \lobicb dates to the twelfth ~twy.
Ireland was subjec1ed to si:< im·asiolls..!· Within this mythological
accowu, the: narmlive of the hislory of Ireland is traced bad; 10 Noah
and his daugll\et', Cessair....flo am"ed forty dars before the: ftood.
Some 268 )'CafS latet'o came the filSl of the: IWO divine d)1lasties
recognized by Gaelic Iraditioo. 'The Racc of Panhol6n: and the Tuatha
Dc Danaan commonly called the Sidh.:3 The third inva5iOll was led by
Nemed. which means gods (W sorcerers from Northern Greece. When
Nemed died his people "'ere defeated and subjugated by !he Fomorii.'"
The Fomorians "'ere a race of powerful and cruel demons whose name
means lilemlly 'under the sea', They were dart. chlhonic forces.
peoplcs of monstrous shape and titanic size. the children of dartness.
Nemed rebelled and thc Fonlorii king was killed but only thinr of
Nemed's followers survi\'ed, ultimately leaving Ireland. in search of
1:I.Ioop leeno<n, ''''''rio; pol)......h w .'n,""""· in M"",,)'.~ P,tri<, Po o.
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=somewhere else to settle. Next came the Fir Bolg or 'bag men' who
got their name because alone point they were slaves, perhaps in
lbrace (an historic and geographic area in south-east Europe), and had
to carry bags of soil from the fertile part of the country lO the rocky,
barren area. They are said lO have divided Ireland into five provinces
called 'eoiceda' or 'fifths': U[aid (Ulster), Connachta (Connaught),
Lagin (Lcinster), Mumu (Munster), of which tradition S.1)'S there were
two provinces. North MWlster and South Munster,
The Tuatha De Danaan. the children of the light. ended the
Fir Bo[g's ro[e of Ireland when they defeated them at the first Battle
of Magh Tuiredh. The vanquished remainder are said to have fled to
Aran but another source claims they were kept by the Tuatha in
Connaught.'l These fifth invaders, the Tuatha De Danaan. the gods of
pre-Christian Ireland. also defeated the Fomorii at the second Banle of
Magh Tuiredh. MoyTuire, as it is now known is situated near Cong in
County Mayo. lbis baule between the ehi[dren of the light and the
children of the dark generated much of the heroic mythology and
resembles the battles between the gods and giants in pre-Homerie
Greece.
The name Tuatha De Danaan means 'people of the goddess
Danu', skilled in magic and all the arts with powerful ....':lrriors.
popularised as the Sidh in Irish folklore (fig.1.2). Their chief and
father god, the Daghda was the son of Eladu. They were finally
defeated by the invasionary forces of the Sons of Mil Espaine or
Mi[csians. the first human rulers in Ireland now knovoTl to be the
Celts. Standish O'Grady believed that through emulation something like
these stories of Heroic Ireland eou[d be fashioned again through his
\.\TIting. while his followers of a more mystical turn felt Ihat Heroic
Ireland lived on invisibly, as they believed the Tuatha De Danaan
lived on alkor their defeat by the Milesians. Heroic Ireland could be
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wimessed in vision and if the mystical effect were intense enough.
reincartlllted."
rig.1.2 Gcorgc Russcll AE, A spitU Or ,idli ill //'" JotJd<rap<',C<H"'3$ I~id 00
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TIlese stories proved inspirational for revivalists of the [ate
nineteenth, early twentieth centuries in their attempts to revitalise a
sense of national pride and renewal in Ireland. For George Russell in
particular. O'Grady represented the 'only Irish writer who exalted the
hero or the doer' and as such the heroic life was beyond the
contemplative or the aesthetic consciousness. Those looking to the
future salvation of Ireland, needed to look no further than the past. as
'" JoIln Wit",," f"n"... ,'/<Iio", qf,1ot Ir!>h li"""'" ",'1>"01 (S}n<U5<. 19tn p. S9.
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=O'Grady said that the ancient legends of Ireland wcre less history than
prophccy.JoJ
W.1l Yeats also saw the necessity to build a ncw tradition
because. as he saw it. 'there was no help for it.' seeing his country.
he feh. 'was not born at all:)1 Yeats attempted to re-educate public
taste by acquainting his fellow countrymen with an imaginative
tradition in Irish literamre. that made Ireland beautiful in memory.J~ He
'.'Totc in his autobiographies. that he was haunted all his life with the
idea that poets should know all classes of men as one of themselves
and that he should combine the greatest possible knowledge of the
speech and circumstances of the world. else the artist would grow
more and more distinct and lose grasp of the always more complex
world." Folklore and anthropological interests opened a way into
nationalism via 'national traditiOll.·H
The disgrace and death ofChar1es Ste\\"rt Parnell (1846-1891)
had profoundly shaken natiOllal self-confidence and perhaps there was
a sense of safety in groups as there scented to be distNst in the idea
of a single leader who could inspire a country. The 1890s saw the
Irish revivalists desperately seeking some sense of identity within a
group as way of defining what it meant to be an Irish writer. Thus. a
n(){iOll of Celticism emerged as a means of common purpose. Studies into
mythology and religion from a 'modem' perspective. such as Sir James
Frazer's (1854-1941) The golden bough. had reached a broad audience
and influcnced many writers. l1rnmgh a revival of Celtic mythology
and thc srudy of folklore. believers hoped to restore an appreciation of
the beauty and holiness of [reland. John Hutchinson maintains that it
was in the arts where we find perhaps the greatest impact of cultural
nationalism. The artist-creator is conceived as the paradigmatic figure of
'" AE. 'LiI"""ure and I;fo: SlaJl<li>h O'Grady' in TM Iris~ SIa'''''''''', 26 MO}' Iq23. p, 231.
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the community. dramatizing the reasons for its historical experiences
and thereby inspiring future generations to individual and collective
self-realisation."
Culrural nationalism is quite independent from political
nationalism. Its aim is the moral regeneration of the national community
rather than the achievement of an autonomous state. Historical memory.
Hutchinsoo believes, serves to define the national conununity. The culrural
nationalist is a moral regenerator who seeks to re-unite the different
aspects of Ihe nation, such as traditioo. modcrnism, agriculmro and
industry. science and religion, by returning to the creative life-principle
of a nation. [t is onl)' by recovering thc history of the nation Ihrough
all its triumphs and disast~'TS that its members can rediscovcr Iheir
authentic purpose. These histories typically form a set of repetitive
mythic patterns, cotllaining a migratioo Story. a founding m}1h. a
golden age of cultural splendour, a period of inner decay and a
promise of regeneration. These result in an explosion of the genl1ic
sciences. including archaeology. folklore. philology. and topography in
order to resurrect the civilisatiOll of thc people from the cultund
sllbstratum. l6 For the revivalist, this invocation of the past secks nOI to
regress into an arcadia but aims to inspire the community to ever
higher stages of development. Two groups are always prominctll in
cultural nationalist movements: human intellectuals and a sl:cular
intelligentsia defined by John HlIlchinsoo as self-made individuals
imbued with an egalitarian ethos and by a convktion of their dUly to
the conununity. Revivalists emerge from an intelligentsia, usually
comprising of historical scholars and anists, who constNct new
matrices of collective identities created from myths and legends and
seek to re-unite these traditional aspects of the nation by returning to
the creative life-principle of the nation. Although small in number. the
"John HLJlCh",-. rl>< ,I)'""mk< qf ,."J'w-a! "",;o""Ii>m: IIot GINlk 1I~,'imJ ",,<I ,I.< e,",,"ioo
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-intelligentsia play an important role as moral innovatol'S. constructing
new matrices of collective identity at times of social crisis.17
Hcrben Dhlomo (1903-53). one of the major founding figures
of South-African literature. believed that it is one of the contradictions
of colonial society that it is the membel'S of the dominating group, in
this case the Anglo-lrish ascendency, who are expected to be the
interpreters. spokesmen and the voice of the oppressed groups.JI It is
precisely because the colonised wen: not allowed to speak for
themselves that the nature of traditional an fonns was distoned.
misimcrpreted and perpetuated as myth. Mythology. the study and
interpretation of myths therefore served the same purpose for the Irish
as for other races: it provided an explanation for the mysteries of life
as experienced by an unlettered but f.'lr from primitive people. The
realisation of this fact gave the Irish literary revival its strength and
made its proponents opt for a native m)1hology rather than a classical
onc.)9
During this period in Irish history. the interest in the past
and folklore in particular was one among a growing trend throughout
Europe. People were examining their culture in the light of an age of
new industrialisation and modernism. 'Ibis inward pre-occupation centred
on a nostalgic yearn for what had gone before but in truth it was
probably a reaction to what ....'lIS coming ahead. Like the fear of death.
the fear of what the futun: had in store made the past seem all the
more appealing. Folklore and anthropological srudies and stories opened
up a way for a new approach to defining Irish idCtltity at a time when
this idemity "''liS being challenged by ever increasing nationalist fervour
culminating in the Easter Rising of 1916 when the mythologies of the
Irish past would be Ctllployed more stridently than the romantic
aspirations conjured up by the revivalists.
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Political violence in Cork: case studies of the Newmarket
and Gantry Riots, 1910
John O'Donovan
Irish nationalism was divided in 1910 between controlling factioll5, each
vying for political pre-eminence. After the 1910 general cle<;tion. the tensions
exploded into violence. The Mansion House Convention of February 1909
and the foundation of the All-for-Ireland league (AFIL) just over a month
later arc the two key events in anempting to chan the gro....th of violence in
the city and county during this year. Internal squabbling within the ranks of
the Irish Parliamentary Party and its grassroots org:misation the United Irish
League (UIL) led to open cooflict at the Mansion House betwecn supportCl'S
of UtL foundcr William 0' Brien, and those of the Ancient Order of
Hibernians (Board ofErin) led by Joseph [)evlin.' Thereafter. previous covert
hostilities between O'Brien supponen and supporters of the rarty leadersllip
came out into the opcn.l Since 1904, O'Brien's suppOrt had come from the
ranks of landless agricultural labourers. small tenant farmen who had not
benefitted from the passage of the Wyndhant Land Act twelve months
previously. and a small eoterie of urban working class. 111e majority at the
inaugural meeting of the AFIL at Kanturk in March 1909 were members of
these classes.) lltcre was then:fore more than an element of class violence in
Cork during 1910. In addition. much of the violence was fuelled by personal
differences between the AFll and the UII•• which underv.'ent a major
reorganisatioo following the crushing AFlL victory in the January 1910
general election. This essay will examine two case studies of the violence: in
Ne....lnarket in May and Bantry in August.
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The aftennmh of the January 1910 general election was
particularly violent, especially in the North Cork constituency. A serious riot
was narrowly averted in Kanturk on 29 January, not long after AFIL
candidate Patrick Guiney had unseated sitting Party MP James F1)~m. A
Guiney supportcr from Ne\\market. James Swet'ney. was shot in the hand
and leg by a neighbour. from a reported 'distance of 50 yards.' Florence
Sullivan of KanlUrk ""s assaulted twice \\ithin a month: on the second
occasion he was assaulted near Newmarket and 'struck scveral times on the
head'. There may have been a connection with Guiney and this incident. as
on the following day the newly-elected MP held a protest rally Ol.ltside
Sullivan's fann near Kanturk. In the first few weeks of April, shots were
fired at the houses of tWO knO"l1 Party supporters in the Kanturk and
Newmarket districts; one of the targets was the brother of the holder of an
evicted fann. A local band, who coumed the chainnan of the local LL.L.A
branch among thcir number. was the targets of gunshots in the environs of
Newmarket on the night of Sunday I May.'
It was within thesc contexts that large numbers of people
descended on the north Cork tOW11 of Newmarket on Thursday, 26 May.
Being a Catholic holy day as well as market day in the to,,". the majority of
those ....'!lo came into the to"" wcre labourers and smaller tenant fanners.
Tensions were exacerbated by the antount of alcohol freely consumed during
the course of the day. In the evening two large groups began to foml in the
tOW11 square, one from the New SI. end (the westcrn side) and the other from
the Church SI. end (the eastern side). Many of thesc were anned with
revolvers, but sticks. stones and hurleys were also used. For a few hours both
groups charged at each other, the ntobs ebbing and nowing between Church
SI. and New SI. The small police comingent in the tOW11. led by District
Inspector Robert Price. pro\'ed unable to quell the rioting. They were patently
under pressure, and were driven off the streets on several occasionS, only to
, Ct MOnlhly Il."."" IQr Cor\; Eo" Iliding. Jan. '0 M.)" 1910. CO 9Q.41ll0. 12, IJ. t4. 57-8. .!66-7. 210.
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regroup in the square within a short time. Shortly after 10 0' clock that night
Price made thc decision to usc fireanns to quell the dislUrbance, and
dispatched a couple of officers to the station to retrieve the Lee Enfield rifles
stored there. Once am1ed. thc police fired a number of volleys over the heads
of the rioters in Church SI. This caused them to disperse from the to\\o11 at the
eastern end of the street. After the police had dealt with the New SI. crowd,
twemy-tive-year-old labourer Comelius Regan was found prostrate on the
ground close to the square. He died a shon time later.J
Reaction in the press to the events at Ne"market was divided. lbe
nationalist newspapers blamed the political tension in the to"l1 following the
January general election for the riot. The Irish lndep""de"t, perhaps
reflecting its strong Catholic moral elhos. called into question the excessive
amount of alcohol consumed.~ The Cork Examiner, mindful of the growing
opposition coming from the AF1L quarter, stated that thcre was no one clear
reason for the riot. and that reports of the scenes contained eonnicting
evIdence.? The Freeman's JOllrnul, free from the constraints of localism, laid
the blame implicitly but squarely aI Ihe door of the AFIL" On the unionist
side and despite implicit support among the Cork unionist papers for the
AFIL _ or perhaps because they had contributed to the split among Irish
Nationalists- the violence was condemned strongly. A report in the Irish
Times stilled that:
The inhabitant' de""ribe the en<ou~ter as one of the mo>! dcsl"'rate and
prolonged eYer ;;ccn in Newmarket. The police stated lhat the actual
combatants did oot number. l"'rhaps, more than f,lIy, bill lhat ,he large
crowds al each side with pany cries made malle,," ""lSe. Missile' were
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-hurled, and 511<.>1-< discharged from laneWll)'S, /Tom window., and from every
point of"anlage,'
In a follow-up report the paper commented that many ofthosc engaged io the
violence had spent some time in America during the previous decade, 'but
there is linle satisfaction in concluding that the prevalent readiness to use
fireanns is a habit learnt elsewhere than at home: lO Thc Curk COllstitution in
a leading articlc remarked that the riot had its roots in Cork City, but also
condemoed the Liberal administration then in power at Westminster and
Whitehall for its readiness to dc-regulate the sales of rcvoll'ers at the
insistence of the Irish Parliamentary Party. The article concluded: "Ihe
readiness ""ith which these shooting-irons are flourished is gro"ing
unpleasantly frequent',"
The inquest into Ihe death of Regan opened on Saturday 28 May
in Ne"market. and was principally concerned "ith investigating whether the
fatal shot came from a police rifle or elsewhere, During the proceedings the
policemeo testified to a number of scenes that they alleged had occurred.
Head Constable Jeremiah McKee. for example, stated a man loaded a double-
barrelled shotgun in front of him, and a number of people brandished
revolvers during baton charges, He also alleged that the Ne"market scenes
'were worse' than the Belfast riots of 1886, where he had also been prescnt. ll
In response to a number of charges made by partics al the inquest, the Irish
Independent reported on Friday 3 June that, according to official RIC
regulations. the police were 'compelled to fire directly at the opposing sides
___ as their fire must be directed with effect when they are compelled to reson
to the e"treme course of using their firearms,' Also in answer to charges
madc by the Irish Times the paper noted that witnesses testified to its rcponer
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'that the worse sceoes have been witnessed in the district, and that the
connict during the late elcctioos was of an altogether fiercer nature, though
no fatality occurred,'"
The retum of an open verdict into Regan's death by Coroner
James Byme on Monday 6 June was greeted "ith silence from the majoril)'
of the papers, save for the Irish Independent and the Irish Times, Thc fornlcr
in a lengthy leading article laid the blame for Regan's death at the door of the
police, However. the paper also commented tha! the 'indiscriminate free use
of revolvers' revealed during the inquest was 'disquieting', This comment,
which had appeared in the Irish Times a few days earlier, was indicative of
the unease felt by many members of the middle class, the majority of the
papers readership, TIle Irish Timt!s in its reaction to the verdict called on the
Liberal govenunent to convcnc a parJiamctltllJ)' comminee to conduct 'a
strict inquiry into the e"tell! and consequences oflhe ciKulation of dangerous
weapons in this count)),,''' RIC County lnsp,:ctor Howe reported in June that
Newmarket aod its enviroos still lay under 'a feeling of unrest ,_. by reason of
the number of revolvers and lirearms. and their use by irresponsible
individuals:" Two momhs laler he ft;'poned that, though the factions in the
to....11 were "at any time likely to re-op<-'lI hostilities' police were now prescnt
'in sufficient numbers to prevent serious conflicts,'I~ 111e same could hardly
be said of Bant!)-',
Tensions between AFIL and Irish Party supponers in and around
the Bantry area had been at a heightened state since the January general
election, wheo supponers of Party candidate Daniel O'Leary and sitting
AFlL MP James Gilhooly repeatedly clashed, West Cork rural society was
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also described by the police as disturbed, with many small 'rctll
combinations' in force on many eslales in the hinterland of Bantry (including
one Co-O\\l1ed by members of the extended White family of Bantry House).
The majority of these had wished to obtain 'sales, or. better terms than
those which the rest of the tenants have agreed 10. ·11 BOlh O'u:ary and
Gilhooly played their part in cuhivating Ihese tensions, harnessing their
potential energy to drive the motors of their respective polilical machines.
During the spring and summer bolh men addressed gatherings of tenants
Ihrough the West Cork constituency, the former exhorting the benefits of Ihe
Birrell Land Act. the laner doing the same for the Wyndharn ACI."
As lhe summer drew on, the likelihood of a general elcrtion
loomed large on the political horizon. and preparalions for large rallies in the
10....11 of Banlry increased. In Ihe middlc of July O'Brien travelled to Bantry
10 address a large AFIL rally in the 10\\n, atlended by Gilhooly and Pmrick
Guiney, as well as several prorninem AFlL supponers in Ihe to\\n. including
Michael Healy. John Kelly and Benjamin O'Connor. lbis was Ihe Imest in a
series of rallies Ihm Ihe AFIL had conducted in Ihe major 10V.11S of west
Cork. RIC Coumy Inspector FaWl;en noted in his report for July Ihal in
preceding me<:tings in Ehndon and Clonakilly 'Ihe police had some difficulty
in keeping the rival parties from coming imo conflict. ,'~ The Bantry meeting,
though infused with O'Brien's characteristic fiery rhetoric - and I'itriol aimed
squarely al the Board of Erin and its dupes, the Irish Party and the UIL _
passed off almost wilhoUl ineidem.~ Several publicans in the to\\l1 were
prosecuted for displaying orange flags in the days preceding the meeting.
O'Leary was forced, I'ia a public letter. to diso\\l1 suggestions that he had
encournged police to prosecute Ihe publicans; he also used lhe ICllcr to auack
Jasper Wolfe, a fellow solicitor bUI a weH-kno....l1 personal friend of James
Gilhooly. Wolfe was, in O'Leary's eyes, the 'politico-Iegal advocate' of'the
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leading O'Brienites of Bantry'." The puhlicalion of O'Leary's letter days
before a major League rally in Ihe 10\\11 did little 10 cool Ihe simmering
tensions between O'l]rienilcs and Redmondites in the to\\l1.
The 14 August da....l1ed dull, with the threat of rain 011 a moderate
south-weslerly \\ind. blowing in ofT Bantry Bay. This was unsurprising. for
the previous month had been besel \\ilh frequent heavy r~in, making
conditions exceedingly difficult for efTecti\'e fanning ofrOOI crops, Ihe Slaple
of the local agricultural economy. A sense of anger and frustration, already
latent in the region since January, now bordered on the hostile; the Irish Party
came in for the brunt of this backlash. Bantry to\\1l had seen an influx from
surrounding districts over the previous twenty-four hours: a huge contingent
from Ihe Beara peninsula made their way towards the to\\l1 on SalUrday
afternoon and evening. Public houses reponed a I'ery hrisk trade, and a few
minor scumes were reponed to police. However, once the train carrying a
large U1L contingent from Cork arrived. violence erupted which did not abate
until the contingent left for the city at approximately seven o'clock. A force
of eighty RlC officers and men attempted to keep both groups apan. bUI were
pelted with stOlles and rotten eggs for much of Ihe duration of the meeting.
The contingent was also conlinuously showered wilh stones. rouen eggs. and
lumps of tar-macadam (present in the square as pan of a major resurfacing
project) even while speaking during the rally. Once the spee<:hes had
concluded. a large group attempled to storm the stage. The police were struck
repeatedly by members oflhe group 'with "batons" longer [and) heal'ier than
their 01'.-11.' Other smaller squads of constables were anacked in Main St ..
Mill SI.. and High St. After holding their ground, all squads of police
anempted to baton-charge the aggressors from the main square. This took
repeated anempts, during which District Inspector Fred Wallace was struck
on the head v.ith a stone, and carried to nearby Vickery's Hotel 10 receive
treatment. Onc member of the police struck a man in the vicinily of the Hotel
with such force Ihal his haton 'broke in half.' An areh erected to welcome the
"Ibid" 13AUll-1910.
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UIL back to the tOI\TI was destroyed during the fighting." The "iok-nce did
not stop aftcr the Irish Patty contingent left the to\\11. Approximately 30
police were retaincd in the to\\11 for the rest of the weekend, when 'great
excitement prevailed. but no scrious collisions took place: UncOl1firn1f~d
reports suggested that a man fTOm the Borlin Valley area had died from
injuries sustained in the riots. A party of Glengarriff Redrnondites were set
UpOll on their return home from the Bantl)' rally. and were badly be3len.
Similar scenes were reported in Cast1etov>llbere, where strect fighting
occurred.J'
'Ine riots received significant amounts of press coverdge, and the
slants presented reflectcd the usual political leanings. The Freeman's Journal
chose to accentuate the reports of the 31tacks by 'All For' supporters on the
UIL groups with 'batons of a dangerous descriptiOll'.'· '[nc Irish
IlIdep<!ndenl. reflecting its more downmarket approach. contained graphic
descriptions of all the major incidcnts. but chosc to focus on the police charge
of the cTOwd. and the assaults on three sp.;'akers 'by baton·"ielding men who
claimed to be supportcrs of the AFIL.·" The SOli/hem Swr. mindful of the
decp sensitivities among its readership, gave no editorial comment on the
scenes. and chose to develop a composite report on the meeting and its
aftermath.'" The Cork EXQmilli.'r. by this stagc an unashamed mouthpiece for
the Irish Party, argu~'d that the Patty 'has more to commend it to thinking
men than the cl)' of "eonciliation", which in practice means intolcrance.
bludg~"OIls. and potshots or deadly missiles: J1 The Irish Times noted that thc
most militant of the AF1L party were 'a crowd of young men, about 100
strong', thus infusing the rioters with the frec-spirit aud recklessness of
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youth.J1 TIle Corle Weekly News report was a composite of the reports carried
in that week's Cons/ilurio/!, supplemented \\ith some persp~tive pi~es. The
paper pithily eoncludcd that the 'feeling of both sections of Nationalists
towards each other is, unfortunatel)·. most biner.' ::'J
In September 1910 arrest waIT'dnts were issu.:d for thirty-three
people (many of whom were subsequently identitied as AFlL supporters) in
conn~tion with the riots in Bantl)', The names and addresses of those
arrested were published in the Cork Wedly Net.,s and, subsequently, in the
Svulhem Swr. Once these lists are ch~ked and cross·referenced, it is
possible to scrutinise census returns for 1901 and 1911 in order to build
profiles of the people involved. Discounting those whose records could not
be retrieved at the time of writing. those arrested ranged in age from sixtecn
to sixty years. There wcre four females in the group. including a mothl'f and
daughter. Of those whose age could be determined, one-third of those
arrested were between fifteen and twenty years of age: another third v,cre
between twenty-onc and fotty. Of those whose occupations arc kJlo\\11. six
were labourers, four were fisherman. three were farmers or fanners' sons.
two were butchers, as well as a drapers' assistant. miner. carpent.:r,
shoemaker. coal porter, blacksmith's apprentice and a tailor.
While it is not possible to draw general conclusions from such a
small sample, a few pTOvisional conclusions may be attempted. The majority
of those arrested were under fotty, pointing to the predilectiOll of thc young
men of West Cork for settling differences with violcnc.:. It must be borne in
mind that. during this period violence and faction lighting was more than just
a political tool. It was also a mcthod of releasing social tensions and settling
scores among not just political classes. but social classes as well.'" Nothing
could be more satisfying for a labourer earning a subsistence wage than
taking physical revenge upon his wealthier neighbour. Although the gro\l'Ih
of sports organisations such as the GAA had. on the whole. moved this kind
'" "ish Ti_•. IS AUi. 1910.
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-of physical altercation from the streels 10 the pitch. nonetheless a certain
amOUlll remained. A second related poilll may be madc here, and that is that
the general eJeclion of lanuary 1906. at which a flimsy agreement was
reached between Ihe O'Brien and his cohort and the Irish Party nOI 10 foree
contests. placed a lid on growing politicaltensioos thal were postponed to the
follo\\;ng general election. which did not take place until January 1910. This
'pressure cooker' idea can be strengthened if one bears in mind that thc
origins ofthc violence ....tJich swept Cork eity and county during thc ycar lay
both before 1906 and allcr 1909.
The third point raised by the Banlry riots was the polilical nature
of the judicial process, Most Nationalist polilicians were also appointed
Justices of Ihe Peace in their area. This entitlcd them 10 sit on the judicial
bench at Ihe local Petty Sessions and. in some cases. 10 act as chair of the
hearings. lames Gilhooly, by dim of his lengthy stint as MP for West Cork.
actcd (when available) as the chainnan of thc local Petty Sessions court.
However. his reluctance to see justice administered was. in the eyes of the
police, a sourcc of irritation. At BantTY Petty Sessioos on Mooday 22 August
Gilhooly summarily dismissed a number of cases brought by the police in
relation to relatively minor incidents which tl1lnspired after the riots. Sergeant
Denis Oennehy remarked that 'he thought that it was time that such a state of
things was put a stop to. The people and the police wanted some rest. ·JI
Pressure on Gilhooly also came from predictable quarters. At the opening of
the hearings into the thirty-five cases at Bantry PClty Sessions on Monday 19
September, O'Leary - present in the court to defend himself in a civil case
brought by one of the dcfendants. William McSweeney - accused both
Gilhooly and Benjamin O"Connor of being biased against him. having elearly
idcntified themselves I'.;th the AFIL at the rally in luly, Another magistrate,
Or J.1. O'Mahony. was accused of political bias, having been named in court
as an officcr of the Kealkil AFlL branch. O'Leary was fined 2.1 6d for
assaulling McSweeney. a finc which he contested all the way to the Court of
j, M,h ri_•. 23 Aug, 191 U: Irl>h l",k/X",lm,. 23 Aog.1910.
62
King's Bench division in Dublin. which later quashed the verdict and made
Gilhooly res]JOIlsible for the Is 6d costs incurred by O·Leary."
Many of the police who gave evidence could barely disguise their
contempt for eilher side of the Nationalist divide. Despite this. proceedings
passed ofT without any major auemptto break up the hearings. This may have
had something to do wilh the confidence the majority of tbe defendants had
in Gilhooly and his 'parish pump' political methods, Another plausible
reason was that Gilhooly as an cx-I'cnian, had more than a linle sympathy for
the struggle to bring self-govcrnment to Ireland regardless of the method.
Therefore. he was more sympathetic 10 acts viewed by the state - in thc guise
of the RIC - as 'considerablc disruma.llce'. Whatever the real reason. reactioo
to the lrials did indeed centre on Gilhooly, much of it based on the speech he
delivered on the final day of the hearings. when eleven defendants wcre sent
forward for trial at the Cork Spring Assizes. Gilhooly condemned thc actions
of the police on the day and Iheir subsequenl investigation. questioning why
none of the rowdies that acconlpanied Mcssrs Thomas Condon, Augustine
Roche and David Shechy were arrested, nor any of the League members from
the locality, He accused Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell and Attorne}'
Gencral R.J. Bany of colluding with the RIC against the AFll.. Rcfcrring to
some of the comments made by members of the RIC in west Cork, Gilhooly
thundered that people could not have
""peel for tllc la"" ... ""Ilcn ""e ha"e panies guilty of gross hlackguardi\ln.
breaking ""indows ewn in tllc policenlen's holi'ies, here allowed to go 5<01
free beca"'" they belong to one political pan}',
hi compiling the monthly report for October in place of Cl Fawcell, DI
Wallace noted that the judgements had done linl" to remove the 'Slate of
unrest" around the Bantry district. Gilhooly's ill-judged speech led 10 him
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being deprived of the Commission of the Peace during NovembeT. Fawcctt
noted "ith no little satisfaction that the decision would
make tne dUly oftne police in enforcing the I,w less difticull as tne ",wdies
,nd ill-disposed relied on him to either get them oUl of any trouble or let off
"ilh a trilling pUl1ishrncnt"
In his study of political violence in Ireland since 1848. Charles TO"l1shend
identified three major catcgories of violence: open insurrection. covert
intimidation (or terrorism), and social violence. which he dcfined as
'spontaneous collective violence which may have no explicit political
intention bUl has political implications,·H While the political violcnce
discussed above may not have heen spontaneous. they certainly had political
intentions and political implications, The tradition of violence in rural Irish
socicty had de<>p rOOlS. as far back as thc agrarian movements of thc early
nineteenth ccnnt!)', and had been resurrected with the advent of thc Land
League fTom 1879,J~ The roots of the violence witnessed in County Cort
during 1910 1tre partially explained by reference to this tradition, The second
key component in this boiling pot was. inevitably. the Pamc][ Split. Though
thc Irish Parliamenta!)' movement was reconstructed using the framework of
the United Irish League. divisions remained submerged.... These were
partially exposed after thc resignation of League founder WiIHam O"Brien in
November 1903. and appeared to have been defused with the pact election of
January 1906. The general election of January 1910. when combined with
excessive drinking and the AFIL, unleashed these latent tensions, Thereafter
ill-fe<>ling bctween the newly fractured Nationalist movements erupted "ith
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increasing frequency, including the (WO cases examined above. -111e political
implications of the violence are more difficult to quantify in the long-tenn,
'Ine almost complete defeat of the Irish Pany-UIL combination in Cork in the
December 1910 general election may have justified the violence in possibly
the second ofTowJlshend's three categories. that of intimidation, This poim
was emphasised by (he pro-Party Nationalist press in their coverage of the
riots discussed above. The high incidence of political violence during 19 ID in
Cork. was the product of a multitude of factors, all of which had deep roots.
and which in difTereot ways aCled as a harbinger of the decade 10 come,
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Farce and tragedy in Eupen-1\lalmedy: the public
expression of opinion in 1920
Vincent O'COllnel1
As a resuh of the Treaty of Versailles the two former German districts of
Eupcn and Malmedy were ceded to Belgium in pan recompense for the
devastation innicted during the Great War. However one condition anached
to article 34 of the treaty concerned the holding of a popular consultation or
as worded in the Treaty 'a public expression of opinion' where those who
wished to object to having the two districts annexed by Belgium could do so
by signing a register of protest in cither Eupen or Malmedy. 1This was to take
place within the first six months of the treaty coming into cfftx:t. TIle e"lercise
was to be conducted under the auspices of the Belgian authorities. This
efftx:lively meant that the consultation would be administered by the
transitory government of Eupen-Malmedy headed by Lielllenant General
Hennan Baltia and no neutral observers were required to be present. Baltia
had been appoimed by the law of 15 September 1919 and granted full
legislative and executivc POv,-crs.
Both districts were predominantly German speaking "ith a
cOlllbined population of over 60,000. However the district of Malmedy
contained some 9,000 French speaking Walloons who for over a century had
comprised an enclave of Latin tradition in the German Empire.! Albeit now
widely understood to havc been a most undemocratic exercise, the public
expression of opinion or what became knov,n as I" perile farce belge was
nevertheless the first encounter the people of this contested territory would
have with Bclgian democracy. Once the period of consultation had ended
only a handful of signamres were entered in protest. From the outset, the
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controversial nature of il5 execution gave rise to allegations of intimidation
and coercion by Belgian oflicials, with the result that the memory of this
episode became an indelible stain on the fabric of Belgian democracy.
However, the residual effect which this episode had in ll:nns of undel1l1ining
Bahia's transilory regime and the extent to which this singular event
impacted on Ihe historical consciousness of the inhabitants of Eupen-
Malmedy remains somewhal understated.
As shall become evident, the low lel'el of panicipmion in the
public expression of opinion was not due solely to fear of intimidation by the
Belgian authorities, although this certainly played a significant pan. The
choice facing many inhabitants caught in the vonex of post-war tumlOil "''\S
a stark one. Either one clung to the floating wreckage of a defunct Empire
weighted dowtl by the cargo of postwar demands or took onc's chances in the
unchanered waters of Belgian annexation.
This anicle portrays the public expression of opinion as a salient
on Eupen-Malmedy's troubled historical path. Due to Ihe dubious nature of
its execution the consultation would later become the touchstone for much
inflamed rhetoric and demands from Slresemann 10 Hiller for a revision of
the Versailles Treaty and the holding of a new consultation. Following the
tennination of Baltia's transitory regime in 1925 the increasingly indifferent
anitude displayed by Brussel> towards Ihe two districts and the parallel rise
in the intensity of pro-German activity saw these new Belgians in Ballia's
own words "quite narurally throw themselves into the arms of German
propagandists who endeavoured to assist them.,j This lack of assenilHI by
Brussels paved the way for the emergence of a counter process of culrural
inculcation later taimed with the hue of nazi ideology. '111e mUlexation of
Eupcn-Mahnedy by Nazi-Gennany in May 1940 whilst seen by many to have
been the inevitable epilogue to a series of farcical events would also prove 10
be the first act in a greater tragedy for the inhabitants of Eupen-Malmedy.
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Long before Baltia entered Malmedy to read aloud the
proclamation outlining the aims and objectives of his transitory regime, the
banle lines for the heans and minds of the population had been well and truly
drawn. Shortly after his nomination as Royal High Commissioner in
September 1919 he "Tote to the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Hymans
stating: '[ am a,semb[ing the various methods which Gennany is employing
to ""Ork on the opinion of the nati~'e populatiOll.' • Throughout the preceding
few months that followed the conclusion of the Treaty negotiations in Paris, a
propaganda war had raged from pulpit to pavement in the troubled temtOI)'
and for many Be[gian observers the chances of acquiring Eupen-Malmedy
especially those parts inhabited mainly by ethnic Gennans 5ct'med highly
unlikely. Writing to his Chicf of Staff in the summer of 1919, Lieutcnam
Gene..-"l Coppejans of the Belgian anllY of oceupatiOll in the fourth wne
noted how few tnl[y envisaged a separation from thc Vater/and.
Whilst talk of a Republic of the Rhine did not seem viable to
most, SOllle eOllsidered the possibility of a union with the [eft bank region of
Westphalia. As for Gennany, neither the Gennan President Ebert nor its
Chancellor Philipp Seheidemalln were believed to possess the qualities
Ilecessary to rescue the Gennan State. [n this light a numher of people
expressed their hope for a return of the monarchy.' This is another
eOllsideration which one should keep in mind in attempting to understand the
high [evel of non-panicipation in the public expression of opinion. For many
of the Kaiser's former subjects the prospect of being IUled hy anything other
than a monarch was beyond the realms of cOl15idcration. Perhaps a Belgian
monarch who after all was a direct descendant of thc first Belgian King
Leopold r. himself of Sa.~e-Cohurg and Gotha seemed a more endearing
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prospect than being party to a revolutionary republic as was being fought
over in Gennany.
As well as monarchical allegiance however the Catholic Churcb
also held considerable sway over the mindsets of the inhabitants of this
largely rural temtory. The vast majority of clerics were as devoted to the
Vmer/and as they were to thc Holy Father. '111c Belgian authorities were wcll
aware of what they saw as thc mcnacing role being played by many Gennan
clerics on the ground spurred on by their superiors in Gennany. Not [east the
Archbishop of Cologne 10 whose diocese both Eupen and Malmedy were still
anaehed, Archbishop FeJix Hanmalm was secn as meddling in the affairs of
the region having issued his 0\\11 proclamation in July of 1919. wbich in
essence was a caU to all Gennan inhabitants to 'search their consciences as to
the righl thing to do,'" Hartmann was an unapologetic imperialist and a
favourite of the Kaiser, He urged that lhe public expression of opinion be
conducted in sceret; hardly a revolUlion:uy conecpt at the time. He
furthennore echoed the Gemlan delegation'scontention that instead of
tcrritoria[ aJlllexation 'One could remedy this situation hy an agreemenl to
deliver wood to Belgium."
Other activities aimed at ensuring a successful outcome to thc
popular consultation from a Gennan perspective had the imprimatur of the
Weimar Government. In the town of Charlonenburg near Ber[in an
associatiOll called Vereinigli.' umdsmal1nschaji El/pen-Maimed)' arranged for
Germall residellls of EI/renois origin to visit the Kreis and impress upon
locals the importance of declaring in filVour of Gennany, [n addition the
German Govenunent puh[ished notices in the Berliner Tageblllll newspaper
over a number of days inviting inhabitants to do just that l
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fig 2. Map ofEupcn-Malmedy "'ith G.,....".ny 10 tne ~asl, Luxembourg 10 th< south and
Holland 10 the north, 1919, (FD,J71_J644WEupen_Malm<:dy).
In order to limit the spread of such propaganda the Belgian
authorities regularly interccpted post in the region and this activity would
continue throughout the six months of the public expression of opinion. This
gives us some insight into the level of anxiety that prevailed in the temtory
on thc threshold of trnnsition. Fears were also prevalent in local business
eireles that Belgium lagged behind Germany in tenns of commercial life."
Rumours abounded that the Belgian Government would not recall German
marks but would instead deem them no longer legal tender. If this were so
onc leading industrialist in Malmcdy predicted that many of the inhabitants
• R3ppon ..... It< "",u'..mm" 1"'1~iG"" <I so<;"u, d... le. poJ"llatOons. Le Cbd d·J;llOt-M.jor
o<n<nl P.O.. Le So.,..{"bofd'E.M,G.. M.gl....... 0.0.0 .. Arrne. !l<lgc. t(, MAL 9 July '919.
No.9!IJ tA.M..... E.B.IO, 79211 .Julj--A"ll. 1919).
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of the region would go to ruin and that 'a vcrit.'1ble revolmion ""uuld
suddenly explode and the vast majority ""uuld manifest their desire for a
return to Gennany. ,10
That said the Belgian administrative controller in Eupen LOOn
Xhaflaire, who had been appointed during the period of Belgian occupation
was approached by one Biirgermeislcr in April 1919 who gave him the
impression that all of his colleagues were pro-Belgian and that if they could
be assured of their jobs they would openly canvass in favour of the
annexation. He told Xhanaire how 'The people suffer from a lack of
everything. The foodsrufls distributed by the cOmill! de ral'ilailleml'tll are
insufficient and when the people have to procure food stuffs on the black
market, they are obtained at exorbitant prices.,H He continued, 'The Cf:rcle of
Eupen has 27.000 inhabitants, give to each two kilograms of pcas or beans
with a kilogram of margarine each week and I assure you that everyone will
be with you.' 'There you go', "Tote Xhaflaire in a memo to the Belgian
Chiefs of Staff: 'a string to pull, why not take advantage of it.'"
The transitory regime over which Baltia reigncd supreme came
into being on 10 January 1920 with the coming into force of the Versailles
Treaty. On the steps of the Howl de Ville in Malmedy the following day he
read aloud the proclamation which he believed would cnsure that the essence
of Belgian law was maintained in its absence. ll Apart from assuring the
inhabitants that their rights would be respel:ted, and that both languages
would be on an even fOOfing, he also promised thm 'whatever their social
position, opinions or aspirations' they would be free to air their 'wishes and
" 'Je «Gi' ""'me do""it ""LIS d~o q"" .i les mlI,k. n·....,'" .... "'I""i> ",no do ,-<mlulion
id.tOfllit soodoit><menl"" g'",,", majo,it,; do. mlIlmOdle'" """,if"" icnI "",teme'" "ut "".ir
d·c.Te ,«>d... j r Alle""'ine ne pUO"an! '"I'J"'I'<I la rnit><: l.eun Goflon to Plerre N"""'mb, 12 July
1919.( A.MA.E.B.lO, 792/1).
" '1... popubtion ",uffN do mat"l"" do "'.... Los .limeCb distr;\>.lk par ,,<u,nil<' de ,.., .. ,ti<mrnt
lOOt in",If",,,,... "''''l'''' le po::nplo do~ '" prucure' 1<:. prod"~••lime"""" on o..,helt., C'"",; des
pri, exhort>iuont. qu'l!> 1<:. obl""': Lion Xhof1>in:. c.~. ,I" C"d. d'E"",,,, l May t9' 9. .'1''''''''0 I to
A,O. D;r<ction do C"",,"le Adm...;".,.tifto Cbefd'E,M.G ..12 M.y )919( A.M,A.F..B.IO.7'l2M!12}.
" .Le ..... " d'Eupon. 27.000 hobi..",,, donno•• ""'l"" ho""'..... par ......it>< 2k.i1. de 1"'_ ou 2kll'
do fhe> .. jo t· ~"" 1<>... le nlOfldo ..,..• .,"" vo...· t A,M.A.E.B.IO.79Ul!\l12),
" 'A .ha"", , oo«UOtY d"'UllI I"" period of<r'SOiitlon ,in« Belgian 10'" ",ould "'" be ,n l'W"'-:
Erl"""""'I'.,n ,I" IHlgiK,",n G,n"aI. BuUUI, ;j; tL.A.V.-N.R.W . 5B.. RW (MHO/IO, "In
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complainIS.· However within a short·time a blanket ban was placed on
Gcnnan newspapers in boIh districts...
Baltia shared the vie\\,' held by most Belgians Ihot the COWItry had
been ~rayed b}' its ~hile allies and failed by ils leaders at Versailles. He
lKlI.ed hO\\:
The Belgians """'" tt..".,..,!v.". hi' disappoinlcd C'OOU&h .ftn W bd/a
prtNWSon "hich ,,'Ott ma<k !hem dun.. the " ......... ",hj,:,h 0...
GIn-emmcnl " ... 5Cfioml)' """'&"" \.. «I~. lie 1il.C11Cd W p..-.ill&
..fEupen-Mal~~... 8elgium in plau ..f ~!lpCCUlions demanded
~ .... 8elgian ckkpion in Paris ,,' JOUI"'Il"I1d • bone I..
~.."
ThaI said he \\'3:5 IT\lJre than a link 5Wprised lOoith the rathe!" lax
allifu(le displayed by the lklgian Prime Minister Uon DeIKr(li,.; in lmos of
the iJH:orning transillX)' adminiSl1lllion. In his memoirs Ballia IOoTIIe$.
Ddacroilll 'appeared 10 me 10 havC' thought no more about gi"ing IlK:
dirttth-e$.· Wbm asked bow he should brief lhe PriIlK: MinistC't" on his
progress Delacroi.'I: m;poolkd 'S« that il goes wC'1l and that il doesn'l cost
100 much. When you ",ill ba,'C' good things 10 comnnmicatC' 10 me. do so.
Yoo lOoill be like a ookJoial governor bul a colony directly connected 10 the
Mt:IropOlis.· I.
With such freedom 10 IC1 Baltia 5eI about administering lhe
popular consultation lOoith zeal. Howe·...er he clelfly understood the perils
auached to such a far from lISSUTed mdeavour. lest lhe failure to secure a
pastli,'c OIItCOl1lC. be laid at his door. Just a few weeks after Ihe consultation
had gottrn underway hc lold Delacmix Ihal. '[fthe results.. and the de<:ision
of Ihe L.eague of Nalions ",ill go against us. I could nOl alone with my
"Sir F 1)1/;'" la E<>rlC,...-.....,. 26 ...... 1~10 (The N.......l Ato~"'''' Kcw [T.N,A,~ 1'0
J711J<>.l4B13J),
" E~.. do< b<lg~!>t<J G<n<nls BoI... Go<r.'CmOIII" 1L.i\.,V,.N.R.W..S8..RW (IOW3\.
,. ·T":"". q"" od••ill< birn <I q"" cd. IV rotil. I"" ''''I' cll<f,OI>and '~'U'" <1<0 ._. ogn!obi<.
, me rommuniqucr, r.i1........ V<>us ...... 00",""" un /l""''<'mCUI" de colonic, mojo UIV oolonic ..oc
rornKC dir<ct "'OC 10 M.."',...,.... Erinncnl"ll"" de. b<i&ioc""" G<.......~ B'IO'I I.A,V._
N,R.W..SIl.. RW 0010/5. p.7~
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fWlCliooaries bear the responsibility.ll The registers were opened on 26
JanllDJ)' 10 prOlestOl'S both male and female who had reached 21 years ofage
either before or during the period of the oonsullalioo. Only IWO regislers were
opened one each in Eupen and Malmedy. 1lte le'"el ofimimidal'oo meted out
by the Belgian authorities both prior to and during the consultation was
highlighled b}' both German and neultlll observers alike. One German
ncwspaper lKlI.ed how "..hat they lermed the poIilical police was so preo."3.Ienl
lhat cars followed the elecnic U1lfn$ bound for Aachen Slopping them to look
for suspects among the passengers." The radio sel'Vice from Nauen in
Germany infcnned liSleners IhaIlhe administralh'e oontroller in Eupen ....'3:5
thralming 10 1!lrtN'lhe first \"OIer down the stairs .....OO dared 10 oome 10 sign
the register. He was also alleged 10 ba"e threatcnallo close the registry ,flOO
many people came 10 VOle, L..ack of ac~ "'0\5 a recurring complaint
throughoul the period of cOll5llllatioo. \.
A joumaliSl ....ith the Manchesler Gut:Jrdian based in MalmOOy al
the height of the popular COI\StIltalko ....TOIl' '1 am Wlable to mentioo the
IllIIIleS of the many pec:lple "'00 supplied me .....ith per.;ona.I informatioo. or to
gi\'e precise details. because ....,·tr)'one .....ith ....-born I spoke implored me IIOlIO
mention names or paniculan that might lead to discovet'}" or ,·iClimisat'OIL·::a
This fear of discovery and vietimisatioo was something thal woold conlinue
10 inscribe ilselfupon the ps)'Che oflhe people ofEupen -Malmedy for many
ckcadcs 10 come. Denunciatioo ofcmain individuals was commonplace. and
if the allegation invlo...ed propagandizing in favour of Germany this would
result in expulsion from thc tenilory. Quilc oftrn such denunciations had
their origin not in political pal1isanship howcvcr but in personal vendettas.
providing an opportunily for the scttling of SC<.>t'l:'S often over some lrivial
maller, One young teacher .....ho taught at the [cole pour Jermes FiIf.,!I in
"'Si ........Iut. de 10 _IIOlion. populo;"'. (.itl"'lo """ion de 10 liiuc dc$ oat""" "" r<.n"",,-~
l'ic] """'.. no"'.it ne """""" p...mpon.. 0<.1 nee 1<0 fonc1iunno ...... r<5P"H"'lIl>lilt." Bo~io to
him< MiniJI.. U<>n D<loc",ix, 9 ".b. 1~10, Br.-1s I A,M.A.E,BJIO, 19211UI6S-1~
"v.....rlot r"#<:I/I,,"II. H Ocl. 19\9.
.. T..nocripl from Roilio N....... I 0<:<. I~ 19 (A.M.A.E.8.10.19211I~
,. M_Iot.,~,CutJl'd/<bl. 11. 11 Moy 19<0' M<"",..nd"m "" E"""n--Molmcdy q.....ion. 21 J..... (910
<i\..MA.E.D, I0, 7921111~
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Malmedy, Frallfeine Steinmetz., was relieved of her duties having been
denounced by a [o.:;al whose daugher had been recently disciplined by the
teacher. Her colleague frauleine Gall was also relieved of her teaching
position and given three days to leave the territory for spreading pro-German
propaganda,' •
At the Council of Ambassadors meeting in Versailles in May.
following numerous represcntations by the German authorities, the BritiSh
ambassador to France Lord Derby deelared thm "'"hile he did not sce the need
for any modification to article 34. he nevertheless took issue with a number
of operational matters concerning the consultation. In particular he referred to
a Belgian circular which he had in his possession and which promised to
inflict a specialtreatmCllt on those inhabitants who dared to sign the register.
He noted, 'They are refused all kinds of favours. they are presented "..ith
difficulties when changing marks and in the provision of basic nccessities
which their fellow inhabitants receive. they are refused passports and
expOl1mion permits'. Lord Derby however doubted thm such practice was
official Belgian po[iey and he was assured by Belgium's envoy to France.
Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy that perhaps one district commissioner had
dictated a circular which 'constituted manifestly an excess of zeal'.
According to Baron d'Hestroy Governor Baltia had immediately annulled the
directions given by his subordinate once he had become aware of them.
When the registers finally elosed on 23 Ju[y. only 271 of the more
than 33,000 inhabitants eligible to partake in the e:<ercise had signed in
protest. The result was later endorsed by the league of Nations on 20
September, and the sovereign status of the territory reso[ved or so it seemed
in the eyes of the international community. However. wlmt was to have been
the coping slone of a lIew beginning for the people of New-Belgium would
instead prove to be the ro.:;k on whieh the legitimacy of Baltia's regime
would perish. II
" 1·"....<lrrs.1~0cI_1919_
" Alf.-e<l Mmk -\..0 rommunalO< i<f1llOnoph,,,.<: r""httion d'u"" ,...,. d·",,~·......,· ;0 N"(UI""k.
UM "Kio" <n E,,,",,,,, (Ni<e-CIwl<roL 199n pp 11>6-1'_
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Over the ne:<t couple of years Baltia and his Eupen~Malmedy
Q()vernment set about the legislative. juridical and adminiSlr'Jtive
incorporation of the two districts into the Belgian State, as well as the
assimilation of their inhabitants. They would eventually become three
scparate districts with SI. Vith being scparated from the district of Malmedy.
Whilst the rather turbulent period which followed the end of Baltia's regime
in [925 saw the administr'.ltive and legislative foundations withstand the
various political tremors that shook the territory. his project of assimilation
was however undermined by a seemingly insouciant Belgian Q()vemmt:nl
which showed itsc[f either unable or unwilling to build upon his efforts. The
doomed attempt by Belgium to sell back most of the territory to Germany
was a case in point.'J Pierre van Werveke the fomler general secretary to
Ba[tia's go\"enuncot was incredulous to such suggestions. 'How' he argued,
'after having govemed thesc peop[es .. and having allemptoo to assimilate
them... do Belgians dare to propose that we throw in the towel and push for'
what he temled 'this abominable e:<change.· Van Wef\leke likened such
notions to 'sclling sou[s·."
Ln [925 Belgium's new citizens were able to participate in their
first Belgian national elcctiOlt. The fi11lt representative for Eupen-Malmedy
elected to the Brussels parliament was the so.:;ialist deputy Marc
Somerhausen. Somerhausen believed that to tic the malleT of territorial
retrocession to that of financial reimbursement was 'a nonsen5C.' The way
forw'ard in his opinion was to give Germany an assur.lnce lhat a new
plebiscite would be carried out and o.:rmany could then recipro.:;ate by
returning monies owed to Belgium since 1918. Somerhausen believed that
the pwple of Eupen as well as Malmedy were 'Ocnnans of hean and souL'
" C><, lA""IwI•. 10 0«. 1915; 1A,\'(ujO" 8<11/<. 15 0«. t9H: r.un1kJ J_ E......~..<;,,,~,,,,,,,'.
,.rritoxl<u "";,io"is,,,. Gm."",_&lgium ,'" ,"" E""n.Malmffl;.' q"'s#"", 1919·191'1 (Wic.bo<lo:n.
19110). pp Il~·71
,. 'Co"""".. opUs o>"ir i,n"wn< cc. po~la<;"'"pcnda.. si> "",islsicl. <1 ","be (\e les .......iie,.u
Iliiime ~i,latif. jLJdlc~« adminiscralifbeJo:c.. .pres ..'oir t«lle do ramrnor l"indu"ric ,'ca d·.lO~
oJObo""..... d',"rn r'j!flcU_"" ee \cs 'lOri<ullcun,~ rouos<.•pres qu· ...... d.... ..,~'."""
impon"". I'''' fmm.c <11", cc I"'}~ ee ." .x.=ue prosptrc. IP>CC: .u ""'oche"""" ;; la Ocill;que. <\cs
Oclilcs 0,"", pro"""", do jet", le "",,,,,he I{Itk la~ ee po....... ;; co 1«>< lbominal>le do ""ndr< des
'm.... Pierre V.n Wee,'Ok. in • 1«<", to Bi<o Public. tl A\li. t926 (A.M.A.E,B.tO.79;y)tI6J~
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He added rather controversially that the Wlll100nS of Malmedy had hardly
been assimilated to the Belgian Slate. Harking back to the discrroitcd public
expression of opinion ht argued that 'these peopl(' who had Il\'ed under a
dictatorial regime hardly dare express their true $C1Itimenf. Albeit unsun: as
to the outcome which any new plebiscite "'·OI.lld bring he noted how 'On('
must nol Iosc sight of the fact that th(' majoril)' of these people sented
\'oIunUlrilyand courageously under German nags.' ~
HO"'~'er the Bdgian High Commissioner for \h(' Rhin('land
Edouard Rolin-Jacqucm~"IIS ...Titing to \h(' Iklgian ambassador to Ikrlin in
1926, ...tlilst rcj«ting any att('ffiptto sell the cantOll5 to Germany beli('ved
fw1hermore that \h(' orpnizatiOl\ of a new plebiscite was 'unjustified.' After
all, th(' public cxpr'('SSim ofopinion according to Jacquem)"TI$ had nodting to
do ...ith appeasing the ...ill of the people. 'TlIey ....ere only Consulled', he
beliC\'Cd. ·to ,·mt)· if an accmtuiUed natiOflaI ...ill was going to become an
obstacle to a Ill(l('(' important anne:.uIion demanded by the Iklgian
Government for economic and S1Tateg)C moIl\'es..' Whilst conceding that the
execution of the oonsultation in 1920 WllS DOC ...ithout criticism. Jacqut'm)"1lS
beliC\"ed that if aD)thing the result demonstrated 'beyorKl doubt. that the
populatim oftbc: annexed territories ...~ Iart;ely luIo;('WIlI1tl and iodiffemtt to
the outcome. ,)10
Indeed Iul.:e....ann and indifferenl are fining ....ords 10 describe
Belgiwn's anirude to"''lIf"d its ne....ly annexed territory and more panicularly
to....ard its inhabitants. The powc-r \"acuum that cntefged fol~ing Baltia's
dc'parturc saw the ("\'('r waning pn:lC('SS of assimilation becOIn(' eclipsed by a
....lwe of pan·Germanism. later imbued ...ith pro-Nari fer....OUT. Organizations
such as th(' Kameradschafiliche Vereiniglll1g OIIC' the Eije/w!rein Which
"·I......z.,""" la ..;w~. inI.<ri<w<d<_ ;enaqui 1__ ...........10 d< ........ fl"" quo loo
AIlc:rnlnd. 0< <"""","""'''' J'lf ....... IOurto:rio et ",,, ",rt...;". F....mn...'. il dol: IVO. UM ,.;, .....
"*tm' MN<: Somortoouxn. lA P.~•. 26 Do<. \92'.
'" ·r.j<>uI< quo. moo ..·.. ., Go"'...",,,,..... bolp "" q""...".,....... r""'·....... do< M. SI_M.
1.'0<&0";"'.,,,,, d'u" plc:~",•• don.", ,.,.,.;", , irIju.. ir.... ~n .fl'",. r.nnniond< ""
.errilo.... on 1918 [,,,I. n'l p"" Cl'; """"'~«. ",,'.fln d< ,,,,if 1uM ><."""1 ........le ..,"'''' .... ""
fli... P'" oboll<le ............xion p.... impon.r dOo i <on"", inl...... fll' le Gou"""''''''''
b<1ti:< pO,"" lc:o """if. iemJ;,.,iq"". '" """I1Pq"" S,ri<I '" """r1<k",ioL Rol;n J..,q""m}.... '0
Robon E,,,,,,, 26 Apr.1926 IAM.A.E.B.IO. 792 11110).
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organized cullural outinlP to Germany for the children of Eupen and
Malmedy were seen now not ooly as instruments of German cuhural
inculcation but also as incubatM of Nazi ideology,;'7
Yd from tht' vantag(' point of the Belgian miniSl('l" in Bertin
Count de: KC1thO'o'(' de Denterglw:m as IlIle as 1933. 'since the arrival of
Hitlc-r an almost complete calm (n:igned] bctwcm Belgiwn and Germany.
contrasting strangel)' ...ith the dail)" incidc:nu and l"C'crimioations prodUCt'd
previously: lnI.kt'd the count bel.iC\"ed that tht' disturbances reported in
Eupm and Malmedy ....c-r(' of a more localized chancter and confIDed mainly
to agitatM in tht' Rhindand. NC\'enhel('SS be wpponcd the Iklgian prilll('
ministc-r's proposaJ.s that Brusseb assume a more: hands on rol(' in tbc
t('l'rilory to deal ('ffectivt'ly ith tht' disturbances and to strip individuals of
Belgian nationalily. H(' nm ~t so far as to reconmend that Belgium llIke
a kad from the policies mlP~"cd by Hitlc-r. 'Ililler', be "'TOI:e. 'did IKM
besil1lte to mlPIoy vis-a-vis immigllllll$. an identiOlI method 10 thal being
advised by th(' Prim(' MiniSler and ht su;:cttded in ridding himself of his
principal ad\'crsaries ...ithout any difficull)'.:'
HO"''(''\'c-r when tht' result oftlit' Saar plebiscite became 1m0000n in
January 1935 C\'ents took a \.t'T)' different turn. Few had ('xPt'C!ed such a
definjth'c result wh('l"c 0'0"('1" ninety percent of the population \"Dled for a
mum to Germany.:t 1llc: ('\'ident acclaim ....ith which the Sa.ar plebiscite ....as
greeted throughOUt Germany and in Eupen was tmlpered by reflections in
some Gennan publications as 10 thl: lack of mmsparency associated ...ith
other plebiscites condUoCled und('l" V~iI1es, Publications such as the
Germania once again focused attention on the legitimacy of the public
" Il<id, Chrioo ....M. rr....-' ,....u,.,IqIh-Jw K,,...,..,,,,Il,,,ian I~ £"P"...MaI,,",,*' :t<u.:Mn di~
b<id<m W.II.tri<.o:<~(MOn<hm 197~). pp ~IO.
,. 'H.'" n'll"" ....i1., .""'''l· ,....vlod<.I~"" mo)'ftl ;0,,"' ""Iui pri<oniooi "" 10:
I'fomiof Min,,,,,,, <1 il "" "''''' inoi. , 0< <lCbo,....... ..,.. <0"1' In. et u.... ditr",uk do<
... prin<i",u, od.......... · L. ,""",,;, K.,,/ovI·.,k 0.""/"%1>/,<... 10 P"u1 I/J-=, M.A_£" 28
0<<000 ,9J3 (A.M.A.E.l.l. IO.7921~SOO).
,. 'Nobody hod ...., b<lic,·«! ,,,", p;"'bil.y of...inll ou<h • lOnnidool>lc: ""'jor.y <lc:<:1o", ...If in
favour ofllil.,,·. (lor....nf......,.. Ilelljl"",', ,_",.. i,., in Il<tlin. • C""", <k K."iooII. lit
[X_'1IIl<.. ", P"wll/;}·"""". I~ J"". 19J1 (A.M..A.E-O.II.04mU·2'71Ja<>-F".~
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expression of opinion of 1920 deeming it 'a farce'."" In Belgium. the
socialists had by now split on how best to interpret evenlS in the region.
Pierre Van Wen'eke described the situation that prevailed by the
late thirties as a 'malaise' due to the fact that 'Belgium had misunderstood
the value of its conquest'." Looking on from afar and now in the last few
years of his life, Ballia noted how since his departure, 'the Eupenoise and
Malmedians, so used to waiting for directions under a Gennan regime or
being able to address a functionary during the period of transition' had now
been left to their 0\\11 devices. with the feeling thm nobody eared about them
anymore. JZ The eventual annexation of Eupen-Malmedy by Nazi Gennany in
May 1940 would sce the beginning of yet another phase of uncertainty and
upheaval in the lives ofits inhabitants.
One recalls the analogy made by Nicolas Pietkin, the abbot of
Sourbrodt. a village on the outskirts of Malmedy. when comparing the
coercive character of Bismarck's KIIllIlrlwmpf to the actions of thc Greek
mythological character Damastes who enticed his victims to spend the night
in a bed which he had prepared for them. If they proved too long for the bed
he would proceed to cut off their limbs. If too short he would stretch them
until they fitted the contours of his fatal lure.H 111e dubious means by which
the public expression of opinion had been executed was another instance
where people were forced to fit the contours of a historical narrative wriuen
with the ink of preseut-day exigencies. Yet follo\\ing the end of Baltia's
regime these once redeemed brothers found themselves being pulled in two
directiOlls by the whims ofpolitical expediency.
During the period of repression which followed the Sccond World
War they were once again suspected for their 'unBelgian activity'. The rather
.. 1'IJIIU,cNr Ekohik'h,"" 19 Jan. t9Jl.
"'Plu«UCl<m<n<" ll<lg...... m••"......~ .. ,~ de .. ronq"'-'«.' Pier« Van W<n-..k La 8,1l/;q,..
<I £"I)<I,.M.lmi,~':0;' <" WIN""" """,' (8"",d 19J1j.. 'mml-prop"'.
"£ri.mmm,'I"nd<. b€lgU"N" Cm",,". llI.a'a (L.A.V,-N.R.W..S8..RW OOtlllS, ,,32).
)] Abbo' POetkin Niot"lo. Pi<tl... It>:: Ixlo,-"j .bbe of Sourbrodt • ,'Hlog< "" ,t>:: «Ii' "fMolmcdy ......
dcdi<.o,«I '0 ,t>::~... ofW.lloon volt>«.nd <"~"'... H~ ....,... hi> =-n foo ,t>:: ",<1&", of"'"
1\'.lloon co"",,"n"y .. Pnwio dill ;"'Itodc: ,ho, 'hoy breoi '''''y from P""",,, ./0""'" llo.,in. 'L 'abbe
Nicoio, Pi<tkin' in La "".. "",!lom". 21 J..... 1921. pp 1,2·'l.
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controversial rnarmer in which they had become Belgian in the first place
together "ith the reality that the two districts had been re-annexed by Nazi-
Gennany were conveniently ovcrlooked in IIll allempt to cleanse the natiooal
conscience of a Belgian state struggling to come to tenns with the events of
the past few years. But where the Belgian state may have succeeded in its
projC(;t of epl/ration those most affected by it in Eupen, Malmedy and SI.Vith
would once again absorb its effects into the collective consciousness already
traumatised by the events of the inter-\Oo'llf period. In this way the pefile farce
beige that was the public expression of opinion was just the lirst act in a
tragedy that continues to play itself out up to the present day.
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Supplying an army:
IRA gunrunning in Britain during the War of
Independence
Gerard Noonan
As a military endeavour. the Easter rising \'..as a failure. As a political
exercise. however. the rebellion proved very effective. for it encouraged
those who re-fomled the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB) in 1917 to continue the struggle 10 ovcnhrow British rule
in Ireland. Ho",ever, with only a limited amount of munitioos available in
Ireland for purchase or theft. rebels were forced to source mate,;el abroad.
Britain was the milin source for annaments procured overseas, and republican
gunl\lJ1ners there engaged in illegal and dangerous activities in order to
provide rnooitions to their comrades in Ireland.' This essay discusses these
gunrunning effons in tenns of the people involved. Ihe types and quantities
of materiel obtained. and the arrangements made for the storage. transpon.
and distribution
On 10 May 1919, Joseph Viz.c. chief IRB gunrunner in Scotland.
"Tote to Michael Collins. head of the IRB or 'fenians'. '[W]e are now on a
few good lincs thm I expect to "urk with good results very soon ...., he
declared. Otle line of inquiry concern..,.;! a big anny stores, containing
machine guns, revolvers, rifles and grenades. The rifles were broken down
into their constiruent pans. All the pans were included except the wooden
sections.. which could be manufactured in Lreland. '[1] intend to give it extra
mtemion and try to strike something good.' Viz.c dedared.' Two-and-a-half
weeks later. Vizc was empathetic: 'We've struck !ill. There is now passing
into our hands 500 Revolvers and 200,000 rooods of .303 [ammunition].
I Padd~' !>all' '0 MichKl Collin•. 28 S<pt. tq21 (Uni,'<nioy Collq;~ Dublin Arobi"<> IUCDAI. RocnanJ
Mul<.hy POpef>', PUM), I "ouO:! lik. '" tMnl: Trinity Colleg. Dublin (Te\)) ond U"....ick CounIy
Co",",,1 for fund"'ll the: r<>eoroh for the: <10<10.-'1111<>;, on ",hich thi, ....y ;, hoo<d: O«ard N""""R.
·1'.... phl"ic.l-IO",. "'fI<Jblbni.m in Brilo'" 1919--1923' (PhDtll<>i>. TCD. 2011).
: Joe Vit< '" Moch.<! Collins. 10 ~l>y \919 (UCIJA. Mulcoh~' P,p<1'S. PUAlll).
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don't think I've made a miSlake in the figures. i1Lh ri.ghj, .. .'.1 The following
week. Viz<' informed Collins that the first raid on the anny stores was
scheduled 10 take place on Tuesday night, 10 June. Between twenty-five and
thiny thousand rounds of .303 ammooition were to be removed by mOlor car.
along v.ith revolvers by hand. Six dumps were arranged 10 receive the
projected haul. The motor car would disITibule the mooitions between the
dumps in the countryside, while a hOl'SC and cart would do likewise in the
city. Vize and his men expected to get a large haul of mWlitions: 'Everything
is looking the best for us, (unless something unforeseen happens) and J have
great hopes of doing something extra big for you (QQQ £ll!!!.l ill." However.
on 22 Jooe. Vil.e told Collins that. 'meeting our old luck'. the operation had
been cancelled. The day before the scheduled raid, Vizc's agent. the army
range-keeper, was sentenced to thirty days' imprisonment fOf pav.uing anny
boots while the range-kecpcr's wife was given three weeks to vacate the
family's lodgings at the base. Vize hoped that they might be able to acquire
some of the munitions within that period. Nevenheless, he was keenly
disappointed: 'mhe worst pan of it is filling you and the boys v.ith such
hopes only to be dashed to the ground. it has not been for the v.'lInt of
working up the job I can assure you. we could only do our best'.'
Scarcity of wcapons was a perennial problem for the Volunteers
or Irish Republican AmIY (lRA) in Ireland. As raids on private houses failed
to provide an adequme quantity of anns, the Volunt~'ers were forced to
exploit sources abroad in order to augment their arsenaL" In this. the IRA was
continuing a tradition of enlisting foreign aid to o\'enhrow British rule in
Lreland. one which stretched back to the binh of Irish republicanism in the
late eighteenth century. The source of Ihese annaments was often Britain
itself.
J lbid.. 2& May 19t9(UCDA. Muic.hy 1':op<1'S, PUAlI1); orill I."",...;,.
, Ibid.. 6 JLIn< 1919 (UCDA. Mul<ohy P.p<1'S. P71A111 J; <>rill 1<"'1'1\1';0.
, Ibid., n JUIl< Iql9 (UCOA. Mulcohy Papen. P71A111),
• Return sho",~ by Irolllhly perM>d' th< numl>or ofml.lldcro of m<mb<:" ofth< Ro~~llroo
Coml.huhu-y and oflhe IJublin M<lropolioan Polic•..' fronlthe hI day of hnual)'. Iq19. to the 3O;h
Al"iL 1920 ICmd. 71)91 19l0. xl p, 2.
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[n the decades bct",'Cen the Fenian rebellions of 1867 and 19[6.
IRB men in Britain procured small amounts of weapons and sent them to
their comrades in Ireland in the hope that they would someday be used to
fight for Irish independenee.1 Joe Vize was one of a small number of men
who continued the tradition of Fenian gunruTUling during the War of
Independence. At that time, a handful of peop[e dominated gun·smuggling in
each of the four major centres of Irish activity in Britain. In u:mdon. Scan
MeGntth. Sam Maguire. and the Can- brothers were the men of importance.'
In Manchester. the comparable figures were Paddy O'Donoghue, John
McGal1og[y. and Mal! Law[ess." On the Liverpool scene, activities celltred
on Nei[ Ken- and his three sons. Tom, Jack and Nei[ Junior. atOllg with Steve
Lanigan. 'o
As the War of Indcpendence progressed. some changes occurred
in the gunrunning personnel. In Ju[y 1920. Joseph Fur[ong. a Wexford man.
replaced Joc Vize in SCOlland. lI During the lruce. Furlong was in turn
sneceeded by D. P. Walsh." The IRA's arson attack on Liverpoo[ dock
warehouses in NOI'ember 1920 led to the interrunent and imprisonmcnt of the
Kerrs and Lanigan. The leadership on Merseyside was then assumed by
Offaly man Paddy Daly.1l Following his arrest in February [921. Sean
McGntth's shoes were filled by Dennis Kelleher." Michael Collins'
injunctiou that 'the enemy mUM not be allowed 10 break up our organisation,
no matter whom he takes' was therefore obeyed, 11
Until December 1920, the gunrunners reeeived their orders from
the lRB in Dub[in. the leadership of which during the War of Independence
, Mork R)".n. F.~ia~ I.,.(Dubl;", 194~). pp40. 47. 61. t71.
, So.., MdJralh inI.<r.'",'" (UCDA. Ern;" O·M.I")· N<JI<:boob. ~ 171>11 00): John J. SfJeTlock S"''''''''n'
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McGr:uh,o An O'B,",", IJ Jut>< 1038 (NU, An 0 Br";n P.pe", M.1-l61f.!6): M.n;n w.w. 'o~
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was dominated by Michae[ Collins. [n the summer of 1920, [RA general
headquarters (GHQ) was re-organised and a number of lIew departments
were created. Among them was a department of munitions purchases, headed
by a director of purchases (DIP). Joc Vize was the first occupant of this
office, [n November 1920, following his arrest. Vizc was succeeded by Liam
Mellows,'· Despite Mellows and his lieutenantS making extcnsive visits to
gunrunning cemres in Britain in 192[, Michael Collins cOll1inued to send
ordcrs to Liverpool llnd london, Liverpoo['s Paddy Daly states that he
succeeded in working with both IRA and IRB leaders in gWlfunning
mallers."
Mellows' appointmell! as DIP in [920 both coincided with and
stimulated the increased involvement in gunrunning of the IRA in Britain.
The home rule crisis of 1912-14 had seen the estab[ishmelll of Volunteer
contpanies in Britain as wcll as in [reland, An estimated two hundred
republicans t11lvelled from Britain to Dublin to fight in the Easter rising,
seven being killed. It [n early 1919. GHQ sent JO\' Vize 10 Scotland to re-
organi:.r.e the Volunteers and take charge of gunrunning. Later that year, re-
organisation efforts got undet""''llY in London and Manchest~, Branches of
the lRB, Cumann na mBan. Ih.: women's auxilia1)', and Na Fianna Eireann.
the republican boy scouts, were also estab[ished. l" Previous to Mellows'
appointment, Volunteer companies in such English cities as London.
Liverpoo[. and Mllnchester had becn involved in gunrunning. but OIlly under
the auspices of the IRB. Now [RA companies ",,-ere ~oming involved in
their o""n right. This was signified by the development of Binningltanl,
Tyneside and south Wales as centres of procurement. On Tyneside,
gunnumin£ operations were run by the officer commanding (O/C) the
T}n.:side brigade, Richard Purcell, the quartennaster. Gilben lJarringtoll, and
" Piu., Be.... ;. ,IIk;""1 C,>lI;'", o,.d 'M ,,,,,.lj"ll ofQ ,..." '"I",.11l ,'olt. l.QnJon. 19"6). i;. p. 161.
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" tbid.. no. 510. Frank T1IornKHI. '" J (NAil: J<>< Good. E:otrloi/",.d b,. dr<aJm",j=ooJ of"
rO'\viu/Um<")" ed. M.....ic< Good 1DinjlI<. 1996), pp 13·17: An <'I lit"'in. '(;o,edhillhor ....., "'...
""'''' <H\ the h;"ory orthe G..lic l.eaane ofl.orolon· in Clopur-hln A~nooJ (1044). p. 126, Mainin Sein
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the adjUI:lllI. J. P. Cmnolly.31 As in Binningham. IM procurm1efll of
munilions on T)1leSIck had begwl m the initial,,-e of the ITlC!I lhemselvts.
"ithoul directim from GHQ or OIlher gunrunning Ctrlll'n.:' [n IM spring of
1921. Barrington "'lIS summoned 10 Dublin 10 meet Mellows. 'The DIP gne
him illSlruclions and mooe)' for Ihe purchase ofanns.:: Connoll,. later mO\'ed
10 south Wales to source munitions Ihert.::J
In Scot[and. the IRA had become involved in ~;unnmning
someI\'hm earlier than in England and Wales. due to the fact that the re-
organisation of the VolunteeD there occurred earlier than 500mh of the border,
Palrid: fo,liII5o. a native of Behnullet. county Mayo. was the 151 lieutenant of
Ihe Motheooo-ell Volunleers. He remembc-red thal the company's main acIivily
was 'the col1ectim ofarms. ammunition and explos"'es to send to Ireland'."
The 1}'Jle5 and quantities of munitions acquired by gullfUl1/\er"S ,n Britain
during the War of Independence .-aried through lime due 10 a nwnber of
fll:1cn. lhest included the orders they rccei.\'ed from Dublin. the fmanciaJ
resources al their disposal. and the nature of the armament sounces a\-ailable.
Michael Collins frequently made specif.e requests of his gunnlllllet"S in
response to Ihe demands of IRA unilS in the field. Many relaled to
ammunition. the shortage of which "..as a constant problem for Ihe [RA:l '[5
there any chance of gdting ammunition for thcse fony fives [i.e . .45
revolvers! [?I". Collins asked Seamus Barren. a Manchester gunrunner. in
early 1919. 'Ofal[ things \\-e want it more badly than llrI>1hing else.'~
Of course. the pro\'ision ofweapoos themselves. in addilion 10 the
ammunition. "<IS also a concnn of the IRA leadcnhip. '[)onrJl fail 10 [be)
keeping all )"OU! C"cs open for anns.' CoIlins loId Liverpool's Sln'e Lanigan
"Mar}A.~_1Jw....... _,.,,.Jnt<<__ 1;._I~I'''J~!I(1)oilIIiIo.t999~p.
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in 1919..... wq'Jrc: awfully short of 045 (m.-oh·ersr.:1 Writing in An ,-Ogftk.
the IRA journal. the OIC of a flying column decbrtd thal the Webley and
Smith & W~ 045 calibre rc:\'OI\'ers were 'ideal weapons for the a\crage
Volunleer'.:O Handguns were shoo range ... -eapons. useful at di51anCC:5 up to
sevCDty-fi\'e yards (69 m).~ Rifles were long range firearms and Michacl
Collins considered Ihcm to be 'Ihe besl of all' weapons.JO Types of rifles
included the WinchcstCT. Mauser. Manini-Henry and Remington. The most
famous. however. was the lee Enfield. the rifle acquired in the largesl
quanlities by Irish gunrunners. 'The gun-smugglers consislently fail to specify
the models of Lee Enfield they ac:quirc:d. bul most were probably the Mark III
.303 calibre "ith short magazine. the standard issue Brilish army rifle during
lhe Great War.J1
Explosi\'es were another form of munilions the sourc:ing of "-nich
ra.xed GHQ. 'If there is any chance al all go ahead as quickly as)'OU can
laying in Ib.e srufJ li.e. explosives): Michad Collins told u\'Crpoors Neil
Kerr Senior in late 1920. adding that the Glasgow gunrunner-s also be
requ<:Sled 10 do likcwise. ll Explosi\'e materials such as gelignite, ammonite.
dinitrobcnzene and lrinitrotoluene, and chemicals such as potassium ch[OI111e.
were used in the mallufacture of bombs. Thes< were Ihen employed in anacks
on police stations and army barracks. ll
The financial resources al Ihe disposal of the gunnmners also
influenced the 1)'Jle5 and quantities of munilions they acquired. As well as
sending orders. Mkh3t1 CoIlins and GHQ provided the rnoocy 10 fund the
purt:hase of!he munitions. be they ammunilion. firearms or cxplosi\·cs. Such
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moncy WlIS rnised from a number of sources including the O3il.).I Between
April 1919 and Seplember 1920. Collins sent around £1.:500 10 Manchesler. Jl
Between June 1919 and July 1920. he gave al leasl £2.5~0 10 Viz<: in
Glasgow.Jo In Marrh 1921. DIP Liam Mellow! sent £1.000 to Glasgow and
£500 10 Edinburgh.Jl As well as providing Ihe funds. Dublin often advised OIl
Ihe prices 10 be paid for the WC3ponr)·. Thus. Collins dil'ttled one gunrunner
to 'Ne\'er on any accounl gi'-e mort' Utan £6 wilhoul consulting' his
U"apool colleagues. This applied 10 rifles and handguns. A price greater
!ban £6 mighl be agreed in the case of a Gmn.an automalic handgun.
complete "ith :Rock and fifty or one hundred rounds of ammunition. he
cOlllinued. Still. ifhe"~ 10 be made such an offer, the gunn.utner should
consult the Merse'yside men before agreeing to itJI
In the acquisition of rnataiel. funds "'a'e emplo)-ed in two
different Wll)'5.. In simple deals. money was handed O\'er in mum for
weapons. Buying weapons from gunsmiths and Brilish anny soldiers recently
returned from the World War "'a'e examples of such l1'a:nSaCtions. Other
deals "'a'e more complicated, sometimes necessililting lbat financial expense
be ineurred e\~ before the mWlitions "'a'e actually acquired. Asking
Michad Collins for an additional £500, Joc Vile explained that he had spenl
all his funds pur.;uing many diffemlt channels of inquiry. eaeh of which
requill'd deposilS and outlays. '1 mUSI hne moncy in those places.' he "role
in February 1920.... [forj if one of them SIiltIlsJ on • large scale. I would
lilte 10 be able to meel them "ithout calling in money from the other places
• JO E"en the lhefl of munilions. from an army bamclts for example.
.. n.,id F;'_r'ock. PoJilia_ hWt lift 191J--19~1'_*"'W "<IK,w",yn/><tJrutld""",,_
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incurred COSlS. The munitions thcmSl.'lves were nOl purchased. of course. bill
soldiers had to be bribed so as 10 faciliulIe Ihe lhcft. 1O
As well as the orders received from Dublin and the financial
resotn=S at Illeir disposal. ~ quanlities and Iypes of munitions acquired by
the gunronners was diculIed by Ihe nat1U\" oflbe weapons sources available 10
lhem. As menlioned earlier. British army soldiers wen: a panicularly fel1ile
source. as on their mum from the Great War many brougbl munitions horn<:
"ith them as sou,'enirs. Acting on initiative. individual VoIWlIeer5 would
approach the former soldiers and ask if they wen: "illing to sell their
weapons. Motherwell'S James B)rne later Slaled that aroomd me hundred
rifles.. and'a couple ofhundr'cd !Tvol,'ers' C05ting between £3 and £J 10s.
wen: purchased in Ihis way, along ",ilh a 5IDlI1I amount of amnumition."
Paddy O'Donoghue remembered Ibat the gunrunner Seamus Barren similarly
sn:uIl'd 'a big number of re'\'oh'ers' fl"OlD soldiers in Maochesler.C As well
lI.'Ii selling their 0\\11 weapons to them.. soldiers sometimC'l helped Irish
gunrunrter5 gain access 10 munitions held in army bamlcks. Such bamlcks.
drill halls. shooting ranges. and similar facilities.. "ilb their arsenals of
firearms. ammunilim. and more. were alluring targets fOl' gwuunners.
Glasgow's Joc Viz.e was "cry illleresled in mounting raids on such arsenals.
In July 1920. he issued orders 10 all IRB cenu-es in Scotland '10 report
withoul delay. any rifle ranges. drill halls 01' army Slores in their diSlricts
..::J By Ihen. he had already moumoo a number oflbefts. His flTSl raid. on
Hamillon army barracks. se<:ms 10 have wen place in August 1919, Vize
made contact with a qUlltlermaster sergeanl in Ibe bamtcks. On the appointed
nighl. a small groop of Volunteers Irnvel100 to the barracks. At a location
arranged by the quartennaSlcr. 11'0'0 of Ihe party climbed over the wal1. They
soon mum with the rifles and handed Ihem to Iheir colleagues. who hid them
under their coats, In all. len rifles were Sl.'ized. along with a quantity of
.. loo Viu'o MOeha<1 Coil"". 21 M-oy 1919 (UCD". M"k:'hy Papers. P71A1llj
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ammunition ..... In June 1920. a second raid on the barracks netted ViZ!: forty
Gennan rifles and bayonets." Republicans in other parts of Britain mounted
similar raids. although much less frequently. In September 1921. for
example. a party of Liverpool and Bil1llingham Volunteers raided a drill hall
in Bil1llingham. netting four Lee Enfield rilles and just under 3.500 rounds of
.303 ammunition. Liverpool"s Paddy Daly was disappointed "..ith the haul.
Michael Co11ins. however. was more upbeat: "If the Cork no. 3 [IRA
Brigade] had had it [i.e. the 3,500 rounds of ammunition] at one period in1a~t
February. they wO\Ild have smashed up 650 of the enemy·.... IRA companies
in Lanarkshire in Scotland and Lancashire in England also stole explosives
from local coal mines."
Once the munitions were acquired. they were usually hidden in
dumps umil an opportunity arose to despatch them to [reland. In Liverpool,
such dumps were mainly located in the private houses of the Irish \vorking
class. 'They were the only people who would take a risk over there.'
commented Paddy Daly." Volunteer Michacl O'Leary agreed. remembering
that although plenty of people sympathised with the Volunteers. few were
willing to take the risk of storing munitiOlls.'"
The smuggling of munitions to Ireland took a number of forms.
Sometimes. the gunrunners and their friends travelled to Ireland on passenger
ships. carrying the al1llaments on their persons or in their luggage. This
seems to have been a favoured method of the London gunrunners for a time,
though Michacl Collins frowned on the use of women as munitions
couriers..e [n the early stages of gunrunning in Binningham. the men there
used the nOl1llal postal service as the most convenient method of despatch."
However. the main method of smuggling was the hiding of al1llaJllents
.. BMHWs no, 177. P",nok ~l;Il" p. J; ibid.. no. 776. Jo>q>/l Book... p, J (NAI).
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onboard trading vessels plying between Britain and Ireland. A number of the
seafarers on thesc boats were Irishmen. and some were willing to smuggle
munitions. Paddy Kavanagh and Billy Vemer worked on the SS B/dckrock.
the vinual l1agship of republican gunrunning out of Liverpool. Other
prominent Merseyside seafarers included Paddy Weafer on hoard the SS
Wick/oU'. Michael Byme on the SS. Kildare. a man named Morris on the Ss.
Kircaldy. Paddy larkin on a Dundalk boat. and a man named McGlew on the
Clarccasl/c. a Guinness boat. Paddy Nolan. meanwhile. was the main
seafarer used to cany munitions dirc<:dy from Glasgow to Dublin in 1919 and
1920.12 William Nelson worked onboard the s.s. Killincy, which plied
between Dublin and LiverpooL Upon reaching Merseyside. NelSOtl would
make contact with the gul1ntrtners. often in a pub called the 'Nonh Stur·.
which was owned by an Irishman named Hegarty. He wO\lld then be taken to
the place where the munitions had been readied for despatch, often a house
on Dublin SI. 'Revolvers and ammunition were easy enough to handle:
remembered Nelson,
as they could be Slowed on the person; but ril1es were a dill'e",nl
prOJlOsilion. Ways and means were found, ~"",'e,·cr. $allors in Ihose days
always use<llonll cam'as bags 10 carry their personal gear (Bed·dollles, sea
boots. oH-skins. etc.): and those same can"",, bags were ideal for calT)'ing
rifles. The modus operandi was 10 pUI Ihc rines into the bags. then swff
lhem around wilh an}'lhlng available s""h "" old newspape" and old "'gs.
jusllo take the corners off. The bags were then taken on their ,,,,n,,,'s
backs (.ie] through tile dock gal"" and ':>n t><>ard ship. "
Aboard the ship. the mUllitions were hidden as best as possible. 'Secre<:y was
the key note of the whole operation'. Nelson wrote. 'for even their {i.e. the
seafarers'] own ship-males were not aware of whal was going on under their
very noses','" Once the munitions reached Dublin. thcy were transferred from
the ships onto ferry boats crossing the river LilTey. 'Q' Company. a section
" lbid .. 00. !ll4. Poddy Daly. PI' ".7. 11 (NAil; Micll>o<l Colli". to Jo< Viz<. I1 J_ 1919 (UClJiL
Mulcoh)' pope.... P71A111j,
"William Ndson. "'Q- Co~."y· inA" tOgl",'h. ii. 00. 2 (1%6~ P. 12
" lbid,
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of the Dublin Volunteers. was specially charged "ith transporting the
annaments from the ships to nearby annaments dumps." GHQ's ml1hod of
distributing mWlitions to IRA units around Ireland was rathcr pl'l."Carious.
Mayo's Richard Walsh remembered. Periodically. provincial brigades sent
men to the capital to claim some of the arsenal. It was then their
responsibility to transport the munitions to thcir brigade area. The main
method of transport was by rail. and many railway workers risked their lives
by helping IRA men to smuggle munitions around the country. Another
method involved placing tnWlitions amongst the nonnal supplies being sent
from Dublin to shopkeepers or meKhams around the country. Once the box
of supplies was delivered. the munitions would be removed by Volunteers in
the businessmen's employ. Overall, Walsh described the distribution system
as ·chaney'.'"
The quantity of munitions smuggled to Ireland from Britain
during the War of lndependcnee is difficult to estimate accurately due to the
lack of a complete set of primary source records for the period and also
beeause of the lack of precisiOll in some of the extant correspondence. In the
ten months from May 1919 to March 1920, the extant correspondence reveals
that the Glasgow men despatched dil'l."Ctly to Ireland at least twel~'e rifles,
fifty-seven handguns. 161 sticks of gelignite, another 109.35 kg of gelignite,
2.702 detonators. 203 fuses, and 270 rounds of ammWlition.'1 In 1919. four
gunrunners in Manchester procured £223 65 6J worth of munitions. including
revolvers, gelignite. fuse wire and fnse caps,"The extant records in relation
to London indicate that 1919 saw the despatch of at least three rifles and
twelve handgWlS dim:tly to Dublin, along with a parcel of munitions. thc
contents ofwhich was not stated.'"
" WitH.", Nd",n', S'ory(NLl, M, ~'.7;:~). ",,;:.!: N<I"'IL '"'Q" Co..",.ny·, p, 12.
'" nMHWs 110. -100. Riclwd W.1sh. pp 1-IO.1(NA1).
"Corre"",_ bel,....", Mic"",,1 comOl.nd Jo< Viz<. F<n 1919--Jul}' lnU(UCDA. Mule,,",
P.".,....P1INtl), •
"c~ bel"..", Mic"""] Cotlins, s..",,,, o..n.n >nd PO<kIyO'[lonogIJ"". Apt-. '919-J....
tnt. "p. PoJdyO'Donogh"" 10 Mic.....1Collin"lLd.. btJl ..... rk«l 'R«d S.t2.t9· (UCDA. Molca"y
P:ope.... P11Af9.P71A1lUj.
.. Co",,~<beI",'O<II Mich""t CoJtiOl. Art O'Brim"nd 5<"" M«l""h. Mar. 192(l_Jnly 19;:1
(NAJ. DE 2IJll-2IJJ1),
90
In March 1920. worried about the security of thc annamenlS
accumulating in Glasgow. Joc Vize suggested the opening of a new transpo!1
route to Ireland. Michael Collins recommended that he send the munitions to
Liverpool instead, where 'Our communications ... are extremely good and
our men are extremely good'."" Soon Liverpool was also ~eiving mwtitions
from London. Binningbam, Manchester and Tyneside, and fOr\\--arding them
to Ireland. Munitions from New York and Antwerp were also senl to Ireland
via Merseyside,·' According to the extant sources, the two-year period from
June 1919 to the truce in July 1921 saw the Liverpool men smuggle to
Ireland seven machine guns, twenty-seven rifles, 285 handgWls. 24,450
rounds of anunWlition. and 483.75 kg of explosives. mainly gelignite and
ammonite.~
These figures, tentative as thl)' are, do not represent the total
amoulll of gunrunning in Britain during the War of Independence. Provincial
IRA units in Ireland, dissatisfied ....ith the quantity of supplies they were
receiving from GHQ. engaged in gunrunning in Britain outside of the official
IRA and IRB channels. Mayo's Richard Walsh, Sligo's Aldennan Lynch,
and members of the Wexford IRA. among OIhers. engaged in such
unamhoriscd missions.'" Michael Collins opposed Ihis development. Arguing
that 'People who have not a long experience in working these [gunrunning]
matters don't know the hann [they do] by sprcading things about in a larg[e)
circle', he ordered gunnnmers in Britain to shllll such unauthorised
missions.... Despite Collins' orders, however, >ome gunrunners continued to
help comrades from Ireland. The quantity of munitions acquired by IRA units
in these unauthorised missions is unknown, but it may have becn significant.
'" Co""lpOfIdo""" bet"...", Jo< v.,. .r<! Micbael Coli .... 1. '4. IS F<b.. J, 14 Mor. t920 (UCOA.
Mnleahy P."."... P71A111),
.0 P>dd}' Doll' irn<n-iew(UCOA. O·M.ll<l'NolOboot-... P'1b'136): Paddy Doly '0 Michael Collln.. 8.
t I, 16, 18 "Ur. 1921 fUCDA. Mulc>.hy P.pen. P71A1~); E~"".,d M. Brolly. Iff/arol'. """'" ...n·kdn
£ngli",J (Dublin, 1918), p, 94,
., Co""'P<JOlkoce bet",·..", Mic.....1Collirul "nd NeB Kerr. SI".. Lani;lolL "nd Poddy o.ly. Ju""
1919--Jnly 192' (UCDA. Mnk;.hy Pope,,, P1IAlI_P11A!6).
., B.\1IlWS "". 400, Riclwd "".Ish. "" I;:S·J6(NAJ): Micha<IColI'" to Poddl'o.ly. S M.), 1921
(UCD,\. Mnlcahy P2p<rs.. P7IIV$): J. P. Connolly to O/J'. n.d.. bW c. S<pLIOcI. 1nl (NU. ()_;"
Popen. M, $-I--l2l$).
.. Mic"",,1 ColI"',o Poddy D.Jy. S M.l' 1921 (UCD,\. Mubhl' Poper>.. P71A1S).
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In J3nu3ry 1921. Mkhael ColHns told Manchcster gunrunner
P3ddy O'Donoghue th31 the supply of munitions would prove to be "the main
feature in overcoming the enemy'." In the evCllt. the IRA in Ireland did not
defeat the British. However, ....;th the aid of rifles, handguns, explosives and
other paraphernalia SOUrcl-d in Britain the Volunteers did succeed in forcing a
stalemate in hostilities, which in turn led to the tmec of July 1921 and the
Anglo-lrish treaty five months later. At least fifty-five people were convicted
of involvemCllt in republican gurmllllling and related offences in Britain
during the War of Independence," A number of others were deported to
Ireland and interned on suspicion of gun-smuggling. Meanwhile, two IRA
mCII were killed while handling munitions: Liverpool's Neil Kcrr Junior in
September 1920 and London's Mielmel Mclnemey in July 1921.61
During the Civil War, boih Free State and Republican forces
procured munitions in Britain. The fonner received annaments from the
British government through official channels, while the laller 'vas forced to
continue clandcstine gunrunning. However, mindful of the role played by
gunnumers in Britain in supplying the IRA during the War of Independence,
the Free State authorities worked with their British counterparts to frustr<tte
the gun-smuggling activities of the 3nti-trealy Voluntoxrs. The vigilance of
customs officials, police, and the British navy ensure<! that Republican
gunrunning during the Civil War failed to match that of the War of
Independence period in terms of the quantiry and quality of munitions
smuggled to units in the field.'"
: Mi<hoel Coil .., to Paddy O·DOI""'lI"... ~. Jon. 1921 (UCDA. Mulcahy P.pe", PUNI 0),
r'~~""n', Jo"rool. /d,h IfJtkp<>fJtk"', lruh nmn. ,\I"""h"'~rGlI<II"dum. n,., OIoM,.,~r n,., Ti"""
1919_ 1921: li>t offift}'-6,'o ptismlef. Kranled r=i"ion on 11 rob. t922: li" "HOWl""~" '
w....ed r=i"ion on I Apt. 1922 (TNA- HO 14414M~}:Kunni!lllinK;"<kflll<d~.. ,""
cont..",... ;"., of oil""'. ""'le. 0' .11 "ft"" roUowing. """""im<. in odo:Iilion to "'''''' con,.iction"
Expio'".." AC1 I 87~. Explooi,'. ~ubst.oc.. A<' ISIll, IUI<l ,"" Fm"", A<' IQ20,
"Mi<...l Colli",to Neil KeIT. 6 Se!Jl1920{UCDA, MUlcIhy Popen. P7IA1J): ,11_""".1'
G",,,,IUm. 30 July. 2 ALIJI.: n,., Obso,.,...... 18 Sepl 1921
.. Noo"",," 'hish r/'t)·.ical fo"", republicanKm ;" n,il.i11 • <h. J.
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A cadre-st:r1c party'! Cumann na nGaedheal organisation
in the constituencies of Clare and Dublin North 1923-27
Mel Farrel1
Much scholarship on pro-Treaty politics identifies a casual approach to
political organisation within the Cumann na nGaedheal party. Historians such
as JOM Regan and Maryann Gialenella Valiulis have dealt with CUlllaJllI na
nGaedheal's structural weaknesses while also highlighting nUlllerous
divisions within the party. I Recently, Ciarn Meehan t\as documemed some of
Cwnann na nGaedheal's more innovative cJectione<:ring te<:hniques allhOllgh
this approach has not yet extended to the realm of the pany"s organisation.llt
remains a general consensus. among historians and political scientists, that
Cumann na nGaedheal was a badly organised.' cadre-style pany that was
loosely tied to its national leaders. Unlike mass political machines, cadre
panics were orgallised on an ad-hoc basis by notable supporters and lackl-d a
large-scale dcpcndable branch network! Cumatm na nGaedhears literature
implies that it too was such a party, and that its platfonns were dominated by
the local elites of Irish society.' Moreover, the dominaJll narrative suggests
thal the party's organisation was deliberJlely dampened down," br.:mches
were viewed as an unnecessary burden and that power was ultimately
consolidated around government ministers ensconced in Merrion Stred. 6
, John M. ~eaon. The Iri3h c<>,.,"" mwuJion, 1921-19J6: T~'i" politic. ,,,,,} ...."1,"','" in
'",h~",k'" IrellJlld (Dublin. 200t): M"'l"ruJ Giokn<l" V.liul;" . Aft.. U., ...'<>1.. "",: ,"" romlO1in
}·.earaofC.......nn no nGoed"""f in ALJdreyS, El'k,onJ Ro"",, F, Gom'lll(ed.l. The ...<3 ufllot /_1'
,""}., "" Iri3h cult,," (De"",~.... 19&81_
, Cilia Meehon. The C""gnn" 1""1)': n hutory OIC""""", "" 'MoWhe,d, I~::J_JJ (Dublin. 201 0)
, Mi<....1G.II.iIi>er .nd Michael Mo""-l.!ql. "I biU( /',_,-1'11)'; Ill< p<J/ilics uf"",,,,,,,,,,hip uf Ih< '-h...
GU(I1""'" (Dublin. ~002). "" 11-, I: Li..m W~h. ·P."ie, and "l< PQlty .y>lem·, in John Cookley .nd
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fon-ell. '1",lond: e<nt.. liution. profeslionoli,""", and e<I~ili,'O ~IUrei' in ~i<""rd S_ K.." and
PC1<f M.ir (edo), 11",,'p;u1/~, org""i=,' cI,ems" "ad {Ok'p"'1;"" In pc",,' "'Kunl:m."", in ",,,"',
"" """";.-, (l.<>n<lon. \994), PI' 216-~1.
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This article. seeks, not so much to challenge this prevailing
historical consensus, but rdther to test it by looking 31 the pany from the
ground up through the lens of its pU13tive constituency structures. By
examining Cumann na nGaedheal's organis3lion in two quite dim'rent
constiruencies. Clare and Dublin North. new light can be shed on the party's
machinery. Was it a classic cadre-style pany. unablc to conlpcte in an age of
collective political mobilisation. or did it more closely resemble the
disciplined. mass movements then emerging in Europe. These questions are
important as ....'C try to understand the more complex reasons underpinning
CumaJUl na nGaedheal's demise as a distinct pany in the turbulent years of
1932-33.
Panies are 'profoundly innuenced by their origins',' so let us
briefly examine the impact of Cumarm na nGaedheal's foundation on the
subsequent evolution of the party's organisation. A distinct pro-Treaty
political organisation developed over the autumn and winter of 1922 as the
Irish Civil War entered its bloodiest phase. The impetus for the new party
came from the pro-Treaty election cOllunitlees that had been fonned in early
1922 to support the Provisional Govenullent eS13blished in January under the
tenns of the AJ1g1o-lrish Treaty. On 29 August the pro-Treaty General and
Election Committee resolved to establish the new )mrty that would bccOOle
Cumann na nGaedheaL' Nine days later members of this committee met with
an Em~'St Blythe led deputation from the pro-Treaty parliamentary party.'
During this meeting, Blythe emphasised the necd to shore up support for the
Provisiof131 Government by establishing a broadly bascd 'N3Iional Party' that
would cater to all interests who supported the Treaty. Against the background
of violent fratricidal eonnict. little atlempt was made to fonnul3le a rigorous
policy agenda or to systematically organise the constituencies. Instead.
, S<om>"-. p"",;" ""d Ilotlr ""..IH.... p, 23.
• Gene",1 a.-.l El«<ion Commitl... mm",.. of""""inI:. 29 A"l!. ln2 (OCD A,clIi,.. Dep.rt"""Jl.
[Dell"'l. C~ ....nn .. nGaedh<a1 porty min... book•• ?39/mi"'l~
'Tho IP""P also i"dU<l<d seam", Dolo... ?odrak 0 Mo,l< and W.k Cok. Ill), ... funll<r "'il!.......
, ..., the _. po.rt~ "'-ro • rolation<hip 10 'ho i<"-.rnrn<1O. .imil., la , , of, ... Br'oi.h Libenl$. 0....,..1
ond Ek"'",n Commitl... m;"...... 7 SopI.!912 (UCDA. Cu",""., .. nGaedheo! part~ mim", book..
P39ImirVl),
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support of the Treaty sculcment and a vague cOnception of govemmem for
the benefit of all classcs sufficed for a policy agenda, Already in power since
January 1922, the Provisional GovenmlClu did not conceive of the new party
as an instrument for winning power but rather to keep it there. to
Veteran Sirm Fein organiser Dan MacCarthy wished to see the
new party launch<:d at a 'big mcc!ing' representing 'all Ireland'." Others
such as Richard Mulcahy were opposed to the idea of launching the party
during a time of Civil War. believing the connict would oversbadow the
fon-nation of a new pro-Treaty party organisation. l1 Nonetheless. when
Treaty supporters gathered in Dublin for a conference on 7 December 1922.
they intended to press ahead with the foundation of the new pany. Those in
au"ndance chose Cumann na nGacdhcal. Ihe name of Arthur Griffith's 1900
precursor to Sinn Fell'. as the new party's title. Ahhougll publicly launched
the following April. the Cumann na nGaedheal party organisalion was
brought into being on the day of the 7 December conference through the
establishment of a provisional party eXl'<;mive. However, Cumann na
nGaedheal's foundation was overshadowed by one of the darkest episodes in
Irish histOl)'. That day, pro-Treaty deputy Scan Hales was assassinated by the
lRA and on the following day four republicans were executed in a reprisal in
an action that could have had no pretence to legality.
Following the preliminary conference of 7 De<:ember, Treaty
supporters were urged to organise Cumann na nGaedheal br'.ulches or
cumainn in their local cOllStiruencies. 13 Dublin North was one of the tlrst
constituencies thus organised as the capital became the initial focus of efforts
to establish the party's apparatllS.1' In early January 1923 R.J. Pl,rcell was
appointed 10 organise Dublin. Ll Fonnerly an organiser with the Irish Self
"Fa"nUta. t..kl'<...k,~ hl'uol. p. IQ!,
"GmoraJa..J ElocIion Commiltoc mill...... 3 0Cl. 1922 (UCDA. C~mo"., "" nGaedheol pony mJn~to
books. PJ9!min!I)
"I\io'honi M~l<ahy to Dan MooCarthy. 18 0Cl. 191~ (UCDA.ltiohoni M~"'ah)' pope.... P7b1l~S):
I"'on'kw"'ilh itislrird M~l<ahy. ill Dublin. IQ Fcb. 2Q IQ.
II O<n<roland El<ct",n C;ommit,.... ,nill..""ofm«<iflg. 14 0«. 19~2 (OCll.... C;""",n" .. nGo<dheol
F,'rtl' "'i""'" books. Pl9!minll ~
, lbid.. S J 1923 IUCDA. C~n.."" .. nGaedl>e.1 I""}' miIlute boo,., P391,nWl).
"lbi<I.. 2~J 1923 (UCDA. CU"';"'" "" nGaed....1part~ ",i"",. books.. P391minll).
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Detenninmion League of Great Britain. the soon to be ubiquitous PureI'll was
pro.-active in establishing brunches. attending local meetings and in ensuring
thal the new cII/llainn were speedily affiliated with Cumann na nGaedheal
headquarters. PureI'll also briefed the provisional pany executive on the
activism levels of those branches he had set up. Within days of Purcell's
appointmelll. c/lmainn had been established in east Clontarf. Dromcondm and
the Mountjoy ward. 16 A branch had appeared in Glasnevin by 8 February
while efforts to establish cl/mainn in other P.1rts of the constituency also
proved successful. On 16 March. Purcell reported to the Standing Comminee
that a cl/maim had been fonned in every Dublin North ward except the
Rotunda. 17 By April. a constituency committee had been set up in Dublin
North at a time when branches had not even been fomled in most
constirnencies in the Free State.
By contrust. Cumann na nGaedheal made a somewhat belated
appearance in the south-western constituency of Clare. By 24 April. Canon
WilIiam O'Kennedy. described as a 'pillar'lt of revolutionary Sinn I'ein in
Clare. was elected president of a new Cumann na nGaedheal branch fornled
in Ennis, the County's main to\.\11. ,9 Lillle or no attempt was made at this
time to spread the organisation outside Ennis to its surrounding districts.
Consequently. Cumann na nGaedheal fought the August 1923 election with
justtlle bare outline of an organisat;Of\ in Clare,
Whereas in Dublin North there was a solid branch structuTC
through which to organise a Cumann na nGaedheal selection convention in
the summer of 1923. things were less satisfactory in Clare. On 28 July an
advertisement appeared in the CI"re Champion which. for ''''ant of
organisation'. simply invited Treaty supponcrs to meet at the courthouse in
Ennis to select the Clare Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. Also invited to
the eonvl.'Jltion were: all the priests ill Clare. all local councillors. fonner Sinn
" Pm' ;0""",1 Gc".,,,,1 Counc;l m;"",... 2 Fob. 1923 (UCIIA. eu"",nn .... nGaod.....1l"n~' ",;,,"'c
book.. P39!mWI).
11 Cumonn .... ,-,Q.o«lfJooL [Pro,';'''",,1~'ICo"""ir.l mimlleo. 16 M,,- 1923 (UCDA. CU"","" ""
.G.<OdfJooll""~·",;"ut. boo... P39Im;"'I).
"C.oon W;II;.m O·K<"'."h. _00 (KHIoIoe 1110«,," An:hi,·c. IKDA1.<l<'l:~ lib),
.. Cl"" ('J••mpi",•. "8 Ap<. 1923.
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FCin branch and constituency officers. pre-TOIce volullteers not a!laehed to
the Free State anny and representative fanners. businessmen and workcrs.l<J
In the absence of established structures across the County, Clare Trealyites
invited ronner Sinn Feiners. representatives of a cross section of economic
interests and local notables to adjudicate on the selection of Cumann na
nGaedheal candidates in the constituency. Seamus Hughes. soon to be the
pany's general secTCtary, chaired the subseqoclll convention at which five
Cumann na nGaedheal candidates were selected. Evidently feeling the need
10 idelltify their pany with Ihe revolutionary "'ar. an official report of the
proceedings in thc folln ....ing week's Ch're Champion Slated that among Ihe
allendance were 'a majority of the men who have borne the bnmt of the
struggle for independence for many years past'." Having selected the pany's
general election candidates. those assembled then elected a new constitul.'Jlcy
executive to take charge of the campaign in Clare.
Meanwhile. during the summer of 1923. the Dublin North
organisation displayed a keen desire to shape the structures 3lId ethos of the
new pany. Dublin North resolutions, dealillg with both the pany's illlernal
mechanics and with governml.'Jlt policy. were pronlinellt in the programme of
Cumann na nGaedlleal's national convelltion of 27 April.!l while
correspondence from its cumainn showed the grass-roots wanted Cumann na
nGaedhealto contest local elections and pursue a policy of ·gaelicisatiOn'."
10 subsequent years activists ill north Dublin continued to express strong
views about Cumann na nGaedhears identity. structures and policy.
A robust election eanlpaign was fought in both Clare and Dublin
North in August 1923. Whereas a well drilled network of branches
underpinned efforts in Dublin North. Cumarul na nGaedheal's campaign in
Clare depended largely on the Cl/mann established in Elmis. In Clare. the
pany's campaign was controlled from an election headqu.1rtcrs that had been
"lbO;l.. "8 July. ~ AUll. 1923.
" Ibid.• 4 A"ll. 1923,
1> Repon ofM,.."," Ito"",, C",w."';"1I. n Apr.1913 (UCDA. Cumann ... nGaod.....1l"ny minute
book.. P391m0nl1 j,
'" Standlni C""""it,,,,, m;'m'.. nf ....,.,;"g.. 12 J..... 6 July 1913 (UCDA. Cumann .... nGHdfJool
pa.>1~ "1;""1< book.. P391min1l).
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set up in the Qtiecn's Hotel Ennis. At numerous election meetings in Clare.
Cumann na nGaedheal"s speakers were introduced by the local priest. A
meeting in Kilkee was chaired by Ft. Charles Culligan, formerly a Sinn Fein
branch officer," while a rally in Ennis addressed by \V.T. Cosgrave wa;;
opened by Fr. John Meade. Priests were prominent on the party's platforms
in numerous rural centres indicating a desire to showcase its Catholic
credentials.
In Dublin Nonh, a selection convention was arranged in a much
more efficicm maJiller than had been evidenced in Clare. Numerous branch
meetings took place in the north Dublin coostitueney before the rank-and-fiIe
gathcred to select the party's candidates on I August 1923. These meetings
were well attended and supporten3 were in a confident mood ahead of the
election. One such meeting on 24 July heard grass-root mcmbers eonfidcmly
predict that the upcoming Dublill North selection convention "'ould be
representative of each part of the constituency through the network of
branches that had already been established since January. Whereas a
makeshift convention It.:Id selected thc party's candidatcs in Clare. signed-up
members chose thc Cumann na nGacdheal candidates in Dublin North.
Moreover. the constituency machine would play an active role in the party's
OVl.--rall campaign in the capital."
The results of the August 1923 election (shown in tables onc and
two below) are indicative of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation's
strength in each constituency. In Clare, the party returned just one deputy,
Eoin MacNeill. while four of the eight seats on offer in Dublin Nonh wcre
secured by CumaJln na nGaedhcal candidates. This was repeated in Dublin
South as the party secured an impressive return on its efforts ,lithe capital.
" Und.,ed list ofSinn Fo;., """""",I. Clarc W"" IN........ I Archi,'" of Irdond. [NAIl. C".....M ...
Pobl.d Sinn Fiin pap<B. 1(941131)
" & inI Co"""itl". Ill."."." 13 July 19;'3 (Ul·OA. C"'''."" ... o(;oed"""l patty ",i"... book..
PJ9/minlt),
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Table 1, First I'",f~",nc~ vOle obllliJled by successful Clare candidat"", August 1923.
Candidale Party Vole
Eamon de Valera Sinn Fein 17,762
Eoin MacNeill Cumann na nGaedheal 8,196
Patrick Hogan Labour 2,083
Conor l'logan Fanners' pany 1,914-
Brian O'Higgins Sinn Fein 114
Ilrian M. W.lk.... P",Ii<J_"'<l<}'~lm,,,,, ,..,ul" in 1«I",od, 1918·~2 (Dublin, 1992~ po 113.
The ignominy sllITOlIndillg Cumann na nGaedhcaJ's poor
perfonnance in Clare was worsened by the failurt of local activists to manage
party funds prudently. Jolm Regan nOles a pre-Treaty culture of profligacy in
the revolutionary Silln Fein movement in Clare, a trait seemingly inherited by
the coullly's Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. Clare', constiluency
conullinee accrued large debts during the 1923 campaign and the Standing
COnIDlittee. itself hamstnmg finaJlcially having depended heavily 011 paid
organisers. wa;; unable to COVet the arrears.Clare remained £200 in debt in
spile of a £150 cheque obtai.ned, with some di.fficulty. from party
headquarters.'· Acrimony between local busillesse, in Clare, Ihe constirucncy
committee and ClImann na nGaedheal headquarten3 rumbled on for over two
years." Unsurprisingly. support for the party in tlte county evaporated, Clare
was unrepresellled at the party's 1914 pany conference as tbe constituency
organisation melted away and in effect becamt a 'one man show' under
Canon O·Kennedy. In the spring of 1925. the indefatigahle R.J. Purcell was
drafted in to repair the broken Clare Cumann na nGacdhcal organisation. In
Clare. Purcell again showed tht: organisational skills that had bet:n on display
in Duhlin North two years earlier. He succeeded in establishing numerous
"SlOlIdinll c""""i'l« min..... 260<1. 1923 (UCDA. Comao" ... nGoedr...1 pon)' min... book..
PJ9Iminll j,
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>e<un: ,hl:ir<l<po<.... C".....~ in ,he £oin MocNeill P'!"'" re..ol, lb< liust~"lISofnurnero..
10<01 buoine .... in. c ....... 1>11> fur dOu>m. ' .... .oportmenl. oDd .lee<,ieol WO"" w<nl _0:1. It""}·
G"" .... lhl: ~""".LlffiCy ""'....Ol)".nd C.IIOO O'Keoned)' " ..... left to pick up the pieces E. Uroepo
Eon MocNe,IL 28 Mar. 192~, !lOll)' Go",""" to Sea" Mo< Giolla Fhooloin. 3 N"v. 1925 (UCDA. Eoin
Mo<N.ill popors.LA 11H/6-112 ;LA 11HI66f.!9J. RI:ll"". ('~.""r "","",.'ion. pp 151-3.
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cl/fllai"" across the COilllty in time for the May 1925 CUlnann na nGaedheal
annual convention. Again. priests were prominent in the reorganising effort
in Clare while the Standing Comminee was careful to emphasise that
constituencies would have to take responsibility for thcir 0"11 electoral
expense.
Tablc 2, First p",fe",nrc '"oIl.' obtained by successful Dublin NOl1h candidates. AugusI
1923.
Candidate Party Vote
Richard Mulcahy Cumann na nGaedhcal 22,205
Alfred Byme Independent 10,518
Ernest O'Mallcy Sinn Fein 4.602
Sdin T. O'Kclly Sinn Fein 4,233
Wi1liam Hewar Businessmen's Party 2.594
Sean McGarry Cumann na nGaedhcal 1.397
MargaretCollins_ Cumann na nGaedheal 1.247
O'DriS\:oll
Francis Cahil1 Cumann na nGaedheal 790
W.lker. P",lia_nfon.' .I'<r!oo ,...."'a, p. 110,
In Oublin Nonh. bnmches remained active during 1924 and 1925.
Activism there had nO! abated with the passing of the 1923 election, and
members in the capital remained eager to shape the new party's identity and
structures. A Dublin Nonh constituency commitwe mecting in September
1923 resolved to provide a social entertainment forum for supponers. Such a
medium would help reinforce the political identity of Cumann na
nGaedheal's followers, To help provide such an outlet, the constituency
committee arranged to meet "lth their counterparts in neighbouring Dublin
County and Dublin South. l ! Members of the Standing Committee were alS()
invited to Ihis meeting which took place on 24 September. From this meeting.
Cumann na nGaedheal established a central bnmch Or aNI dlllfll"''''.
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Addressing the 24 September meeting. Mulcahy expressed hope thar the
central branch would be.::ome a centre for 'progressive ideas' and
'gaelicisation'. An Irish language conuninee was subsequcntly furmed
showing that elcments deep within the party machinery remained commined
to Irish-Ireland ideals.l'J The central branch aimcd to both entertain and
educate pany members and its conilllinee was made up of delegates
represeming the three Dublin constituencies.JO CumlllUl na nGaedheal's
activity in Dublin, corresponds "ilh the efforts of lllass organised panies in
this period to build 'cohesive, class-based communities' that would 'reinforce
a collective political idcmity'."
The Dublin Nonh constituency organisation's imerest in Irish
nationality was again evidem at the party conference of 1924. VariOllS north
city branches proposed resolutions, some of which called for Irish dancing
and music to dominate all future party social functilHls.31 Changes to party
rules were also suggested while the GlaSllevin branch proposed that a book
be produced annually 'giving particulars as to salaries in the Civil Sen'ice',JJ
In April and May 1914, capitalising on the twin crises of the Army Mutiny
and the NatilHlal Group secession, Dublin Nonh members led el10ns to give
the organisation more input in governmenl policy, Councillor Paddy
MclJIl)"rc. chair of the constituency commillee, also sat on the party's
Standing COlluniuee at this time. The Dublin Nonh clHlstitueney called lHl
the Standing Comminee to SUlllmon a national convcntion of party members
S() that the relationships between thc government. the parliamentary party and
the CUffilllUl na nGaedhcal organisalioll could be diseussed and defined. J4
The Standing Committee referred the matter to the National Executive which
met to dcbate the issue on 13 May.
,. Ibid. ~~ sept. 1913.
.. [)"b1in £,..ninr Mail.lO<!. 1923,
" Scarro",. Piu1~' ,,,,,, IM;" m<mM",. p.•.
II Ammd""'IlI' to the ronsI_"'ioo, lOlL 192-1" (UCDA, H~ Kennody papett. NIl Jr0'9j,
" lbid,
'" 1'"......1Excc.. i,~ minute<. 13 M.y 1924 (UCUA. C.ma... DI nG3<dhe.1 JaflyminUk book..
PJ9Iminflj.
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During the tumultuous 13 May meeting. Mclntyre called for
greater consultation bet"''Cen the govermnem and the party organisation and
wamed that failure to bring about closer cooperation could plunge the party
machine into a general election where it would be expected to ~ure lhe
return of an unpopular government. Instead, he argued, lhe party hierarchy
should warn rank-and-file memben; in advance of unpopular legislation and,
where possible, test public opinion through the Cumann na nGaedheal
branches, Delegates from other parts of the count!)' concurred with
Mclntyre'S analysis,!l However. the government was not about to cede power
to its machine and the organisation's scope to influence decisions remained
limited,
Such conmtitment to improving Cumann na nGaedheal's
structures. or to pursuing an Irish-Ireland type policy agenda as witnessed in
Dublin North was rarely in evidence in Clare, This is somewhat unusual
given that during the revolutionary period O'Kennedy had said thatlhe ideal
Sinn Fein branch 'ought to be a school for national thought', At that time
O'Kennedy had clearly taken an interest in what shape all independent
Ireland would take and how political action could help foster Irish
nationality,J6 Aside from occasional references to the exploits of Miehael
Brennan and others during the War of Independence. the reorganised Clare
branches tended to only discuss mallers of local concem. lbis was true of
resolutions proposed by the Ennis Cumann in advance of the 1925 party
conference, Among these were motions calling for the drainage of the river
Fergus and for loans to be made available to famters who had lost livestock
to fluke. Another proposal sought to take advantage of the new sugar beet
industry by pointing out that the lands on the banks of the river Fergus were
'in cvCl)' way' suitable for the growing of sugadx:el.]?
Land division "''as another maller that provoked discussion in
Clare Cumann na nGaedheal circles. In June 1925. the Sixmilebridge branch
" tbid,
.. [}a"X! I'il,.,.trick. PuiW", ,,,,,II,'.h /if,. 1913_191/: pro";""iaJ ,x/N,I,,,,_ 'if."" and ffl"""~'"
(Dublin, (977). p. t!9,
"Om¥C"'''''pUm, 2 M.l' 1925.
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president, James O'Regan. an unsuccessful election candidate in 1923.
suggested his Cl/mann cooperate with the local elergy to ensure that the Estate
Commissioner. the official responsible for assessing local needs in areas
wherc land was to be divided, would reeeive the best possible advice when
inspecting the area,JI Priests, heavily influential in the Free State during the
1920s and 30s. were often called upon to advise these cOlmnissionen; on their
visits to an area. The Sixmilebridge branch subsequently fomted a
cOIlUUittee 'none of whom are claimants for land' to help guide the
Conunissioner in his work,!" A week later, the Ennistymon branch was less
civic·minded, Members anending a meeting there on 21 June resolved that
Cumllnn na nGaedheal supporters should in fact gain preferentialtreatmenl in
reSpecl of land division,"" It seems that at least some memben; of the
reorganised branches in Clare hoped to use their connection to the
'govenunem party' in pursuit of political pmronage, Whatever their
motivation. the reorganised branches remained quite active throughout \925
with regular meetings taking place across the county, However, activism in
Clare would again drop in 1926 prompting yet another reorganisational effort
in early 1927,
Dublin North's commitment to the party cause "''as rardy in
question, Oft numerous occasions, Dublin North supporters voluntccred to
campaign during by-eleetions in other constituencies." In addition, there
seems to have been closer cooperation throughoUl the period between rank-
and-file branch members and the party's candidates there than lhere ever was
in Clare, Dublin North lIlemhen; were sometimes consulted on strategy
during campaigns,'! Moreover, in Octobt:r 1924. Dublin North chairperson
Paddy McIntyre, was dispatched to Mayo to help organise it for the by-
JI Terenoe Dooloy, 'TI>< ""'df« ,I>< propi,', 11>< I""d q",,,j,m in j",k,wnMnI 1"1",,,1 (DuN... !\l(I.lj.
~ 25•.
Clan Cha",pi""" !O Jun< t92S,
.. Cl,,,, Cha",!,'""" 27 Jun< t ~JS,
" F"",,,.. '. Ja"n><>1, !S I'~", 1924
"Dublin C\''''inR M<li/. 9 F.1l.19J5,
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el~tion of November. Clearly Mclntyre's success in Dublin North was
rt'cognised and it was hoped he could use those skills elsewhere:J
Noisy political debate remained the hallmark of Cumann na
nGaedheal in Dublin North. In September 1925, a resolutiOll was passed
proposing a new tillage scheme in Irish agriculturt'. During the course of the
debate. various speakers for and against the m(){ion put forward cogent
arguments as to why such a scheme was suited or unsuited to Irish farming.
A report of this meeting reveals. not just a knowledgeable discussion of
agricultural policy, but a willingness among grass-root supporters in Dublin
North to go against the prevailing policy of their 0\\11 party..... At other
meetings mcmbers supported increased interest rates on deposits hcld in the
G.P.O to provide investment opportunities and to give voters a stake in
electing stable governments.'" This resolution made it to the programme for
the 1926 party conference. as did the motion on agrielllrural policy....
Furthermore, in 1927 a branch member in Glasncvin proposed making use of
the anny to help inculcate a sense of Irish nationality among citizens.
particularly in rural areas where. according to its proposer, cynicism and
apathy were most prevalent." The anny would be used in marches and
pageants to show that Irish national aspirations were cotenninous with the
f~ State. Although this isolated initiative never came to an)thing. it does
have continental precedents. particularly with regard to Primo de Rivera's
Spain...• and shows the cOlltinued innul.-'Tlee of Irish nationalism among many
gowrnment supporters
Cumann na nGaedheal faced the people twice in 1927. Having
lost sixteen seats in June, the Standing Commillce anticipated an early
general election and took steps to improve organisation. At meetings in July
<> Sl.>f,.Jin& C.,mmitte< ",inUl<>- 10 Oct. 1924 (UCDA. Cumann ... oOO<dh<.t part)' """UlO hooka
P3Wminllj
"M'h tnJ<t""'knr. 2 SepI. 19~',
., lri,h n""". 10 M.)' t926,
.. Cumann "" lIGoodh<aL UUII.UlI COIl''''''''",. t926 .....,Iulio", (Cork Cily ond (''''''''l' Ar<hi,....
ICCCA1. Lilom de Roi"" l"i'<f" U27liThiil mat...i>VK~
'DuM,. rr"ning .11,,1/. IOJ.1L 1927.
.. Alejao>,lro Ou;,-~ .U.b"l!: .'it~miorrl< Pri"'" ,k Rh..,. imdlM ""'i<mali:,,,;,,. 'f ,I>< """""S, 19!J,
In (Ba'"'lI""k•. 2007).
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the Standing Commiltce focussed its efforts OIl constituencies where seats
had been lost in the June election and urged deputies to improve the local
machinery." Given the tight Wi[ arithmetic, and the political eonvu[sions
following the assassination of Kevin O'Higgins in Ju[y, Cosgrave sought a
fresh mandate in Septembcr.~ In a filrther attempt to make good the seat
losses sustained in June, Cumwill na nGaedheal hired an advertising agency
to coordinate its press campaign.ll
[n botlt Clare and Dublin North. the campaign for the two
elections of 1927 took on much the same character as that of 1923. Paid
organisers were dispatched to Clare to stir the party machinery to action in
early 1927, while Dublin North's active branches WCTl: already wdl prepar(:d.
In Clare, lIew CI/ma/lln were established or existing ones reorganised months
in advance of the party's se[ection convention. Sensing that its prospects in
de Va[era's constituency remained grim, Cumann na nGaedheal cooperated
with the Farmer's Party. A prominent fanners' Party councillor. James
O'Flynn. helped v.ith the reorganisation of the Sixmilebridge Cllmann na
nGaedheal branch arguing that 'a purely National organisation' that was 'best
suited to the interests of all classes' should continue to govern." To boost the
local campaign. various high profile speakers such as l'atrick Hogan and
Desmond Fit~ra[d travelled to Clare to address Cuntann na nGaedhC"',d
election rallies. H
[n Dublin North the cumaillll had remained active and busily
involved in election~'t:ring. Whi[e some cl/ma/lln. such as that in Clontarf, had
lapsed and needed to be revived, the constituency remained well organised
with active branches in most places. As can be gauged from the tables below.
as in 1923, Clare remained a problematic constituency, returning just one
Ctunann na nGaedheal deputy in both the June and September 1927 eloxtoral
.. Slwirla Commi".., min",... 17 J....... 9 July 1927 (UCDA. CUlni\un "" rtGoodheal pony mince<
booko. PJ9Iminllj.
,. Sl.phen Coil .... rh. CdOgr<"" I.""",· (Dublin. 19961. pp '11·1,
" M""""IL CdOlI'U'~"",",,'. pp Ill·>I.
"Cl"" CiJ,,"'I""". 1I MM.19!7.
" lbid.. 26 M.,.. 21 M.y 1927.
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contests." In Dublin North. a detennined effort to win back a scm lost in June
proved successful in the se<oond election of the year."
Table 3: Fi"'l pnofcno""e ",Xc obtained by successful Clare candidales. June 1927
Candidate Party Vote
Eamon de Valera Fianna Fiiil 13.029
Thomas Fah'ey Fanners' Party 5.140
Pmrick Hogan L>b<"" 4.147
Pmrick Michael Kelly Cumann /la nGaedheal 3.612
Pmrick Houlihan Fianna Fiiil 1500
Table~: First p",fe",nce ,'Ole obtained by sue<:essful Clare candidates. Seplemb<1" 1927.
Candidate Party VOle
Eamon de Valera Fia/lna Fiiil 13.902
Patrick Michacl Kelly CUmllnn /la /lGaedheal 5.646
Palrick Hogan Labour 4,683
Martin Sexton Fianna Fiiil 3.506
Patrick HOlllihan Fianna Fail 3.003
W,lk.r. Pa.liom""o,:"' .kcll"" ,will.'. p. 12,.
Table S: First preference vole oblaiRed by sU<ce"ful Dublin Nonh candidales. June
1927.
Candidatc rarly Vole
Alfred Byme Independent 17,780
Gen. Richard Jamcs CUIl131lli na nGaedheal 11,726
Mulcahy
Seiin Thomas O'Kelly Fianna Fail 6,040
Oscar Tmynor SilUl Fein 4.351
Kathleen Clarke Fialma Fail 3.818
John Joseph Byme Cumann na nGaedheal 2,267
Margarel Collins- Cuma/ln /la /lGaedheal 2.267
O'Driscoll
DelUlis Cullen Labour 1.692
Tabic 6: Fim prefcrcnl:c "ote <>blain«! by successful Dublin Nonh carodidales.
September 1927.
Candidate Party Vote
Gen. Richard James Cumann na nGaedheal 14,597
Mulcahy
Alfred B)me lndcpcndem 11.864
James Larkin (Sen.) Indcpendem Labour 7.490
Sean Thomas O'Kclly Fianna Fiiil 6.958
Eamon Cooney Fianna Fail 3.477
Jolm Joseph Byme Cumann
"'
2,935
nGaedheal
Collins- Cumann na nGaedhealM_re<
O'Driscoll
Pmrick Leonard Cuma/ill na nGaedh.:al
2,274
2,068
"W.I'«. P"rli"m<n"",' .I",it>" ,,,"I,, PI' J18·17.
"Ibid,
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With the passing of the September election. llte Dublin North
constituency retained its commitment to developing a sense of Irish national
identity. while a constituency social club, established in November 1927,";
\\'3S lauded in the new party organ n,e Freeman, llldeed. the party's
newspaper encouraged other branches to follow the example of Dublin Nonh
by calling 011 them to ammge social events for members, From party
headquarters. the Dublin Nortll social club organised card games, billiard
nights. music and Irish dancing classes and in the process maintained a
longstanding Irish nationalisltradition of merging leisure and politics,l7 Soon
other conslitul'I1cy committees sought to emulate the club's success by
extending their o\\n social activities, For example, in December 1927 the
Ballinake CI/manll in county Longford resolved to bc.::ome a 'medium of
social entertainmcnt for the district',ll However. in Clare Cumann na
nGacdhcal activism again dipped as the party struggled to make an impact in
de Valera's stronghold,
CumalUl na nGaedheal's organisational fortunes differed greatly
in the two constituencies lltat were examincd in this article, Between 1923
and 1927 the party was continually dogged by structural problems in Clare,
fk,iIlches lapsed between elections, funds were inadequately managed and
the constituency failed to send delegates to the 1924 part)· conference. In
addition, Clare's Cllma;,m network seems to have been somewhat isolated
from the party's central strucmres and lillle by way of an ideological agenda
is discernable among the reports of Cumann na nGaedheal meetings in the
county. Instead activism there seemed to revolve around the parish pump and
the limited spoils of office that were perceived to be on offer. Paid organisers
were needed and these were dispatched to Clare in 1925 and 1927 to breathe
new life into the lapsed constituency machinery. In Dublin North ott llte other
hand, CumalUl na nGaedheal brauches remained active throughout the period
and thcir cultural and social activities correspond with the characteristics of
"1J..F"e""",.loNov. ton.
"R.v.. Co"""fud. ·PIlt"Olism~.po"i"..: U.. >pp<otofF.niani.m .. 11.. mOd 1860<';" /rhh
1/j"",I""i SI,~I~,. xxii (Morch 19l! I1. pp 239.50,
"TIot (",,,,,,,,. t7 OK. 1927,
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the mass party. Cumallu meetings in Dublin Nonh were regular and the
party's structures seemed to function quite successfully through the period in
question. In addition, the constituency's allempts to provide recreational
activity through the mediwll ofCumaull na nGaedheal represemed an altempt
to forge a loyal. party cOllullunity.
Mass parties are distinguished from cadre panies, not by their
success in enrolling a grass-root membership. but by their willingness to
enlist supporters in a widespread branch based organisation.'" In this regard,
Cumann na nGaedheal cannot be regarded as a cadre party. Not only did it
have party newspapers, centralised structures and branches as its basic unit,
Cumann na nGaedheal also took corrective action whenever its grass-root
structures were in need of repair. In 1925 and 1927 paid organisers
descended on Clare to form new branches and stir graSS-TI)(){ activism in a
clear allempt to marshal support through the organisational struCtures of th...
party. That these efforts broke do\\n between elections is evidence, not of an
"amateur' approach to party organisation. but rather is funher proof that de
Valerd's stronghold was unfertile territory.loO As such. in trying to understand
Cumann na nGaedheal's demise as a distinct pany in 1933. the cliche of an
inadequate commitment to party organisation cannot suflice. In explaining
Treatyite political realignment in 1933, scholars should instead focus on the
suitability of the party's economic and social policies in the cOlltext of
rapidly changing global eireumstances.
,. Scanow. P"'ti<~""" ,''''', ~,,,,,twn,p. 19.
0) Meellan. c",grtI>... rI'''''. p. ,;;;.
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Consultation and Coopcmtion? NATO's intra.alLiancc
frictions du ring the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961
Soris Barth'
On 27 November 1958. Nikim Khrushchcv, Chainnan of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR. questioned in a note to the USA the division ofBcrlin
into four sectors, and asked for the reconsideration of the city's status. I In his
opinion. the fonnding of the Federal RepUblic of Gennany (FRG) in 1949
and its accession to the Nonl1 Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) in 1955
'grossly violatcd' the POIsdam Treaty of 1945 which regulated the
administration of occupied Gennany by the four victorious powers of World
War 11: France. the Soviet Union. the UK, and the USA. Khrushchev pointed
01.1\ that the creation of the West Gennan stale had hanned the allied goal ora
reunified Gennany and that FRG's membership in NATO not only posed a
threal to the Soviet Union but to all countries Which. consequently, had
organizcd themselves militarily in the Warsaw Defense Treaty in 1955.
Eventnally, Khrushchev asked to end the city's status as a 'state within a
state' and 'a springboard for imensive espionage. sabotage. and otl1er
subversive activities against Socialist countries' by requesting it become a
demilitarized free ci1)'.' If the Western allies did nOl cooperate to find a
satisfYing solution within half a year. Khrushchev would settle the question
of the status of Berlin in a bilateral agreement with the Gennan D<:mocratic
Repnblic (GDR). Thereby the Soviet Union'S occupational rights over Berlin
• A long.,. """ion of'hi> ."id. " ... ",il'.... in 201 0••• temI pope' futthe ..minor "T.."""lo...i<
R.l.,"",,··. oo".,.ed hr And,... E'ge< .nd P.ul Duboi> .. the JoM-f.-K.nned)'lnslioUl of fro..
Uni, itJllla-lin. l.m iV"'otullOr .0.",.....' 1»' Cbriit"n 1<Jhonn. frir>.lcrik. M.hl and Anno
Ba,bo Sum. •• ".11 .. edilini 1»' K"hr)," r.""ia-
, 'NOI' from 'he Sovi<l Un"" 'n ,he Uniled S,..., I'<i"rdin(; 'he ..aI.. of llerhn .od 're POI>dom
~m< ....·.27 Nov. 19l!" in Unioed SlO'" [lq>anment O(SI.C(ed.~ 0."'''''''''19 "" (i",,,,,m' I~n_
IWlj (W""ini'on. D.e.. 1985, I'l' 'l2-9. Khru>h<re" hod ,~nd)' cxpr<.oed bis " ...... OIl 're .... '" of
Ilerlm in , speech ii''<n 011 10 NOv.mber 1955 .. Moscow. of •Addrco. hr 're a..~,""" Khtushehcv
pro"...;n,; 're W<>tern Po"·.... 'h<no.lOrtbdnldil..'lywioh (re Gor""'n Democr:alio R.o:publio OII'ny
q.....ion OOIt<<ming II..-lin· .10 Nov. Iq,S. in: ibid. PI' SU.6.
, 'NOI' from 're So"i<t Un"" '" ,he Unilcd ~,... ",prding ,he ....'" ofll<rlin .00 ,he POI>dom
A.ir«me...,-. 27 No,'. 19l8. I'l' l53, 550.
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would be transferred to the GDR. at thal time not recognised by the thret:
Western allies.
Khrushchcv demands were the begil\lling of the second Berlin
Crisis of 1958 which. eventually. ended in the construction ofthe Berlin Wall
on 13 August 1961 and has been characterized as ·the likeliest flash-poim of
conflict in the Cold War'.' The political crisis nOl only called the three
Western allies and tbe FRG to action but all NATO mcmber states, In a
resolutioo of 22 October 1954, lhe North Atlantic Conncil (NAC) l1ad already
declared that the three Westcm occupation po,,-ers in Berlin 'reamnn that
they will treat any anack against Berlin from any quarter as an auack upon
their forces and themselves'" According to the NATO treaty's anicle 5,
member states are obliged to militarily support any auaeked member state in
a counter-strike.' An attack 00 West Berlin by the Soviet Unioo would have
meant an allack on the sector> of the lhret: member states and could have
provoked a military imCT\'ention by NATO. Policies concerning Berlin were
negotiated and agreed npon between lhe three Western allies. taking the
FRG's interests imo consideration. On the other hand. military provocations
against West Berlin called all NATO member Slates to action. This clearly
was the grounds for a stalemate: Eleven NATO members were not coosulted
in the decision-making process but had 10 militarily support any strike or
counter-strike by the other four if Berlin was anacked - not to mention the
constant threat of both the US and the USSR actually using nnclear weapons
when rhetoric deterrence failed.
This article will research intra-alliance frictions between the
eleven NATO member states and the three Western allies plus Wesf
Germany caused by the second Berlin Crisis. Two types of intra-alliance
J KOO Shake aDd Jol>n Gc.....,." 'Edit",", j",rodU<1""" in (ed" TIw /krUn Wo/I «It... 1"'"",,',1-..., on
C<JJJ 11'", alliance, (Basinptoke aDd New Yoo-k. 20(2). PI' ,·,iv. p. >,
, 'R...., ... .", ofossocial.", hr other p.rt'" '" 're North A,Ia..;. r y. AM'" B, declara'ion hr 're
lIo"ernmeou o( United SIl.... of Ameri<&. United Kir\idom ,no! F ·. 22 0eI, t9S4
(lJ!Jo· ...."".. !IO'" 1>I"''''''''Y!l!l~>ll'OiQmoi>1 I<\[< 17; I! mm) (19 Mar.lOW).
, 'TheNorth A'!ant", Tru'y·.; Apo-. 1949. Art;'1e 5' (l!:!m:c':1l.~,;oHII!"'19Ii"-.'
011;.;.1 101, t~1 (29 Mar. 2010).
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frictiOllS "ill be looked at: the disregard for the 'habit of consult3lion" within
NATO and the deliberate defiance of the three Western allies by launching
LIVE OAK in January 1959, a clandestine organisation responsible for
Berlin contingency planning. The other type of intra-alliance dispute was
caused by the question of which policy to adopt when dealing with the Soviet
Union - dc-escal3lion and diplomacy. or detcrrence and, ultimately. military
confrontation? Here. special attention "ill be paid both to NATO's Secretary
GenCTIlL Paul-Henri Spaak's (1956-61) attempts to establish a consensual
diplomatic position of the alliance and the US policy under President
Eisenhower. Analysing the US foreign policy is especially relevant ~ause
the US played a dominating though not unchallenged role within the
"triumvirate" with France and the UK.' The US was also the only superpower
in the bipolar world order of the Cold War to face the USSR. Furthermore.
the US was eager to impose its policies on its allies, both within Berlin and
NATO, and, finally, the US "..305 then the only NATO country in thc
possession of a relevant quantity of nuclear arms.'
NATO's intra-alliancc situ3lion during the sccond Berlin Crisis
has not yet becn thoroughly studied. Recently, Christian Nlinlist and Bruno
Thoss have researched this topic individually.9 as did an anthology edited by
John P. S, Gearson and Kori Shake. IQ An amhology edited by Mary Ann
Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma investig3led intrabloc conflicts of NATO and
• ·R""".. ofthe: Commiuoeofn.r..,ort oon--mililory coope,otioo in NATO. 13 Dec. 11>56, Chap«< 11
Polilic.1 Coope<otioo. 1'- Co",u~"iort. A. Srop< ond ,_'er of potilic.t e<>n<U~..ioo. !",TOg",ph ~J'
(MW' """.I1,lIO·"t..'·r>'>J"'''''l<>I;'·~'9ffkyjte", I ,;~ I."'ml (21) Mill. 201 Ol.
'The ...,,,,nion> of F,..""". the: tJK .f'>(! lhe: FRG hn" .1>0 to be oomider<d in this ",id. as w~11 .....
lhey inn...need the ...,..·.lIi.""" c,..... 100. On lhe "'n......,. of the: UK ... Jo" 0."""",. ·!l,n,,,,.r-.J
the Rerl;n W.II Crnis. 1958,1962' in 0.."". or-.J S","k". 1'I>t? B<rlin Wailer,.;', pp 43_72: <>n
F.....,.·. inO""'"'" ... C)Tilllun... ·D<G.ull<. tn. Ilomb.r-.J Berlin; Ilowto u... polilicol "'..".,n·
in ibj,d.. I'P 73·95. ond """" Loclln<r.r-.J Cbtiltio" N""nli". ·Cor.."'inJ'he r",,,,,h M.I.i.., The rol<
ofNATO', S«:,"',I)' 0.....,..1. 19$8· I963' in M.I)' Ann H,,;" ond S. V""", popco...... (<do~ IIATQ
m,d ,hr 11'''''''",' Pad.- ;OIrabl"" """j1ieu (K...... Oil. 2001~ pp 75_90.
, (;,,,.t Il,..in only ..onoo to go'" -... 10 n""Ie" "'<opo" in Ibe 1950. 'od olo.. ,y """",...ted "itb
the US <>n lbeil d<,~k:tpmc"" The US 1<"''''1edJ< .f'>(! ~ ..ntily of.1JfIII "-" fI, mor< od".r>ted ....u..
the)' beJon d<'~k>rina ,,"'... <o,Iy .. t.... 194(10.
• Cto-i""n Niinli... 'Die N..HO on! d;' B«linkriK """ 19~1,196)' in El<md GTcin<r et. ,I. (ed.).
Kri"n jm Ku/Un Krirll (Ilonn. 2(09). pp 2-I-I-73 . ..-.t 11"'00 n.o... ·Info'molioo. p"'....'ion. 0'
'0"",~"ion1The " ....... PO""'" .r-.J NATO during ,I>< Berlin C,;,is. 19SI-1962' in Chri.. ian
N.....li.. ond Art... Loc..,., (ed.). Tronsar/amk ",iar""" ut stn;'r: afJN"" ajNATO/9'6-1971
(Zoricll. 20(6). pp 73,94,
,. 0..,,,,,,, aM SlIok•. no. lkrlin Wall <r;'U.
112
lhe Warsaw Pact from a broader, comparative prn;pectivc. lI A significant
amount of contemporary source material is available: NATO itself provides
relevllm ollicial lexts ofth31 time, e. g. communiques of NAC or Spaak. and
declassified official US documents are accessible in the Digital National
Security Archive. The documenl edilion 'Foreign Relations of the United
States', issued by the Depanment of State. allows valuable insights into US
policies of that time, tOO. ll
Relictiom to Khnlshchel"s Berlin Ultimo/"'''
On 17 November 1958. OIIC week after the speech in Moscow and
a few days before the release of the Khrushchev note on 27 November, an
extraordinary NAC-meeting "'"lIS held in Paris. Interestingly, NATO members
were not overly concerned with the Soviet aggression but ralher irritated by a
note released on the samc day by West Germany's federal government to Ihe
Soviet UniOll. 1J The other member states were even more irritated because
Horst Blankenhom. the German ambassador to NATO. had deliberatcly left
them out and defended this action by stating that a consensus "'ith the three
Western allies was accomplished prior to the sending of the note. The actiOll
of the Gennan federal government was especially audacious, Christian
NUnlist argues, since it was in ",,:cd of the suppon and solidarity of Ihe whole
alliance as this emerging crisis could have led to military conflict," In a
telegram to the Depanment of Slate, the American ambassador to NATO, W.
Randolph Burgess. briefly reported tbat 'tbere was strong pressure from all
members and chainnan for fullest use of consultative process in North
Atlantic Council OIl all lIlatters cOllnecled with Berlin silUatiOll'.ll Dirll
Stikker, Burgess' Dutch colleague and later NATO Secretary Gener'AI.
affimloo that 'other NATO members have associ3led themselves with Ihe
" 11.... ..-.d Pop«o.mo. NATO and ,hr War"",' PaN.
" All "ft....m~ """""ib" ooJ;'" "io http~I"'"W.lIOlo.inI. I'iIlp:ll....n:IIi" •.•hod>o.y<iLoomI ODd
Iatp~ld"'i<:<>!I.libr ..y. "'~.ed..rFRUS (21) Mor<h 2010).
IJ N(lnliit. NATO und";~&rUnUisr. p. 24<;>(
.. 11*1,. p, 2SO.
"'T"IeVOm &om !he mi..io. ,,,,he: Nonb AIl...i<:T.....),Orgoniutiorl.r-.J E""'l"''''' R"llio...1
(.loop";.., to Ill< D<pon.....'" ofStol<', 11 No~. 1911 in Uniled St... lkpaltm<nl of Slot•.
Fore;" Re." of"'" U"'ed SI.... (FRUS). II>S8_1960. roL VIII, p. Wf.
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position of three powers in Berlin' - btU, as Burgess pointed out. apparently
not for the price of giving up the organisation's habit of consultation.
NATO's irritation was reinforeed by anothcr intra-institutional
conflict caused by France earlier thm year, in mid-September 1958: Charles
de Gaulle had proposed a tripartite US-UK-French consultation fonnn that
would have becn in charge of 'the security of the free world', including the
use of nuclear 1Neapons. and would have left out the smaller member states in
consultations.'· Secretary General Spaak did try to prevent de Gaulle from
the realisalion of these plans because the remaining NATO member states
were offended by this proposition. However, Klu"ushchev's Berlin ultimarnm
finally allowed France to reach its goal: it was not obliged to consult NATO
for allY measures to be taken in Berlin because of Ihe three Western powers'
occupmional rights. I? This position ""'as again expressed during a later
meeting of NAC on 26 November 1958 where the three Western allies and
the FRG did not participate in any discussion on the Berlin situation. 11
Through their abstention, no substantial discussion 011 Khmshehev's
demands took place. With the release of Khrtlshchev's note on the following
day. the Soviet1cader forced the Western Alliance as a whole to consider the
maller within a timeframe of six months and to comc up with a consensual
position.'~
The next NAC session !Tom 16 to 18 December 1958 was the first
meeting to provide an official position regarding Khrushchev's provocation
and eventually led to the Declaratioo on Berlin alld an official response by
the four Western allies. It ""'as preceded by a debate on whether or no! to put
Ihe Berlin situation on the meeting's agenda. West Gemmny's chancellor
Konrad Adenauer opposed it because he did not wam Khrushchev to be
successful in dominating the organisation's agenda and preferred a secret
quadripartite meeting. Spaak, who favoured a deb.lte ""ithin NATO,
"·Leu... from ~...i.Je", <l<Goulle ", ~id<:", Ei>enhow", .17 S<!>'"rnm I~S9 in FRUS, 1955.I%O.
mI.VII.pa.~II.p.II[
"l..<><ln<r ",,:I Nuenllst. Con"'ini"ll'~ F",,,,,~ Mnlai~. PI' 7S·90... p_ 77(.
" Nlinllst. Ok NATO ,,,,<I ,fit lk,UnJ;,;"" p. 2S I,
" A«Qrding 'a ibid.. p, 2~2. ,"" ullimalum <1<''''''''''«1 ,"" cm;" .od pro"id<:d ".""'bl< time: fo,
NATOta ~Iop. """""",...1p""i1;""
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persuaded Blankenhorn to put this urgent malleI' on the meeting's agenda and
to deline a consensual position among the member stales. Evenlllally, the
Berlin matter "'as puI on the agenda.
Again, the Western allies were reluctant to participate in
consultations on the mallCT. Overall, NATO member states were divided on
which attitude to adopt towards the Soviet Union: diplomacy or deterrence.
The Eisenhower adminislnltion :limed at a policy of deterrence, Ilot letting
itself become intimidated by the Russian aggression and convinced to use
escalation in order to test Ihe Soviet Union's seriousness of its claims on
Berlin. France generally supported a "hard-line'"·position because General de
Gaulle was not convinced of the seriousness of Khrushchev's threat, either.'"
The British were very reluctam regarding the possibility of a war: the Chief
of the British Dcfense Staff, wrd Louis Mowltballen, would not risk a
nuclear strike against Britain for the sake of Berlin. ll On the West G~'TTllan
side, Adenauer had made the protection of West Berlin and West Germany a
condition for Ihe FRG contributing militarily to NATO.1l Therefore. the
federal governmenl upheld a finn stance on the Berlin matter, though
excluding the option of especially nuclear military actions when \'~'rbal
deterrence had failed (which undoubtedly would have taken place on its
territory).ll This approach ""'as rejected by the US: 'Prevention of war by
deterrence was not possiblc without the willingness to incur the full risk of
using nuclear weapoos'," as Bruno Thoss paraphrased the US position.
NATO achieved two important conclusions by the end of the
NAC ministerial meeting: a demonstration of the organisation's credibility
and a strong will to meet its aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.1J Tbe member
states did manage to agree to a consensual line with the Declaration OIl
'" IJ"ffi:!, {}e G",./I". lire b<-b """ ~,Ii~. p. R
" Tho... 111I"'''''''i"" p""""ian. or <:amIllIOl;""?, p. so.
"Ibid.. p. 7S.
'-' S<"" M. M."""'y"'ll""" ·M' d<,n A...bnl<h "in.. all~"m<;"""K'~W'"BetI.... "b<1I>o "i."in
"rh<b1iocb<r T"il dco buD<l=l<ut",""n T"rrita';u..... - Un "-"",,,,1,,,l>on abg<><hri<:""n', Seon M.
M.lo""y, 'N",follplonu"ll liir Il<:rlin, Va,lllur... <!er Fl<xible R<psoo;c: 19~8·19l'iJ· in
Mili'IJ"gu<~idtl<. 7 (l99h PI' )·1 S." p- )
" Thou, l>ifo"""'ioo, /W"""'ion, '" ronsllllali<HI?, p. 81.
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Berlin. It is not surprising that NATO's Se<:retal)' General bighlighted the
well-functiOlling of the organisation, especially regarding the 'position
excellente' achieved by NAC,:!6 because in his function as S~"Cretary Gcneral
it was his respoosibility to maintain good working-relations among the
member states, The Alliance Council's first statement in the Declaration was
a clear opposition to Khrushchev's claims: '[n)o State has the right to
withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements' was a clear
reference to the binding nature of international treaties, The possibility of the
USSR handing over its rights over Berlin to the GDR government 'can in no
way deprive thc other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its
nbligations'," Further, NATO as a whole supported the communique issued
by thc triwnvirate and the FRG 011 their status and rights in Berlin two days
earlier - a communique that had been published without prior cOllsultation
with NATO whose members wanted to release a concerted commllllique,"
The Declaration further recalled the Alliance's members consent
to 'the security and welfare of Berlin', meaning to reject any solution 'which
jeopardized thc right of the three Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long
as their responsibilities require it' and its commitment to 'assurc freedom of
communication betwccn that city and the free world',.N No doubt, 'free
world' meam the Western, democracy-based COlllltries, and presumably, all
NATO members in particular, The Declaration finally legitimised the
political system of their member countries by highlighting that 'the two-
million inhabifants of West Berlin have just reaffinned in a free vote their
o~'erwhelmingapproval and support for that positiOll'. demonstrating thereby
that NATO operated highly conscnsual within its OV>Tl structures and did not
exercise coercion like the Soviet UniOll which aeted without the democratic
consent of the people. NAC recalled in the Dcdaration'S end that 'the
"r."~Il<,,,i~.'la~od. rrobl<..... qu; .. po_." Com<;Id< rOTAN, I"""_"m.u
CollOge d< O<km< d< rOTAN: 13 J.". 19~9 "' Spuk. La ~mi< ",rop«ffl>< ""'/an'iq", ,i<' P",,/.
l/,omSp""'t t911_/9-!, <d, by """H, Sm<l.(llnm<lo. 1980). ,..,l2, P\'I699-7fJ7," p.700,
"'Declara';"" 0. ~I;o' .16 Oct. 1958 (h!,p... '..........uawinl."~i'.,."~
ll":l" mm) (29 Mar, 2010,
" ·MelOOr-.odum of"",we.",'"., m;,,;"eriol """""'10 of the North A'Io"'", co"",;r, I~ lJoocember
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Western Powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready 10 examine this
problem, as well as those of European security and disannamcnt. They arc
still ready to discuss all these problems.' Through this last statement NAC
clearlyaffinned its and the three Western allies' finn position on Berlin and
invited the Soviet Union to mutual cOIl5uhation - both 011 the Berlin Crisis
but also on mauers going beyood the city's future alone, as for example the
possibility of a reuniHed Gennany. Spaak was highly content wilh the
collective declaration: the 10lle was 'ex/remem",,1 ferme' but at the same time
'"ullemO'IlI plVlv,:anle,.J() If the three allies were to give up Berlin, the
consequence would have been, according [0 him, 'la premiere <!tape de la
disagregarion definitil'e de l'Occident'.)' For Spaak. no policy was
acceptable that 'omimerail le depart d'Europe les trollpeS americaines' -
since they seem to have been the guarantor of a peaceful and prosperous
Western Europe, One can presume that this conviction was one reason why
he let the Americans dominate NATO and disregard the organisatioo's
consultation habit. Although he doubted that the Soviet Union really wanted
to provoke a third world ""'ai", he legitimised NATO's tinn positioo because
'la diplomatie savii!liqlle est 1111 pell obligee de jOller ({I'ec le feu et, par
consequent. la diploma/ie O/.'cidemale allssi'l: - buT emphasized the optioo of
a diplomatic solution of the crisis,
On 31 December 1958, the thl'\X Western allies replied in
individual notes to the USSR's note after quadripartite consultations and draft
discussions on 29 December 1958.)' The notes received the consem of
NATO.J.< The Federal Repllhlic of Gcnnany sent its note on 5 January 1959,
The US govenUllent again emphasized the impossibility of a unilateral
abstemion from lhe Soviet Union's commitmcms to Berlin, The Unik-d
States made its point clear that the treaties in force were 'binding upon all of
the signatories so long as they have not been replaced by othen; following
so P.u~He ...; Spook. tu IP"""-I! prohl"..... P. 700,
)J lbid.. p. 7<12.
" Spaa/;, L.. KrondJ prohlii""', p, 706.
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free negotiations'.)! Nevertheless. the US government sho....-ed aJl awareness
of the fact that it 'cannot prevent the Soviet Government from announcing
the tennination of its o....n authority in the quadripartite regime in the sector
which it occupies in the city of Bertin'. Bearing this in mind, the US stated
that it would not have accepted the unilateral tennination of any treaty
regarding the four powcr administIatiOll of Berlin because 'such action on the
part of the Soviet Govemmelll would have no legal basis, since the
agreements can only be tetminated by mutual consent:'" Since the US
regarded the FRG as the only legitimate state, it could not recognise the
"other" Gennan state. If the Soviet Union was interested in consultatiOlls, the
US goal would be 'to discuss the question of Berlin in the wider framework
of negotiations for a solution of the Gennan problem as well as that of
European security'.
This response note seeks cooperation with the USSR and does not
contain aJlY belligerent elements that the US was willing to go beyond verbal
deterrence. As NUnlist argues NATO's double-strategy ofa finn position on
the matter and the offer of cooperation and diplomacy influenced both the
USA's official response and that of the other three Western powers.17
Presumably, Spaak's influence on calling the four NATO members to
consultations within the Alliance produced a common positiOll. Nevertheless.
thc fact that the four Western allies imposed their view on the maller in the
premature sending of their communique without consulting NATO has to be
taken inlO cOJlsidcT3tion. Disregarding the habil of consultation did not end
with thc release of the communique of 14 December 1958, the Declaration on
Berlin or the four Weslern powers' notes. The four pursued their "individual"
way on thc matter of creating cOlltingency plans for Berlin. kno"'n under the
operational name of"L1VE OAK".
LIVE OAK__ (}lwdrifXIrlile Contingency Plwmingfor Berlin
J' 'N"" &om I.. Unilod S"'''''o to. So"i<1 Union on 1h< ...... ofBorlin md 11>< p",;.,lom
AlV""""'''''·. 31 o...cmb« 19~5. P. S74,
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On 4 April 1959, thc three Western Powers issued a Berlin
contingellcy planning called the 'Tripanitc Basic Paper'. lbe previous four
months had been marked by tripartite consultations and the harassment of a
US convoy by SovIet soldiers in February." The mission of the contiogcncy
planning was the Allies' overall 'determination to maintain lheir free acccss'
10 Berlin and, in order 10 meet this aim, requestcd their respective military
aUlhorilies 10 'plan quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of
a kind which will nOt Create public alann bUl which will be detectable by
Soviet intelligence' ,'" 'Quiet' and 'precautionary' presumably hims at NATO
which, in the beginning, was to be kept out of the group's military plans..... A
tripanite staff for Berlin COlIlingency planning was to be eslablished in Paris
under the supervision of US-General Norstad, US Commander in Chief
Europe (USCINCEUR) and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SAUCEUR) in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE)... I Norslad, however, did not exercis<: an actual command amhority:
all LIVE OAK plans and decisions were subject to the approval of lhe
powers involved.
The aClual limeframe within which LIVE OAK had to establish
contingency plans for Berlin in case of a military conflict "'ith lhe Soviet
Union and the mandate of this sub-organisation "'lIS unclear. The initial
estimation was that it would take about six to eight weeks to complele lhe
plallS:1 Againsl Nortstad's inlentions, it was decided that the three states that
,. r", 0<I<I.ile4 .""I~.is ofll>< <OII>ull.,ion> kodins to tn. Tr1>anit' &SO< P..,.r .... Gr<¥"'Y W,
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W. Eplo:~ to<l). I"'~"",,;_d CO/;/ W,'I" ",m"lt), ,,,:o'vh and hj,,"'J'; pro('u'#nx3 -if'M In''''''''iond
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fOl1lloo LIVE OAK would receive instruetiOlls from their national authorities.
LIVE OAK was reduced to an executive instrument carrying out what was
planned ",thin tripartite consultations.
[n a memorandum by Norstad dated [4 Apri[ 1959, part of a
previously classified "lOp secret" letter from SHAPE to the Department of
State and therein referred to as 'an infonnally-agreed charter for the Berlin
contingency military effort':' NOTStad outlined how to operate Berlin
contingency planning. He recommended that a 'liaison will be established
"ith the Gertllan Federal Republic.' [t was not put into effect until more than
two years later, in August 196[ and. consequently, LIVE OAK's political
governing body, the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington. D.e.,
then beeame quadripartite. Further. he demanded that 'political guidance be
available for the LIVE OAK staff which 'can be made available to the staff
as a whole, but the senior officers may be used as national representatives for
this purpose'. The latter statement referred TO the decisional authority of all
three states and took illlo consideration the explicit character of cooperation
among national governmellls. In panicular, 'Anglo-American differenccs'
and "the diffidence of the French' who had differenT views concerning thc
cstablishmcnt of the planning staff should have been accommodated.
Concerning France, The letter which accompanied Norstad's
memorandum stated that France was asking for 'coordination' and not
'intcgration·. presumably to emphasiz.c their vicw on the operation as one of
cooperating staTes and nOl as states contribUTing to a US mililary operation."
In the case Britain, the diffcrences were caused by different assessments of
The actual risk a Soviet threat posed. 1nl' UK was reluctant to engage in a war
over Berlin, espeeially if the possible use of nuclear weapons was involved.
because. as Lord MounTbatlen expressed iT. 'such a STep would involve TbI'
., ·Il..yroond L. Thur..on to Fo}' D. Koh.... ·• 20 Ar>r 1959 (.... pJln>orchin,<had,,)d.ooml (29 Mot.
201O~
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destruction of OI.Ir land. while for the United States [ .. ] global war might
only involve the destruction of a few cities'."
With the administrative structures set. LIVE OAK started drafting
plans how (0 react if the Soviets used force !HI allied troops accessing
Berlin."" The firsl measures were drafted on 14 May 1959 and approwd by
the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group:
Course A. a probe that would Slop if cOIlfronteJ with Soviet or F..asl
German obstacles; Course B.• pro!><: who.. personnel would attempt to
remove such obstacles but would Slop if the S<JvielS or East Geml3f1S
sho".-ed a willingness to """ force; aod Cou= C•• pm"" with allached
engineering equiprnem to o''''''ome olm.des widlOUllhc u,," ufwea""ns
(except for self-defense),"
A[Though This approach can be judged as dra\\ll-back rather than aggressive
towards SovieT harassment. The BriTish were pointing TO one aspe<:t
undt'r1ying the whole issue: What happened if The SOViCTS responded
miliTarily to any of these Allied probes? The BriTish go\'cnunent saw 'no
point in trying TO use further military force on Thc ground in an atTempt to
resTore access' and was able to include This point of view in a second draft
sTudy called "More Elaborate Military Measures', which was released in mid-
June 1959. Norstad. following the US' hard-line in arguing with the Soviets.
supported a more deterrent position in making the Allies' firm point of view
On Berlin clear to the Soviets in case of aggression against an)' of the Allies'
troops: 'convince the USSR of the detenninatioo of Thc Three Powers to
maintain their lawful rights even at the risk of war, and to exclude the
possibility of a sulX:essful Sovict bluff. ,41
The Ber[in contingency pllllming was a constant work in progress
UnTil 1961. Other measures to guarantee the Western Powers' aceess 10
Berlin. besides ground access plans. included an airlift (OperaTion QBAL) 10
" (iI<d .ft" n.o.., l<foi'ot<lIion, P'""",iaft, or c"",IIIlation.'. P. SS,
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supply West Berlin's population as well as air and naval reinforccments"·
Interestingly. only the use of convcntional weapons \I'3S integrated. the use of
nuclear weapons Ihat could have been provided by the US was not taken into
Ihe cataloguc of counter·measures..\<) Although the LIVE OAK planning slaff
did establish a reactive contingency plan in case of Soviet aggression. they
did not have to carry it out: at the end of May 1959. Khrushchev's Berlin
ultimatum expired without the realisation ofhis threat to hand over the Soviet
Union's responsibilities to the GDR. Khrushchev confinned to Eisenhower
'that there WllS no longer an)" "time limit within which he would sigtl a
Soviet-ElIst German pellce treaty'··.l' Although there was a 'low level of
tension' in the Berlin question.J2 Norstad did not consent to the dissolution of
the LIVE OAK planning staff once their mission had been accomplished. He
opposed the disbanding because he wanted 'to keep it in existcnce so as not
to lose thc pool ofspct;ializcd knowledge thal had becn built Up',Jl His wish
seems to have been lIpproved: since 'cOllcem about possible Soviet moves 10
reduce Allied access rights never went away completely'.s.< a reduced LIVE
OAK staff kept on planning 1I division-sized tripartite operation during
1960.1\ When, on 4 June 1961. Khrushchev renewed his demand for pellce
agreemcnts to sellle the Gennan question lInd to turn Berlin into a 'Free City'
"ithin a six momh timeframe.l<> thc Berlin Crisis reawllkened and provcd
Norstad ri!¥it to have kept LIVE OAK read)" at a standing order. He re.
enlarged the orglIIIisation's stllff and obtaincd thc consent of the three
governments to direct tripartite operations themself.
Gregory Pedlow argued that LIVE OAK. firstly, was 'a
significant crisis managcment instrument' and. secondly. 'a vCI)' successful
.. Pedlo"'.·Th= ...., ror BerHn', p. IXI: l'e<llo.... •...llied er;';, _~em<nI'.PI' 97.100.
.. M.Ioney. NQ/jdllpldn,,"1:..fUr &rlin. p. 5,
'1 Pedlo". 'T!lr« !>ai, ror Bertin'. p. t 79
" tbid.. p. IN: I'e<llow. 'AlIied er;';' _n>gemcnt". p. too.
". 'T!lr« hol, ror Berlin'. p. 17'l.
"Ibid.• p. 100,
" Podl",..,. 'Allied er;';' mallaiement·. p. IN.
,. ·Aio.Ie--M<moin: from "'" So..'i<! Unioo '0 ''''' Unit<'d Su,., "" ''''' GclTTlOn Qu<>tioo...<><led by
Cho"men Khr",,",,,,,, ,,, Pn:.idcnt Kcnnedy .. vicn... ·. 4 J""" 1961 in lJo<wrwnu OIl Gm."",,·. pp
729-32.
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instrument of multinatiOllalil)".l1 The latter assessment certainly secms
correct because all three, latcr all four, states' considerations were taken into
account and the Ambassadorial Group worked together on an apparently
equal lcvet and through cOIIsultations, But where did NATO come into the
picture? The four Western Powers deliberately left NATO OUI of its Berlin
contingency plalUling." France, the UK, and the US established reactive
measures to confront possible Soviet military strikes during this Berlin Crisis
on the basis of their occupying rights in Bcrlin. The dominant United States
had to maintain its credibilil)' as a leading world power that was. as a lasl
resort, willing and able to fight for its position. The Eisenhower
administration seems to have had an imponant ally in Gcneral Norstad who
was ....illing to pursue the US hard-line position within the muhinmional
LIVE OAK. It can be judged as the most concrete military response
instrument establishoo during this Berlin Crisis. Howcver, NATO was left
out of il. This raises again the qu<:stiOll of its position in the case of a military
interventiOll due to article 5 oflhe NATO treal)' and the Alliance's declared
support to assure the Three Western Powers' rights in their Berlin sectors.
Although Khrushchev did not manage to change the Four Power
status on Berlin, hc surely did thoroughly trouble the functioning of NATO.
The Berlin Crisis was a test for the Alliance's credibility, finnness and its
ability to speak unanimously. 111c crisis depicts how the intern3lional
organisation NATO malfunctions when member states are not equals at the
negotiating table and, as Stikker put it. 'too many m<:mbcrs of NATO
attached greater value to certain political principles than 10 the overriding
idea of the Alliance'." 111is captures very well Ihe essence of Ihe Wesl<:m
crisis management. The US under the Eisenhower administration, priocipally
supponed by its 'satellites' Francc. Grcat Britain. and West Germany,611 was
acting wilh an attitude characterizcd as brinkmanship: ·the ability to get to
" l'edlow••Allied Cr;,;, M'""i,,,,,,nt". p. 110,
"Niinli>t. NATO "oo/lie &rUnlriu. p. 218
" Christian N"""h ·tnl<> ''''' t%Os: NATO', ,ole in ...._"'. ,.. "'tat ...... 1958-63'. in Anrlre..
WCIIlIcr. Cbri>lim N list ond Anna Lochc-r {odo).ThmlfOnw/ng NA TO in ,'" O~JW... (N.... Yu"".
20071. p. N .
.. Thi< lCfm i< l6Cd by Shal, ond Gear..... Editor. lntrod""io.. p. xi..·.
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the verge v.ithout getting into the war: as John Foster Dulles e:<plained i1.· '
Eisenhower chose escalation: he did test the firmness of Khrushchev's
demands, installed measures 10 probe the Soviet Union's military
dedsiveness, and included the risk of an 'atomic holocaust'."" Not without
reason do some scholar's judge the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961 as 'prelude to
World War 1I1'.OJ Blufling.though, is part of this game theory as well: 'You
have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war', as
Dulles e:<presscd it. An interesting questiOll, though probably very difficult to
measure, is how much bluffing was involved in Khrushchev's demands and
Eisenhower's reactions. How 'hot' was the Cold War during the Berlin
Crisis?
'Through the clandestine organisation LIVE OAK and Eisenhower's
meeting with Khrushchev at Camp David in September 1959, leaving Oll!
NATO and deliberately disregarding the organisation's habit of consultation
became especially obvious. Though it did not weaken the Alliancc's finn
stance on the Berlin matter, the US heavily dominated NATO's position OIl
which approach to adopt regarding Khrushchev - initially the position of
detem:ncc, later the position of coexistence. Spaak tried to maintain good
working relatiOlls among the member Slates and, fearing the Americans
leaving Europe alone against thc threat posed by the USSR, to alT"dnge the
member states behind Eisenhower's superpower politics. Presumably, the
presence of American troops in Europe convinced the continental European
NATO member states to consent to Eisenhower's policy of deterrence.
Britain's reluctance to wage a costly v.'ar o"er Gennany supponed their cause
to choose diplomacy over military confrontation. In the Declaration on
Berlin, they did manage to intrOOuce the PQssibility of diplomacy with
Khmshchev, The double strategy of military deterrence and diplomacy then
shifted under the Kennedy administration towards a preference for bilateral
., 'Uproar Q'-ef' brink' in un: Moga=''''"' ~3 Jo". 1956 (h!.Iw'.'n~" I"'" wID.'I;mr.,lIOg,>li!!<·.ol<k:
{I ~I i I ~~I ;16 ," ","\Il (2~M". ~OIO~
., The ''''''' n'" ""'" by John F. K<nnody. 'R<p<>n to the Nation "" the I\<flin et;';". ~~ Juty t96t in
John F. Kennody, To Tum ,'" n,t<. by John W. (;.ror.." (<<1.) (l.<>r<Ion. 1\l62~ pp tss-n. at po t93,
oJ O'....nd Dnid 11<IIe" n.. 8..n~(",;'i, 1"'"1"''''0 """,,Id N'", 1fI'(o..b)", cr, 1\1(1): Sl\ok<.nd
0<2t>nn.l;d."". lnl"",,",lion. p...
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negoti31ions and conflict management with the Soviet UniOll. thereby
severely damaging cooperation and confidence 'Wilhio NATO. Additionally.
de Gaulle's rising demands for a more imponant French (lQsition cuu&u
more imra-alliance frictions. "''hill.' Eisenhower could still integrate France in
quadripanile contingency planning for Berlin, calls for more influence in
international relations - and thereby challenging the US leadership - rose
from the French during Kcnnedy's presidency.... Al the end of the Berlin
Crisis, the consensual cooperation seeking policy of NATO as well as the
cooperation among the Western four had changed completely. if nOI to say
was damaged because of the inequality of member states. non-consultation,
and, in the case of France, even non-cooperation. Spaak's vision of an
"Atlantic Community". that. starting tTom NATO, cooperated nm only
militarily but politically and economically, 100, v.'aS certainly out of reach
due to lite 'cycles of supell'Ower detente' m the end of the Second Berlin
Crisis.'" In his farewell address, SP.1ak pointed out thm upon' Knmedy el de
Gaulfe, c'e,l! d'eux que depend le s/lcces 011 le die/in de /'Allimu:e
"I/antique' and had to deal with three major issues: 'des armes alomiques,
{. ..} /a consul/arion poli/iqlle 1.'1 {. ..J et fa solidarili economique'.'" He
paraphrased the persisting problem about the balance of power and equalily
v.ithin the Alliance as following: 'Quatre 011 cinq agis.wml [KIllr le comple de
101« les oil/res? Pew-trre. Mais les GOllw:rnl.'m..nts sont-i/., pri:ls iJ ,me wile
delegalion d'""lorile? On en diSClllera encore longlemps:·l Even Spaak, m
the end of his time as NATO Secretary Gener'31, seemed to have doubted the
possibilily of achiC'.'ing an Alliance of equals - the principle he persistently
had fought for during his mandme and which declined in the course of events
during the second Berlin Crisis.
.. E""",.. lIy. F......,., ,,·itMre,,"/i-om NATO in 1%6.
., N"""I;>I. ''''0 ,'" 196Ih. p. 3~.
.. I'o"l-ll"",; Spuk. 'Au I'<,..,it OTA."I', F.b, t\l6t in Sopaak. La ".."';ulJropi."""., ""tmiNjue. vol
J, pp 79I,~. h<re p. 794f
., Ibid.. po 79~"
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